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Drawing on a wide variety of historical and literary sources, this thesis argues that the 
First World War transformed British perceptions of Mesopotamia, distancing it from 
long-established associations with myth, antiquity and fable and relating it instead to 
Britain’s wartime experiences and potential post-war choices. The first chapter 
examines pre-war perceptions of Mesopotamia. Through an analysis of British travel 
writing and journalism from the years 1907-1914, it locates early twentieth-century 
British perceptions of Mesopotamia within the well-established tradition of travel to, 
and writing about, Arabia. Focusing on accounts of the siege of Kut (December 1915 - 
April 1916) – one of the defining episodes of the Mesopotamian campaign – the 
second chapter explores the impact of the first two years of the war on British 
perceptions of Mesopotamia. In particular, this chapter asks what role discourses of 
race and civilization played in shaping British reactions to the ‘cradle of civilization’ and 
to the Indian servicemen serving alongside them.  Through a close examination of the 
archives of the Mesopotamia Commission, Chapter Three investigates the significance 
of ‘British prestige in the East’ in the conduct of the Mesopotamian campaign, 
particularly in relation to events leading to the siege of Kut.  In order to push north to 
Baghdad and beyond in the final two years of the war, British commanders built an 
infrastructure that transformed Mesopotamia. Chapter Four looks at the impact of the 
modern in a region defined for many Britons by its associations with ancient or biblical 
sites and civilizations. The final chapter examines the years between the Armistice of 
Mudros and the coronation of Faisal. Looking closely at media and fictional accounts of 
the revolt of 1920, it traces the impact of both pre-war and wartime conceptions of 
Mesopotamia upon representations of the region in these pivotal years.   
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On 23 August 1921, The Times announced the coronation of King Faisal I of Iraq to its 
readers: ‘To-day’, the paper proclaimed, ‘the EMIR FEISAL is to be crowned King of 
Mesopotamia, or Irak, as the territory is now officially described. Through his 
coronation a new Arab State will be constituted.’1 This thesis charts changing British 
perceptions of Mesopotamia from the years preceding the First World War until the 
creation of the ‘new Arab State’ under British auspices. Donald Maxwell’s account of 
his time as an official war artist in Mesopotamia, A Dweller in Mesopotamia: Being the 
Adventures of an Official War Artist in the Garden of Eden, was published in 1921 – the 
year in which Mesopotamia ceased to be known by that name in Britain. Reflecting on 
the changes brought about by the British occupation of ‘the Garden of Eden’, Maxwell 
noted that ‘before the war *...+ Mesopotamia was a more distant land than it is to-
day’.2 This thesis argues that the First World War brought Mesopotamia closer to 
Britons, removing it from long-entrenched associations with myth, antiquity and 
legend and locating it, instead, in Britain’s wartime experiences and post-war politics. 
  The first chapter looks at how Mesopotamia was envisaged in Britain 
between the years 1907 and 1914 and explores the consequences of the British affinity 
with Arabia, which Katherine Tidrick identifies in her history of the concept of the Arab 
in Britain: Heart Beguiling Araby: The English Romance with Arabia (1981). Tidrick 
attributes this familiarity to ‘two books which occupied a prominent place in the 
reading of every literate nineteenth-century child – the Bible and the Arabian Nights’.3 
This chapter outlines the ways in which Mesopotamia was represented in Britain in 
contemporary editions of the Arabian Nights stories, as well as in accounts of 
Mesopotamia by travellers, Arabists and journalists. It argues that long-entrenched 
perceptions of Mesopotamia as the seat of ancient empires, or even as the Garden of 
Eden itself, served as a lens through which British travellers saw and represented the 
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 Donald Maxwell, A Dweller in Mesopotamia: Being the Adventures of an Official War Artist in the 
Garden of Eden (London: John Lane, 1921), p. 16. 
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region in these pre-war years. Their disappointment in the simplicity of the place they 
believed to be the cradle of their own civilization led them to create a vision of 
Mesopotamia and of its peoples as frozen at an earlier phase of their evolution.  
In examining the perceptions of British travellers to Mesopotamia in the 
early twentieth century, Priya Satia’s doctoral thesis ‘The Secret Center: Arabia *sic.+ 
Intelligence in British Culture and Politics, 1900-1932’4 and James Canton’s doctoral 
thesis ‘From Cairo to Baghdad: British Travel Writing on Arabia, 1882–2003’5 have 
some shared interests with my own research.  Both define Arabia broadly to include 
the Mesopotamian provinces or vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. While many of 
those whose journeys form part of Canton and Satia’s investigations also play an 
important role in the arguments that follow, the narrower focus of my study has often 
resulted in a different engagement with the same sources.  
As I will discuss, there was debate in this period over the inclusion of all 
three Mesopotamian provinces in some definitions of Arabia. This is unsurprising given 
changing conceptions of Arabia itself. As a result of shifting definitions of the term, 
Satia and Tidrick conclude that Arabia was less a tangible place, locatable on a map 
than a cultural signifier. Satia notes that ‘Arabia was a geographic and cultural 
imaginary’,6 and Tidrick describes Arabia as ‘a country of the mind more real than any 
place on a map’.7  Though Tidrick sets her theoretical approach apart from that of 
Edward Said in Orientalism (1978),8 in Satia and Tidrick’s insistence on the lack of 
specificity of the term ‘Arabia’, and in their assertion that the term tells us more about 
the British travellers who used it, than it does cartographically about the region, the 
overlaps between their conclusions and Said’s thesis are clear.9   
It is impossible to write about the Middle East without drawing on 
Edward Said’s seminal work, and, particularly in Chapter One of this thesis, the 
4 Priya Satia, ‘The Secret Center: Arabia Intelligence in British Culture and Politics, 1900–1932’ 
(unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, 2004). 
5 James Canton, ‘From Cairo to Baghdad: British Travel Writing on Arabia, 1882–2003’ (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Essex, 2008). 
6
 Satia, ‘The Secret Center’, p. 6. 
7
 Tidrick, p. 37. 
8
 Edward W. Said, Orientalism [1978](London: Penguin Books, 2003) 
9
 Tidrick writes: ‘I do not attempt to argue, as Edward Said does in his controversial study Orientalism, 
published shortly after the present book was completed, that writers on the Middle East are primarily to 
be understood as prisoners of an institutionalized system of discourse which makes it impossible for 
them to regard Orientals as human beings like themselves. Their faults were legion, but more various 
and more interesting.’ Tidrick, p. 2.  
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influence of Said’s Orientalism is palpable. In the 30 years since the publication of his 
groundbreaking study, Said’s conclusions have been criticised by many scholars; it has 
been pointed out that the force of Said’s argument painted a black and white picture 
of the relationship between the west and its Orient where shades of grey must surely 
have existed.10 Whilst accepting much of the criticism of Orientalism, I have often been 
surprised by the extent to which accounts I examine fit the model Said outlines: the 
nuances that scholars have called for are uncannily scarce in some of the 
representations of Mesopotamia I trace in the following chapters. However, there are 
many occasions where my conclusions diverge from Said’s ideas.   
My interest is in the very specificity of the idea of Mesopotamia during 
this period.  I argue, contrary to some of Satia’s conclusions, that while the inscrutable 
mysteries that surrounded Mesopotamia held an undeniable attraction for many of 
the individuals whose journeys I trace, these travellers also sought Mesopotamia out 
for its defining landmarks and history. Although it was undoubtedly located within 
broader categories such as the East or Orient, Mesopotamia had many attractions 
which made it a desirable travel destination in and of itself. Even those who, like 
Gertrude Bell, loved its uncharted deserts visited Mesopotamia for sites that could not 
be found elsewhere. Whether they went in search of Nineveh or the Arch of 
Ctesiphon; the remains of Abbasid Baghdad; to wander through the land of the 
Arabian Nights; to follow in the footsteps of Roman or Hellenic emperors, or to see the 
site of the Garden of Eden, travellers in the early twentieth century sought 
Mesopotamia out not merely because it may or may not have formed a part of Arabia, 
a seemingly indefinable place, but because it held attractions and significance in its 
own right.  
 To say this is not, of course, to deny the discourses of power at play in 
the encounters this thesis examines; here Mary Louise Pratt’s term ‘contact zones’ has 
proved immensely useful in helping to understand how the interaction between 
Britons and Mesopotamia ‘created’ different versions of the region in the years 1907-
10
 Criticism responding to Said’s Orientalism is extensive. See for example: Aijaz Ahmed, In Theory, 
Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1992); Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1994); James Clifford, ‘On Orientalism’ in The Predicament of Culture 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997 [1988]); Bernard Lewis, ‘The Question of 
Orientalism,’ New York Review of Books, 24 June, 1982, pp. 49-56 and Robert Young, White Mythologies: 
Writing History and the West (London and New York: Routldge, 1990).  
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1921.11 Nor do I mean to suggest that the borders of Mesopotamia itself were stable, 
or specifically defined in this period. What, therefore, did commentators mean when 
they wrote of ‘Mesopotamia’ in the early twentieth century? 
Definitions of Mesopotamia 
British travellers and commentators conceived of Mesopotamia as a 
geographically and culturally specific place, but also as part of a much greater East or 
Orient. When they referred to Mesopotamia, they were describing an area that 
stretched from the Persian Gulf to the borders of Persia, Syria and Asia Minor. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the name Mesopotamia derives from the 
Greek for ‘between rivers’ or ‘between the rivers’; it is the second of these translations 
that is most often cited.  The OED defines Mesopotamia as ‘a region in south-west Asia 
between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, now in Iraq, site of the civilizations of Sumer, 
Babylon, and Assyria’, and notes that the word Mesopotamia ‘occurs as a place name 
in English contexts from Old English onwards’. In the years 1900 - 1914, it was used 
alongside more specific terms such as the Jazirah, which denoted the northern part of 
Mesopotamia, and Irak or Irak Arabi stretching south to the Persian Gulf, and much 
broader terms such as the Orient, the East or Arabia.  
In a paper titled ‘Journeys in North Mesopotamia’, the traveller and 
politician who would give his name to the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement, Sir Mark 
Sykes, used very specific terminology to refer to Mesopotamia, and to the Jazirah 
within it, but also more general terms such as the Orient. Sykes argued that in 
Mesopotamia ‘there was never any recrudescence of stable imperial power which is 
absolutely necessary for the development of prosperity in an Oriental country’.12 
Sykes’s paper, which was given at the Royal Geographical Society on 11 March, 1907 
and published later that year in the Society’s journal, was almost entirely devoted to 
locating and defining Mesopotamia geographically, historically and anthropologically, 
11
 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
12
Mark Sykes, ‘Journeys in North Mesopotamia’, The Geographical Journal, 30, (1907), 237-254. (p. 246). 
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yet he alternated between the use of very specific terms and broad generalisations 
about Mesopotamia as an ‘Oriental country’.  
It is unclear whether Mesopotamia was actually located within Arabia in 
this period. The 1911 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica defined Arabia in a way 
that excludes parts of Mesopotamia: 
A peninsula in the South-West of Asia, lying between 34° 30’ and 12° 45’ and 60 
E., is bounded W. and E. by the gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. Its northern 
or land boundary is more difficult  to define; most authorities, however, agree 
in taking it from El Arish on the Mediterranean, along the southern border of 
Palestine, between the dead sea and the gulf of Akaba, then bending 
northwards along the Syrian border nearly to Tadmur, thence eastwards to the 
edge of the Euphrates valley near Anah, and thence south-east to the mouth of 
the Shat el Arab at the head of the Persian gulf – the boundary so defined 
includes the northern desert, which belongs geographically to Arabia rather 
than to Syria; while on the same grounds lower Mesopotamia and Irak, 
although occupied by an Arab population, are excluded.13  
However, as James Canton notes, there appears also to have been a general 
understanding of the term Arabia as denoting those lands populated by Arabs, thus 
including Mesopotamia.14 Some maps of Arabia from this period, such as Captain 
Leachman’s ‘Map of North East Arabia Showing the Routes of Captain G. E. Leachman,’ 
indicate that Mesopotamia was definitively located in Arabia. This map, dated 1910, 
clearly includes vast swathes of Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to north of 
Baghdad unambiguously labelled ‘Irak Arabi’.15  
[PTO] 
13‘
Arabia’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information, 
11th edn (1911) 
14
 Canton, p. 3. 
15
 Cited in: G. E. Leachman, ‘A Journey in North Eastern Arabia’ The Geographical Journal, 37 (1911), 
265-274.
13 
Figure 1 ‘Map of North East Arabia Showing the Routes of Captain G. E. Leachman’. 
Mrs. Hume-Griffith, a missionary who accompanied her husband to the Middle East, 
also located Mesopotamia within Arabia. Hume-Griffith wrote several accounts of their 
time in the region, in which she reflected on the lives of the women of what she 
14 
termed the East. Her 1909 book titled  Behind the Veil in Persia and Turkish Arabia: An 
Account of An Englishwoman’s Eight Years’ Residence Amongst the Women of the East 
has many chapters devoted to Mesopotamia.16 
 Other sources, however, are more ambiguous, and although they do 
not overtly exclude southern Mesopotamia, it is unclear whether they entirely include 
it. Captain Fraser Hunter’s ‘Map of Arabia and the Persian Gulf’ was published in 1910 
as part of the Indian Survey. Hunter’s Notes on the Map of Arabia and the Persian Gulf: 
With a General Index of Place Names on the Map includes both ‘Basrah’ and Baghdad 
and gives their locations on ‘the map of Arabia’.17 Although the map includes lower 
Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to Baghdad, since it also includes Persia and labels 
Mesopotamia clearly, it is difficult to tell whether Mesopotamia is part of Arabia or 
simply adjacent to it. An official War Office ‘Sketch Map of Arabia’ dated 1906 also 
includes the same portion of Mesopotamia. However, the smaller ‘Map of Koweit and 
Surrounding Country’, illustrated on the same document and reproduced below, 
clearly distinguished Mesopotamia as part of ‘Turkey in Asia’.18  
Figure 2. Inset of ‘Map of Koweit and Surrounding Country’. 
16
M. E. Hume-Griffith, Behind the Veil in Persia and Turkish Arabia: An Account of An Englishwoman’s
Eight Years’ Residence Amongst the Women of the East (London: Seeley & Co, 1909). 
17
 Captain Fraser Hunter, Notes on the Map of Arabia and the Persian Gulf: With a  General Index of 
Place Names on the Map (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1910), pp. 31 and 25 
respectively. 
18
 War Office *Intelligence Division+, ‘Sketch Map of Arabia’, IDWO 1835, Scale 1:7 500 000. Inset of ‘Map 
of Koweit and Surrounding Country’ at 1:2,027,520 (London: War Office Intelligence Division, 1906). 
[Held at British Library, Maps MOD IDWO 1835] 
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Another geographical descriptor that included Mesopotamia was the 
Near or Nearer East: Zachary Lockman argues that this term came into use because ‘in 
the nineteenth century many Europeans *…+ had come to regard ‘the orient’ as too 
broad a category.’19 The archaeologist and traveller David George Hogarth devoted 
over half of a book titled The Nearer East to discussions of Mesopotamia and described 
it as:  
A term of current fashion for a region which our grandfathers were content to 
call simply The East. Its area is generally understood to coincide with those 
classic lands, historically the most interesting on the surface of the globe, which 
lie about the eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea; but few probably could 
say off-hand where should be the limits and why.20  
Hogarth suggests that the referent ‘Nearer East’ was arbitrarily assigned and did not 
serve to clarify the borders of the region: the Nearer East was a term that denoted a 
portion of what would once have simply been the East.  
Lockman describes how the term Near East was itself replaced by the 
more specific Middle East in the early twentieth century. The Middle East was a term 
‘coined in 1902 by the noted American military historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan. *…+ 
Mahan demarcated a Middle East which he regarded as stretching from Arabia all the 
way across Persia and Afghanistan to the borders of today’s Pakistan’.21 The term was 
popularised by The Times’ correspondent in Tehran, Valentine Chirol. 22 In his book The 
Middle East Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence, Chirol defined the 
Middle East as ‘the regions of Asia which extend to the borders of India or command 
the approaches to India, and which are consequently bound up with the problems of 
Indian political as well as military defence’.23 For Chirol, the primary significance of the 
‘Middle East’ was its relationship to India. Despite his insistence on the area’s 
importance, however, the term ‘Middle East’ was not widely used by other 
commentators on Mesopotamia during this period.  
19
Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2004), pp. 96-7. 
20




Lockman, p. 97. See also Billie Melman, ‘The Middle East/ Arabia: “The Cradle of Islam”’ in The
Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing, ed. by Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 105-121. 
23
 Valentine Chirol, The Middle East Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence (London: John 
Murray, 1903), pp. 4-5.  
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  The growing specificity of terms to describe what we still call the Middle 
East suggests that the turn of the century saw a growth in interest in the area by 
western commentators. Such an increase in scholarship, or commentary, on the 
Middle East would have necessitated a more accurate terminology with which to refer 
to the lands that had hitherto simply been understood as the Orient, East or Arabia.  
 
 
The Mesopotamian Campaign 
 
  The First World War was the starting place for my interest in this 
project. Mesopotamia was always seen as a side-show of the First World War; for 
Liddell Hart, the campaign was nothing more than ‘a fresh diversion of force from the 
centre of military gravity’.24 Perhaps as a result, where the Mesopotamian campaigns 
are mentioned in modern histories of the First World War, the siege of Kut is the 
defining, or in some cases the only, event represented.  
  The siege is the focus of the few pages that Hew Strachan devotes to 
the actions of British forces in Mesopotamia in his The First World War: A New 
Illustrated History.25 It is likewise the centrepiece of Martin Gilbert’s account of British 
and Indian forces in Mesopotamia. Gilbert’s First World War details Indian 
Expeditionary Force D’s progress before Townshend’s attempt on Baghdad and their 
subsequent capture of the city in 1917, but  the focus of his treatment of the campaign 
is the siege of Kut, and the ill fate of those men who were taken into captivity after the 
surrender of April 1916. 26 Mesopotamia is mentioned in passing in two sentences in 
Niall Ferguson’s history of the war, The Pity of War. He stresses that the deployment of 
British forces anywhere but to the Western Front was a ‘perilous’ gamble.27 Robert 
Jones’s article ‘Kut’ is the only reference to Mesopotamia in Cowley’s The Great War.28 
The focus of John Morrow’s The Great War: An Imperial History is on the impact of the 
war on the European empires. His treatment of the Mesopotamian campaign is, 
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therefore, primarily concerned with how the war changed the nature of British 
influence in the former Ottoman territories.29 John Keegan’s emphasis is almost solely 
on Kut. He devotes very little space to the Mesopotamian campaign, noting only the 
significant events: predominantly the events leading to the siege of Kut, and a brief 
discussion of the consequences of the capture of Baghdad in 1917.30 Representations 
of the siege, therefore, are to a large extent synonymous with those of the 
Mesopotamian campaign as whole in modern histories of the First World War.  
  In Britain, contemporary newspaper coverage of the early 
Mesopotamian campaign was sparse. Only in the run-up to Townshend’s attempt on 
Baghdad in late 1915 did the British media begin to take a serious interest in events in 
Mesopotamia. In an effort to address British perceptions of Mesopotamia in these 
years, this thesis examines in some detail the cultural and political significance of the 
siege of Kut, and its impact on British perceptions of Mesopotamia. Chapter Two looks 
at the reactions of the men and women sent to serve in the ‘neglected war’ between 
the years 1914 and 1916.31 The chapter uses the siege of Kut to examine how 
discourses of race shaped the reactions of servicemen to ‘the cradle of civilization’, its 
inhabitants and the Indian men serving alongside them. The interest in the siege of Kut 
during the war was translated into a number of published accounts by those who 
survived it: Charles Townshend’s own My Campaign in Mesopotamia (1920), Major 
Edward Sandes’s In Kut and Captivity (1920) and E.O. Mousely’s oft-cited The Secrets of 
a Kuttite: An Authentic Story of Kut, Adventures in Captivity and Stamboul Intrigue 
(1921), to name but a few.32 These accounts concentrated on the suffering of the 
British troops, largely ignoring or lamenting the behaviour of Indian soldiers. 
  Although Charles Townshend’s reputation suffered after the war, his 
assertion that the inferiority of the Indian troops under his command contributed to 
the surrender of the garrison in April, 1916 has recently been re-examined by 
historians.  Nicholas Gardner’s article ‘Sepoys and the Siege of Kut-al-Amara’ has 
attempted to see beyond the racial bias in Townshend’s account of the siege, to argue 
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 John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War: An Imperial History (London: Routledge, 2004). 
30
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that the refusal of Indian troops to eat horsemeat did indeed materially affect their 
health, and therefore seriously damaged Townshend’s ability to break out to meet 
with the Tigris Relief force in 1916.33   
Chapter Two does not enter into the argument amongst military 
historians as to the extent of blame that should be apportioned to Townshend and his 
commanding officer. Instead, it investigates how those men who lived through the 
siege of Kut recalled or recounted their experiences. This chapter examines how the 
recollections of those who served under Charles Townshend compared to his and 
other published accounts of the siege of Kut. For those serving in Mesopotamia, the 
siege of Kut was significant not only because it was a major surrender of British-led 
forces, but because of its tragic aftermath: the ill-treatment of soldiers taken captive 
after Kut became infamous in Britain. This chapter compares published accounts and 
histories of the siege of Kut-al-Amara, which often maintained that Arab and Kurdish 
guards had been responsible for some of the worst maltreatment, with the 
recollections of those who survived it. In so doing, it assesses the impact of the siege – 
and its resultant mythologies – on British perceptions of Mesopotamia and its 
inhabitants.  
Despite the publication of more modern accounts of the war such as 
Ron Wilcox’s Battles on the Tigris (2006) or Paul K. Davis’s Ends and Means: The British 
Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission (1994), A. J. Barker’s study remains the 
most influential history of the campaign in Mesopotamia. Far more accessible than 
Moberly’s four-volume official history of the campaign, Barker’s 1967 history, The 
Neglected War, is often cited as the source for any detail about the Mesopotamian 
campaign in broader histories of the war.34  
It is unsurprising, given the brevity of most accounts of the 
Mesopotamian campaign in modern histories, that whilst some of Barker’s analysis is 
reproduced, other elements have simply not been included. For Barker, it was largely 
General Nixon’s failures as a commander which led to the surrender of the garrison at 
Kut. In particular, Barker criticises Nixon’s failure to assess accurately the needs of his 
force in terms of river transport and medical supplies, his failure to listen to the advice 
33
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of Charles Townshend (who declared his force to be insufficient to take Baghdad, and 
the communication lines to be too long), and especially Nixon’s over-confidence in the 
ability of the Indian Expeditionary Force D (IEF D) to defeat Turkish troops. Barker 
identifies other causes that are not noted in modern histories of the campaign. He 
argues that the Indian Army was not capable of taking Baghdad because of decades of 
chronic under-investment in the military.35 He also maintains that the structure of the 
Indian military was at fault, and that communication failures between Simla and 
London caused decisions to be made in India that would not have been approved had 
they been scrutinised in Whitehall.36  
 Barker does not give any indication of his sources; however, it is clear 
that he relies heavily upon the conclusions of the Mesopotamia Commission, which 
published its findings in 1917. His points are almost verbatim those of the 
Commissioners, and are presented in almost exactly the same order.37 Given the 
influence of Barker’s history of the Mesopotamian campaign on some of the most 
popular histories of the First World War, it is no exaggeration to suggest that although 
the Mesopotamia Commission itself is little mentioned, its conclusions continue to 
shape the way the Mesopotamian campaign is understood by modern scholars of the 
war.  
In many ways, it was not the siege of Kut itself that came to dominate 
the way Mesopotamia was represented in the British press, but the debate over how 
politicians had failed to see the impossibility of a successful advance to Baghdad in late 
1915. Townshend and his men surrendered in April 1916, but the Mesopotamia 
Commission did not publish its report until the summer of 1917. This resulted in a 
protracted public debate over the Commission’s proceedings, which continued for 
many months after the garrison at Kut had surrendered. Once the Commission’s report 
was published, this debate was replaced by a new one over the punishment of those 
identified as negligent or blameworthy by the Commissioners. The siege of Kut and the 
Mesopotamia Commission dominated coverage of the campaign in Mesopotamia in 
the British press for many months after the events had taken place. As such, the 
35
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Commission has a central role in this thesis. Chapter Three is devoted to an analysis of 
the twelve volumes of the Commission’s archives, held at the British Library.  
  Transcripts of the Mesopotamia Commission’s interviews and 
documentary evidence submitted to the Commission reveal an emphasis on the role of 
prestige in the authorisation of the advance to Baghdad, and indeed the dispatch of 
troops to the Middle East in the first instance, which is under-acknowledged in 
histories of the campaign. Paul Davis’s study Ends and Means: The Mesopotamia 
Campaign and Commission provides a thorough analysis of the Commission’s findings. 
However, Davis’s concern is with an assessment of the fairness and accuracy of the 
findings of the Mesopotamia Commission. In common with most histories of the 
campaign, Davis’s study spends little time analysing the role of ‘British prestige’ in the 
authorisation of Townshend’s advance to Baghdad in November, 1915.   
  In his article, ‘The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: Prestige as a Factor in 
British Eastern Strategy, 1914-1916’, David French makes a convincing case that the 
protection of British prestige in the East was an important consideration for those 
running Britain’s Middle Eastern campaigns.38 Chapter Three seeks to expand on 
French’s definition of the concept of prestige and to apply it specifically to 
Mesopotamia. This chapter builds on Stuart Cohen’s thesis that the dispatch of the 
forces to the Gulf was primarily motivated by ‘propagandist’ aims.39 Rather than 
protecting the Admiralty’s investment in the oil pipeline at Abadan or forming the 
‘vanguard of a programme of sustained expansion’,40 Cohen argues that the men of IEF 
D were primarily intended to impress the Arabs, and the Muslims of India.41 Through 
an analysis of evidence presented to the Mesopotamia Commission, contemporary 
parliamentary debates, media coverage and fictional representations of the siege of 
Kut, Chapter Three argues that fears over the protection of British prestige in the east 
were an important consideration for those running the campaign in Mesopotamia. It 
suggests that the apprehension they expressed over the consequences of the ‘loss of 
prestige in the East’ offers an insight into contemporary anxieties over Britain’s role 
and standing on the world stage.  
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  Townshend’s failed attempt on Baghdad had an enormous impact not 
only on the way in which the campaign was conducted, but also on the way in which 
the campaign in Mesopotamia was represented and perceived in Britain. In February 
1916, the War Office in London took over the day-to-day running of the 
Mesopotamian Campaign, and Indian Expeditionary Force D became the 
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force (MEF). London’s more direct control of the 
campaign brought with it greater funding, greater troop numbers and financial 
investment; these changes transformed Mesopotamia’s infrastructure and landscape, 
and improved the quality of life of those serving in the region.  Chapter Four examines 
the impact of the modern in a region defined for centuries in Britain by its association 
with myth and antiquity.  
  This period was also characterized by iconic victories and losses such as 
the capture of Baghdad in March 1917 and the death of the much-lauded Commander 
in Chief, General Sir Stanley Maude, later that year. Through an examination of the 
letters, diaries and memoirs of men and women serving in Mesopotamia, Chapter Four 
charts British perceptions of Mesopotamia as aeroplanes, cars, trains and cinemas 
began to replace camels and goat-skin floats in British descriptions of the region. It 
argues that a new set of mythologies – rooted in servicemen and women’s wartime 
experiences – began to overshadow traditional images of the ‘land between the rivers’ 
in the final years of the First World War.  
 
 
The Creation of Iraq 
 
  A wealth of historical research into the history of the Middle East has 
informed this work. Charles Tripp’s A History of Iraq (2000) is a thorough account of 
the formation of the state of Iraq and of its history almost to the present day.42 The 
protection of Britain’s Indian Empire was one of the primary concerns of those charged 
with planning Britain’s policy in Mesopotamia throughout this period. Briton Cooper 
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Busch’s Britain, India and the Arabs: 1914-1921 is, therefore, an important resource.43 
The centrality of India to Busch’s understanding of the evolution of British policy in the 
Middle East influenced much of what follows.  
  My reading of the years between the Armistice and the coronation of 
Faisal in the summer of 1921 has been particularly informed by studies of the British 
Mandate. Peter Sluglett’s authoritative Britain in Iraq remains the most comprehensive 
history of Anglo-Iraqi relations from the First World War to the end of the British 
Mandate in Iraq, in 1932. Sluglett’s invaluable history is detailed and wide-ranging; his 
focus is very much on the post-war period.44  
  Toby Dodge’s Inventing Iraq also analyses the creation of the state of 
Iraq by Britain and looks predominantly at the British Mandate in Iraq. Dodge argues 
that the changing face of international politics, particularly the rising influence of 
Woodrow Wilson and the United States, combined with domestic pressures upon 
successive British governments to circumscribe their role in Iraq, ultimately causing 
them to fail in their mandated responsibilities towards the nascent state.45 Dodge 
asserts that British military and civil authorities in Iraq approached their task ill-
informed, and that their decisions were coloured by a traditional colonialist mindset 
that was ill-suited to the shape of the post-war world. Financial restrictions motivated 
by domestic unease in Britain along with the pressures of Iraqi nationalism, he 
maintains, ensured that rather than creating stable and self-sufficient institutions of 
state, Britain actively colluded with Iraqi nationalists to create the illusion of a state 
that would respect the rights of its many minorities and that was capable of defending 
its borders long before this was actually the case. For Dodge, Britain’s desire to find the 
cheapest way of maintaining law and order led those charged with creating the state 
of Iraq to rely increasingly on the power of the Royal Air Force.  
  Peter Sluglett has identified the years between the Armistice and the 
return of Sir Percy Cox in 1920 to take up the role of High Commissioner as being of 
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‘inestimable importance’.46 It was in these years, as pressure mounted on the 
government in Britain to reduce spending in Mesopotamia, that many important 
decisions were taken about the form of government to be installed in the nascent 
state and the ways in which order should be maintained. Dodge argues that the 
rebellion of 1920 was an important factor in turning British public opinion against the 
British Mandate.47 Chapter Five, therefore, uses fictional and media accounts of the 
rebellion of 1920 to examine the longer-term impact of the First World War on British 
perceptions of Mesopotamia. It looks at the emerging debate about what role Britain 
should play in the future of Mesopotamia, and maps the ways in which wartime 






  This thesis draws on a wide variety of sources in an attempt to capture 
changing attitudes towards Mesopotamia in the years 1907-1921. A concerted effort 
was made to seek out a wide range of voices. This has been partly successful; because 
of the scarcity of sources, women’s accounts remain a minority. I hope, though, that 
where they were available, I have been able to find and include them. In the years 
before the First World War, a minority of travellers to Mesopotamia were women. 
Only Gertrude Bell, Louisa Jebb and Mrs. Hume Griffith left published accounts of their 
journeys. During the war, women joined the armed forces as nurses or served their 
country in other capacities.  A number of nurses’ accounts in the form of diaries, 
memoirs and interviews inform the chapters that follow. Women like Emily Lorimer 
and Belle Cox went to Mesopotamia during the war to accompany their husbands. 
Lorimer went on to serve as editor of the British government publication, the Basrah 
Times. As Penelope Tuson points out, other women were certainly present, but their 
accounts, letters and diaries are not available to researchers.48  Because of her position 
of influence and close connections (personal and professional) with those in power, 
                                                     
46
 Sluglett, p.22. 
47
 Dodge, p. x and pp. 8-9. 
48
 Penelope Tuson, Playing the Game: Western Women in Arabia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. xii. 
24 
Gertrude Bell can be seen as a case apart. Bell was requested to travel first to Cairo to 
join David Hogarth’s Arab Bureau, then on to Basra, and later Baghdad, to serve under 
Sir Percy Cox. Her geographical, ethnographic and linguistic knowledge of the Middle 
East was invaluable to Britain’s war effort during the First World War and to its post-
war decisions in relation to Mesopotamia.  
Gertrude Bell was not the only ‘Arabist’ whose informal love of travel in 
the Middle East before the war transformed her into an essential asset during the 
British campaigns in the Middle East. Many men with interest or expertise in the 
Middle East also came to play an important role in the Mesopotamian campaign. They 
included the archaeologist Sir David Hogarth; the traveller and politician Sir Mark 
Sykes; the archaeologist Reginald Campbell Thompson; travellers such as St John 
Philby and the traveller and later politician Aubrey Herbert. T. E. Lawrence is probably 
the most famous of such figures, but aside from one controversial intervention where 
he formed part of a party of British political officers who attempted to buy the 
freedom of the Kut garrison in April 1916, Lawrence played little part in the 
Mesopotamian campaign. His role in shaping the post-war state and support for Faisal 
as the future monarch has been well-documented in histories of the period. 
 In this, as in many other instances, this thesis does not attempt to add 
to the rich existing history of the creation of the modern states of the Middle East. 
Instead, it seeks to shed light on changing British perceptions of one part of the region. 
In order to do this, a decision was made not to concentrate on the papers of many of 
the central figures in the campaign: those men whose accounts of Mesopotamia 
formed the backbone of British policy in the region, such as: Sir Percy Cox, Sir Arnold 
Wilson, Sir Winston Churchill, Sir Mark Sykes, to name but a few. The archives of such 
men have already formed the basis for many of the existing histories of the region and 
the war. Instead, I wished to see Mesopotamia through the eyes of those on the 
ground: the travellers, journalists, servicemen and women whose stories had not yet 
been told.  
In order to trace changing ideas about Mesopotamia in Britain I looked 
at a range of contemporary publications. These articulate how individual journalists, 
novelists and others saw Mesopotamia, but also give a more general idea of how the 
region was represented in Britain throughout this period. By looking at a broad cross-
section of publications – newspapers and periodicals from across the political 
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spectrum, with varied readerships – I have followed changing popular representation 
of Mesopotamia in these years. These were some of the most accessible 
representations of the region to all strata of the British public. Newspapers such as The 
Times or John Bull reached a vast readership which was simply interested in the news, 
rather than a far more self-selecting group who sought out information about the 
region because of a specific interest. Letters printed in newspapers and periodicals 
were an important resource because they offered the personal opinions on the 
campaign of men – and sometimes women – living in Britain.  
  In the pre-war period editions of the Arabian Nights stories were the 
predominant fictional representation of Mesopotamia, and particularly of the city of 
Baghdad. A number of fictional accounts of the Mesopotamian campaign were 
published during the war or took the war as their central theme. Where they could be 
located, this thesis considers a mixture of contemporary short stories and novels. 
These have been limited  by what is available to boys’ adventure stories and short 
stories of a military theme, and romances. This meant a repetition of themes and 
ideas. It is difficult, therefore, to draw broad conclusions about literary representations 
of Mesopotamia in this period. 
  Letters, memoirs, diaries and interviews made up the bulk of primary 
material pertaining to the war years. Though these sources refer to the same period of 
time, perhaps even the same event, they are each very different in nature. What 
servicemen and women wrote home was intended to be seen only by their recipients 
and the unavoidable censor. I have approached letters home as additional 
representations of Mesopotamia to British audiences: private and unguarded as some 
letters were, they were also intended for at least private circulation amongst friends 
and family. Some letters were even forwarded on to the regional or national press, and 
printed in the papers for a much wider readership. Though the men (I have seen no 
women’s letters printed in this way) who wrote those letters had no idea that they 
would reach such a wide readership, the very presence of the censor (an oft-
mentioned additional reader), the likelihood that several people would read each 
letter, and the time-lag between mails, meant that many letters read like reports home 
on Mesopotamia and its peoples, and very frequently included potted histories and 
descriptions of sights of architectural or archaeological significance. From the very 
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beginning of the war, many men and women also debated what Britain’s role in 
Mesopotamia’s future should or might have been.  
  The diaries of travellers, soldiers, officers and nurses were more private 
still. These sources were censored by no-one, perhaps even intended to be seen by no-
one, though there is a pervading sense  (expressed by many servicemen and women, 
particularly in the later years of the war)  of the importance of marking their service in 
the First World War. Many were conscious of the importance of the war and wished 
their letters and diaries to act as a record of their service.  Memoirs, often written 
many years after the war, are another facet of this process. They serve as a reminder 
that those who served in the Great War were aware of its importance, and wanted to 
preserve their memories of the war for posterity. These reflections are trickier sources: 
time erases many memories, and changing attitudes towards race and empire 
undoubtedly coloured how servicemen and women chose to recount their time in 
Mesopotamia. This is also the case with what service personnel revealed in interviews 
conducted mainly in the late 1960s and 1970s with the Imperial War Museum (IWM), 
or the BBC, now held in the IWM’s sound archives.  
  It is difficult to know to what extent the perceptions of those who 
travelled, or were sent, to Mesopotamia were shared by the wider British public. The 
frequency with which the region was mentioned in the papers, or even the number of 
letters written to The Times or other publications about Mesopotamia give a limited 
indication of public interest, but they can only accurately gauge the level of interest of 
the press itself.  Only rarely does one come across a letter written to someone in 
Mesopotamia from a loved one at home. In a letter dated 25 January 1917, Dorothy 
Bennett wrote to her husband, the Rev. Gordon Bennett, then a chaplain with the 
YMCA in Mesopotamia, in words one can imagine were repeated in letters to men on 
every front: ‘I hope that you don’t worry at all about me, I am perfectly well and my 
body is the only part of me that is in Coonoor [Conoor, Hyderabad], the rest of me is in 
Mesopotamia.’ 49 It is impossible to say with any certainty how far the perceptions of 
those who wrote home were shared by others across the empire. But, as Dorothy 
Bennett’s words suggest, the families of the men and women serving in Mesopotamia 
experienced the campaign through the accounts of their loved ones. We can conclude 
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that a crisis like the siege of Kut or a major victory such as the capture of Baghdad 
caught the attention of the nation, but it is much more difficult to make broad 
statements about generic British public opinion towards Mesopotamia for the entire 
period covered by this thesis. This thesis is not a history of Anglo-Mesopotamian 
political relations during this period, nor is it a history of the Mesopotamian campaign. 
Through a literary and historical reading of a broad range of sources, the chapters that 
follow chart changing British perceptions of Mesopotamia before, during and 



















Mesopotamia in the British Imagination, 1907-1914 
 
Mesopotamia was familiar to British audiences from the work of the archaeologist 
Austen Henry Layard, whose excavations of magnificent Assyrian artefacts had brought 
Mesopotamia’s civilizations to life, and to Europe, half a century earlier. Travellers 
such as Gertrude Lowthian Bell (1868-1926), Sir Mark Sykes (1879-1919) and David 
Hogarth (1862-1927) went to Mesopotamia to see, or to dig for, the remnants of the 
ancient civilizations that had given the world some of its first empires and cities and 
whose people had invented the first cuneiform writing. They and their contemporaries 
went in search of the remnants of the Caliphs whose empire had stretched from 
Arabia to the gates of Europe and without whose foresight Greek learning might have 
been lost forever. They went to trace the journeys of Alexander the Great and to see 
the arch of Ctesiphon where the Emperor Julian, misled by omens, had turned his 
forces back, only to be killed in battle. They went, also, in search of the place where 
Scheherazade’s tales of A Thousand and One Nights had been set, to walk through the 
cobbled streets, dotted with the glittering minarets that she describes. They went in 
search of the Baghdad where the Caliph Harun al-Rashid had walked in disguise as a 
commoner amongst his people. Finally, they went in search of the place where they 
could see for themselves where Jonah had landed and where Daniel had survived the 
Lions; the very place where the Garden of Eden had been, and where they could still 
visit Babylon.  
  This chapter examines how established cultural references such as 
these combined with contemporary events to shape British perceptions of 
Mesopotamia in the years 1907-1914. In the familiar tropes described above, 
Mesopotamia is defined by the achievements of its ancient civilizations, or by 
mythological or religious signifiers; the power of these long-entrenched 
preconceptions of Mesopotamia coloured the ways in which Mesopotamia was 
perceived or represented in Britain in these years. This chapter looks at how Britons 
dealt with the incongruence between the expectations of Mesopotamia such cultural 
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references encouraged, and the reality they encountered upon visiting the region in 
this period.  
Contemporary Significance, Future Possibilities 
Geopolitically, Mesopotamia was a part of the Ottoman Empire and, as 
such, it was included in perceptions of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. The years 
1907-1914 were ones of turbulent change for the Ottoman government, the Sublime 
Porte. The most common reference to Mesopotamia, particularly in the earlier part of 
this period, related to discussions of the Baghdad Railway, which was to extend an 
existing rail link between Istanbul’s Haider Pasha Station and Ismid, to Ankara. 
Eventually, the line was to link Istanbul to Baghdad.  
With German financial assistance, work on the first extension from 
Ismid to Ankara had begun in 1888, but in 1902 the Sublime Porte granted the 
concession for laying new track from Ankara to Baghdad to a German company. This 
was widely seen as Germany’s attempt to gain greater influence over a part of the 
world where, as Ottoman power waned, European powers vied for greater influence 
and trade opportunities. A 1902 report in The Times on the growing importance of the 
port of Basra urged British investors ‘not *to+ allow their Russian and German rivals to 
get ahead of them in a quarter of the globe which promises to be of very special 
importance at not distant date’. 50 Britain had for many years developed trade links 
and alliances with the shaikhs of the Persian Gulf; other European powers were seen 
to be encroaching upon British territory and taking advantage of British investment in 
the area. As the influential commentator Valentine Chirol asserted, any European 
power that sought to trade in Mesopotamia was building on peace and prosperity that 
had been established by Britain: ‘each and all drawing upon the accumulated work of 
British pioneers’. 51 
After agreements had been reached over spheres of influence in the 
Middle East and North Africa with Britain’s traditional rivals France, in 1904, and 
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Russia, in 1907, British attention became focused on the rivalry with Germany. The 
Baghdad Railway brought Mesopotamia into the limelight as yet another potential seat 
of rivalry between these two European powers and, consequently, it was of 
contemporary political interest. Perhaps because of this, it was often used to 
contextualise Mesopotamia for British readers in accounts of the region published 
during these years.  
  Reflecting upon her decision to publish an account of her travels 
through Mesopotamia, the agricultural administrator Louisa Jebb, later Mrs. Wilkins, 
(1873-1929) described it as ‘a country which is also destined to become, as civilisation 
advances with the Baghdad Railway, the centre of future political interest’.52  Jebb’s 
travelogue By Desert Ways to Baghdad was an account of her journey through Asia 
Minor, Mesopotamia and Syria. Jebb travelled with her friend Victoria Buxton (later 
Mrs. De Bunsen), who remains anonymous in Louisa Jebb’s account of their travels. 
The two women met at Newnham College, Cambridge, where Jebb completed an 
agricultural diploma. Similarly, in his critique of Tavernier’s Travels in Mesopotamia, 
the archaeologist and Assyrianist Reginald Campbell Thompson contextualised the 
land for the modern reader by writing that it was ‘the country through which the 
Baghdad railway may pass’.53  Thompson was to spend much of his career in 
Mesopotamia. After completing a degree in oriental languages at Cambridge, he 
worked at the British Museum before beginning the first of numerous field trips to 
excavate the remains of Nineveh, near Mosul in northern Mesopotamia, in 1904. At 
the outbreak of war Thompson became a political officer, and served in Mesopotamia 
from April 1915 until the end of the campaign.  
  Particularly before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908-9, the Ottoman 
Empire was seen and portrayed as the archetypal mismanaged and stagnant oriental 
despotism.54 In an article titled ‘The Sultan and the Development of Mesopotamia’, 
The Times reported in 1907 that ‘mismanagement has become so proverbial in the 
Ottoman Empire that the very word “Turkish” connotes a muddle, so that in the rare 
instances in which they succeed the Turks receive but scanty credit. The world either 
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ignores the anomaly, or with an incredulous smile watches humorously, waiting for the 
usual collapse’.55  
  As part of this perceived ailing Ottoman Empire, Mesopotamia was 
described as a place with potential that had suffered from many years of Ottoman 
neglect. It was regarded as a region where chronic mismanagement had combined 
with the laziness and the lack of initiative believed to be characteristic of oriental 
fatalism, to create a land untouched by modernity, and where no progress had been 
made in millennia. The orientalist, traveller, and, later, political officer in the Indian 
Army, Ely Banister Soane, reflected in his travelogue, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in 
Disguise, that in Mesopotamia: 
Bad government and continual insecurity of the country have done their best to 
restrain the people from any attempt at permanent buildings, the result being 
that every bazaar, mosque, and caravanserai is broken down and ruinous; in 
fact, Mosul strikes the stranger as a squalid city on the verge of 
disintegration.56 
In Soane’s account, Mesopotamia, and the city of Mosul in particular, embodied the 
crumbling Ottoman Empire; its buildings – or lack thereof – were seen as symptoms of 
the prolonged illness that had afflicted the ‘sick man of Europe’.  
  Such assessments of Mesopotamia were common. In an article on the 
Baghdad Railway for the Contemporary Review, Edwin Pears commented that 
Mesopotamia ‘has been for centuries under the rule of a race which has never shown 
any power of developing industry or commerce’.57 Pears was a barrister, publicist and 
historian best known for his writing on the Ottoman Empire and for his reporting of 
the atrocities against Christian Bulgarians in 1876.  He concluded that ‘while traversing 
the sites of the most ancient western civilizations *…+ *The Baghdad Railway+ will 
probably do as much to rescue the population from the barbarism of centuries’.58 
Here, Pears’s appreciation for what he significantly terms ‘ancient western civilizations’ 
(my emphasis) is intermingled with his sympathy for the peoples who have had to live 
under Ottoman mismanagement. He presented the Baghdad Railway not as a business 
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venture, but as a project that had the power to ‘rescue’ the inhabitants of 
Mesopotamia from Ottoman neglect.  
  Implicit in these critiques is the sentiment that the British could manage 
it so much better, if only they were in charge. What frustrated these travellers and 
commentators most was the potential they saw in Mesopotamia; their belief in the 
success of past civilizations simply enhanced their unspoken, but evident, belief that if 
only Mesopotamia was better governed it would blossom once more. Although they 
did not overtly seek British influence in the region, the language of British 
commentators was imperial and their criticism of the Ottoman regime overt. Sir Mark 
Sykes, for example, compared Mesopotamia to regions in which Britain had already 
formally or informally annexed territory: South Africa, Egypt and the Sudan. He 
stressed the fertility of the land to his audience at the Royal Geographical Society in 
London: 
Now the question which naturally presents itself to one’s mind is, What was 
the past of this strange and silent region? This is not the South African veldt 
with its miserable emptiness, or the Sahara with its dismal solitude; this land 
was once teeming with life and wealth, business and war.59  
The Mesopotamia Sykes described here was no wilderness but a land of potential, ripe 
for colonial development. He drew on the prosperity and power of Mesopotamia’s 
ancient past civilizations to assert that this was a place that could once again be made 
to prosper. Indeed, later in the article Sykes stated overtly that in parts of 
Mesopotamia ‘cultivation is possible, and, from the numerous ruins which stud their 
banks, I should imagine would prove profitable’.60 Sykes’s rhetoric drew on 
Mesopotamia’s past success to look forward to the possibilities of its future – and the 
profits to be found therein.   
  Although the planned railway was one method through which British 
travellers and commentators saw potential for restoring Mesopotamia to the 
prosperity they identified with its ancient empires, there were others. One particularly 
evocative topic was a project initiated by the new Ottoman government to restore 
Mesopotamia’s irrigation system. A survey of irrigation was accordingly carried out in 
Mesopotamia by Sir William Willcocks between 1908 and 1910.     
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  Willcocks outlined his work to the Royal Geographical Society in 1909; 
his paper, titled The Garden of Eden and its Restoration, was published in the 
Geographical Journal in 1912.61 Reflecting on the possibilities that such projects – both 
with European intervention at their heart – might create for Mesopotamia, Mrs. Hume 
Griffith noted in Behind the Veil in Persia and Turkish Arabia: 
Irrigation in Mesopotamia will change the whole face of the country; vast 
stretches of desert will be transformed into a garden, ruined villages will be 
restored, a new kingdom may be born, and Babylon possibly rebuilt. Mosul, 
practically on the site of ancient Nineveh, will become easy of access from 
Europe by means of the Baghdad railway and the restored navigation of the 
Tigris. Its waste places may be filled with corn, and the city be crowned once 
more with some of its ancient glory.62  
Echoing Willcocks’s reference to the Garden of Eden, Hume-Griffith could envisage a 
transformed Mesopotamia flowering once more. Unlike Edwin Pears’s account, which 
focused on the benefits such projects might bring to the lives of Mesopotamia’s 
inhabitants, Hume-Griffith sought to highlight the possibilities of the region for 
European travellers. Like Sir Mark Sykes, Mrs. Hume-Griffith could only assess 
Mesopotamia’s potential with reference to her understanding of its past: words and 
phrases such as ‘restored’, which she repeats; ‘rebuilt’ and ‘once more’, draw the 
reader’s attention to a past Mesopotamia that she wished to see restored. References 
to Babylon and to Mesopotamia’s ‘ancient glory’ suggest that Hume-Griffith looked 
back to the Babylonian and Assyrian empires as the zenith of Mesopotamian 
civilization, and the register of her comments echoes the grandeur she associated with 
these ancient empires.   
  The complex and often contradictory British perceptions of 
Mesopotamia are well illustrated in Gertrude’s Bell’s 1911 book Amurath to 
Amurath.63 A well-known traveller, archaeologist and, later, Oriental Secretary to the 
British High Commissioner in Baghdad, Bell would play an important role in the 
formation and administration of Iraq under the British Mandate. Bell dedicated her 
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narrative of a journey in 1909 through Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia to the 
diplomat and recently retired proconsul of Egypt, Lord Cromer (1841-1917). 
Addressing Cromer, she explained her choice: ‘you, with your profound experience of 
the East, have learnt to reckon with the unbroken continuity of its history’.64 For Bell, 
the east was a place of wonder. It was a place of adventure and a place to seek 
knowledge, a place in which one could experience a freedom impossible to find in 
Britain, but it was also a place that was crying out for the benefits of western 
civilization, justice and liberty. Although Bell did not argue for greater British 
involvement in Mesopotamia, her desire to export western methods of fair and 
effective government is evident, and her dedication of Amurath to Amurath to Lord 
Cromer is significant.  
   Cromer’s name was almost synonymous with a benevolent British 
Empire. Upon his death in 1917, The Times reproduced the debate in the House of 
Lords. In one of a series of tributes to the Earl of Cromer paid by his colleagues in what 
Lord Curzon (1859-1925), former Viceroy of India, termed a ‘house of mourning’,65 the 
Marquess of Crewe (1858-1945), secretary of state for India 1910-1915, reflected that 
Cromer ‘was one of those men who earned the good will of alien races, not so much by 
a desire to confer on them political institutions resembling our own, as by continually 
caring for their material prosperity and advance in general civilization. He did a great 
work in Egypt’.66  In the same debate, Curzon concluded that Cromer’s achievements in 
Egypt would ‘remain his imperishable monument’.67  
   Credited with the stability and efficiency of Britain’s informal empire in 
Egypt, Cromer was a dedicated imperialist with very distinct views on Islam, the 
modern ‘Oriental mind’ and its deficiencies when compared to that of the European. In 
his book Modern Egypt, Cromer described the 'Oriental mind': 
The reticence of Orientals when speaking to anyone in authority; their 
tendency to agree with anyone to whom they may be talking; the want of 
mental symmetry and precision, which is the chief distinguishing feature 
between the illogical and picturesque East and the logical West, and which 
lends such peculiar interest to the study of Eastern life and politics; the fact 
that religion enters to a greater extent than in Europe into the social life and 
laws and customs of the people; and the further fact that the European and the 
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Oriental reasoning from the same premises, will often arrive at diametrically 
opposed conclusions – all these circumstances place the European at a great 
disadvantage when he attempts to gauge Eastern opinion.68 
Lord Cromer was a man who believed that, after many years in the East, he 
understood the Oriental mind (as much as any westerner could), and who had judged 
it and found it wanting. The ‘Oriental’ was lacking in ‘mental symmetry’; ultimately 
‘illogical and picturesque’ like ‘the East’ and ‘diametrically opposed’ to ‘the logical 
West.’ Nevertheless, for Gertrude Bell only Lord Cromer, with his ‘profound 
experience’ and understanding of ‘the East’ and its peoples, could best understand the 
sentiments she wished to express. 69   
  Bell explained that her dedication to Cromer was in recognition of his 
role in improving the lives of the Egyptians:  
Remembering that the return of prosperity to the people of the Near East 
began with your administration in Egypt, you will understand why I should have 
ventured to offer it, with respectful admiration, to you.70 
In dedicating her book to this archetypal imperialist, Gertrude Bell was seeking colonial 
intervention in a land crying out for change but, in her view, unable to achieve it 
without help. She regarded the people of Mesopotamia themselves as fundamentally 
unable to understand the concepts of freedom and liberty that they so needed. On her 
travels she questioned the Mesopotamians she met about the value of liberty and 
reflected on their inability to understand or make use of the concept. She described 
one such conversation on the merits of democratic government with an Arab: 
Murawwah drew himself up on his hungry mare. *…+ “…We will not bow our 
heads to any government. To the Arabs belongs command.” And he slashed his 
tamarisk switch as he proclaimed the liberties of the wilderness, the right of 
feud, the right of raid, the right of revenge - the only liberty the desert knows.71   
The Arab Bell describes in this passage is a wild creature, untameable and only able to 
work within his own framework of values. Bell indicates Murawwah’s misplaced pride 
by drawing attention to the ‘hungry mare’ upon which he makes a physical 
demonstration of his power: ‘he slashed his tamarisk switch’. Bell tells us that this 
physical and violent act proclaims ‘the only liberty the desert knows’. Here she 
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conflates Murawwah with the vast, empty, homogeneous and barren space of the 
desert, itself a defining feature of Arabia in the western imagination. Moreover in 
constructing his proclamation as a physical act rather than a vocalised utterance, Bell 
suggested that Murawwah was simply incapable of articulating a sophisticated 
position, in the same way as he was unable to understand the benefits of good 
government and of liberty, here posited as alien, western concepts in opposition to the 
violence of the east. 
  Like other travellers, Bell often reflected on the past fertility and 
prosperity of the Mesopotamian landscape and lamented its uncultivated state, which 
she too attributed to a lack of investment and good government: the traits of the 
Oriental Despotism the Ottoman Empire was understood to be. 
The majestic presence of the river in the midst of uncultivated lands, which, 
with the help of its waters, would need so little labour to make them 
productive, takes a singular hold on the imagination. I do not believe that the 
east bank has always been so thinly peopled, and though the present condition 
may date from very early times, it is probable that there was once a continuous 
belt of villages by the stream, their sites being still marked by mounds.72  
Bell’s admiration for Mesopotamia and her frustration with its contemporary state are 
expressed in equal measure in this passage. Like Sir Mark Sykes’s assessment of the 
possibilities in Mesopotamia’s future, in this description, Mesopotamia’s natural 
attributes (its ‘majestic’ river and ‘uncultivated lands’) are combined with its past 
prosperity - here symbolised by the ‘continuous belt of villages’ that no longer exists - 
as proof of the region’s future potential. Bell’s use of the word ‘uncultivated’ and her 
assertion that it ‘would need so little labour’ makes clear her frustration that such 
potential had not been fulfilled. Like Sykes, she dismissed Mesopotamia’s 
contemporary state, looking backwards to its past civilizations, and forward towards a 
more prosperous future, based on a more direct British involvement.  
  However, Bell’s attitudes did not fit entirely with the European imperial 
project. Despite her affinity with Cromer, she stated unequivocally that ‘the people of 
the West can conquer but they can never hold Asia, no, not when they go out under 
the banners of Alexander himself.73 Bell, like so many others, looked to the change 
promised by the Young Turks for hope for the future of Mesopotamia. The Young Turk 
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Revolution was led by the Committee for Union and Progress in 1908; it called for, and 
succeeded in reinstating, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876.  When in July 1908 the 
‘Oriental Despot’ Abdulhammid II announced the restoration of the Ottoman 
constitution, British observers seemed to hold their breath in anticipation. His 
deposition in 1909, and the beginning of the reign of Mehmet V, was greeted with 
hope, and the new constitution, which gave real power to the parliament, was seen as 
the first real step towards liberty and democracy in the decaying Ottoman Empire.  
As she travelled, Bell asked many of those she encountered what their 
hopes were for the future and concluded that ‘the chief bar to progress was the 
political fatalism of the people themselves’.74 ‘Profoundly discouraged’, she argued 
that ‘European Turkey is the head and brains of the empire, and that if the difficult 
task of reform is to be carried out in Asia it can only be done from Western Turkey’.75  
It follows from her characterisation of the Arab as savage and incapable of acquiring 
the products of western learning that only a regime in European Turkey held any hope 
for Mesopotamia.  
The new regime to which Bell referred was formed after The Young Turk 
Revolution; its promised aims were greeted with great enthusiasm in the British press. 
The author of an anonymous article in Blackwood’s Magazine declared that ‘Turkey, 
the effete, the crumbling empire, has committed herself to a revolution, possibly the 
most amazing, because it was the least expected, in the history of mankind’.76  Here, 
the Young Turks were portrayed as a group of aspirational Ottomans who had 
gathered in European capitals, immersed in European culture and civilization, to plot 
the demise of the authoritarian regime of the Sultan. In Paris, the author explained, 
the Young Turks ‘came under the influences of modern progress; were able to judge of 
the qualifications for modern statecraft; and what is more important, to realise the full 
measure of the canker at the heart of their own country’.77  For him/her, the Young 
Turks were only able to see the Sultan for what he truly was, after they had come 
under the influence of ‘modern progress’, here a synonym for European civilization.  
Representations of the Young Turk Revolution were filled with hope 
that the new regime might bring change in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, a 
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possibility that Oriental Despotism, and its consequent stagnation, might soon be 
brought to an end. However, many British travellers believed that such changes would 
be slow to take effect in Mesopotamia itself. Gertrude Bell, for example, pointed out 
that while change had certainly taken place in Constantinople, its consequences would 
be slow to manifest themselves in Mesopotamia. As change rocked the capital, Bell 
made her way across the desert almost entirely isolated from the revolution. When 
news trickled through to the Mesopotamian provinces, Bell reflected that ‘in Mosul 
not a voice was raised against the second triumph of the new order. With the entire 
lack of initiative which characterizes the Asiatic provinces, men resigned themselves to 
a decree of Fate which was substantially backed by the army’.78  Bell’s description 
homogenised the peoples not only of Mosul, but of Asia. She described a listless 
population that took no interest in the revolution in Constantinople.  
  However, the Oriental fatalism she attributed to the people of Mosul 
does not tally with historical accounts of reactions to the Young Turk Revolution and its 
aftermath in the Mesopotamian vilayets. Charles Tripp maintains that the ‘Young Turk 
revolution of 1908 [...] allowed many of the hitherto suppressed currents of political 
opinion within the three Mesopotamian provinces to find public expression’.79 He 
describes the period immediately following the revolution as one of defined by active 
‘political engagement of growing numbers in Mosul, Baghdad and Basra’.80 But such 
political engagement is nowhere to be found in the accounts examined here; in neither 
Mesopotamia’s cities nor its towns did these British travellers and journalists report 
any engagement with the revolution.  
 
 
Mesopotamia as a Relic of its Own Past 
 
  For the majority of British people who did not travel to Mesopotamia 
itself, and indeed for those who did, the first encounter with the country was likely to 
have been in Scheherazade’s tales. The Caliph Harun al-Rashid is one of the many 
characters whose stories she traces, but the fascination with the Abbasid caliphate was 
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by no means restricted to the Arabian Nights stories. In the accounts examined here, 
Baghdad was identified primarily as the city of the Caliphs. The Abbasid Caliphate, 
which dated roughly form around 750 AD until the Mongols sacked the Baghdad in 
1258, is considered the golden age of the Muslim Empire. Under the Abbasid Dynasty 
the capital of the empire was moved from Damascus to Baghdad (except for a short 
period under al-Mu’tasim (833-42), when the capital was Samarra in the North of Iraq). 
In the pages of the Arabian Nights stories the east in general, and Baghdad in 
particular, was depicted as a mystified, exotic place. Illustrations, like these by Edmund 
Dulac from 1911, were often very detailed and full of intense colour:   
Figure 3. An illustration of the enchanted palace of a cursed prince from:‘The Fisherman and the Genie’ 
in The Magic Horse and Other Stories from the Arabian Nights, retold by Laurence Housman, with 
drawings by Edmund Dulac (1911) 
40 
Others, like the illustrations in this 1914 edition, were framed in gold. The books 
themselves seem to convey the luxury and opulence of the court to their readers: 
Figure 4. The view from the bridge in Baghdad on which Hassan meets the Sultan, Harun al-Rashid from: 
‘Hassan the Sleeper’ in Sinbad the Sailor and Other Stories from the Arabian Nights, Illustrated by 
Edmund Dulac (1914) 
 It would be overly simplistic to argue that the images of the east and of 
Baghdad in these tales were taken to be descriptions of contemporary Baghdad. Yet 
the frequency with which the Abbasid Caliphate was invoked in descriptions of 
Mesopotamia, and of Baghdad in particular, suggests that the imagery of Abbasid glory 
had merged with the mystique of the Arabian Nights, and remained the abiding image 
of the city for many British travellers and commentators in the early twentieth century. 
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   David Fraser was a correspondent for The Times and The Times of India 
and ‘an authority of no mean weight on the topics of western Asia generally’.81 In 
concluding his account of his journey through Mesopotamia, he reflected:  
 
Our long and fascinating kelek voyage is over at last, and we float past the 
gilded dome and minarets of the mosque at Kasamin, between groves of dates, 
palms, and orange-trees, down to Baghdad itself, with its  
“Shrines of fretted gold, 
High walled gardens, green and old”.82 
 
Ending his narrative with this romantic image of the east, complete with glittering 
minarets and ‘shrines of fretted gold’, David Fraser’s description of Mesopotamia 
echoed the illustrations of the Arabian Nights stories. Fraser’s quotation comes from 
Alfred Lord Tennyson’s 1830 poem Recollections of the Arabian Nights. Tennyson’s 
poem describes a boat journey during which the narrator makes his way to Baghdad 
and through its magical streets. The poem is set at Baghdad’s zenith: ‘the golden 
prime/ of good Haroun Alraschid’.83 Fraser’s reference to these lines, which serve as 
the refrain for each of Tennyson’s stanzas, is testimony to the continuing prominence 
of these opulent images of Abbasid Baghdad almost a century after the publication of 
Tennyson’s verse. 
  With such rich visions of Mesopotamia’s past, it is little wonder that the 
reality of Mesopotamian life often paled in comparison in the travelogues considered 
here. Bell and her fellow travellers often compared the everyday lives of contemporary 
Mesopotamians with the grandeur they associated with its history, and inevitably 
found its present wanting. Many were dismayed to find what they perceived as 
barbarity in a land whose inhabitants ‘were once civilised’.84 Bell described 
Mesopotamia as a land that had lost all traces of its former prosperity: 
It was a very barren world, scarred with the traces of former cultivation, and all 
the more poverty stricken and desolate because it had once been rich and 
peopled; flat, too, an interminable, featureless expanse from which the glory 
had departed.85  
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Bell’s language is evocative of the violence that she believed years of neglect had done 
to Mesopotamia’s once-fertile and prosperous provinces. In a continuation of the 
importance she placed throughout her account on Mesopotamia’s history, Bell 
stressed that the poverty and starkness of contemporary Mesopotamia was made ‘all 
the more’ desolate because it had once been great. Louisa Jebb also reflected on the 
past glories of Mesopotamia, and on its contemporary desolation: 
The Eastern gate of heaven was unbarred; Shamas, the sun-god of Babylonia, 
flamed forth and stepped upon the mount of sunrise at the edge of the world. 
As he had poured the light of heaven upon the luxuriant gardens and fertile 
cornlands of the Babylonians, so was he pouring it upon the same spot, now an 
arid and deserted wilderness.86  
 
Jebb’s language and imagery echoed the decline she perceived in Mesopotamia’s 
fortunes. In her description of Babylonian Mesopotamia, her language evoked a world 
of plenty: words such as ‘flamed’, ‘sunrise’ and ‘light’ filled her imagery with golden 
light; this combined with her descriptions of ‘luxuriant gardens’ and the fertility of the 
Babylonian landscape she described to evoke a world of plenty, aptly ruled over by 
‘Shamas’ – the sun god. In contrast, her vision of contemporary Mesopotamia was 
bare, like the landscape she described; ‘an arid and deserted wilderness’ stood in stark 
contrast to Babylonia’s former glory. These travellers were shocked and dismayed by 
what they saw as the decay of one of the greatest civilizations that the world had ever 
seen. How, they asked over and over again, how could this once great race have fallen 
so low? 
  Only five years before Bell published Amurath to Amurath, her friend, 
the traveller and archaeologist David Hogarth, had attempted to explain how it was 
that the civilizations that had once stunned the world with their sophistication had 
fallen into ruin. For Hogarth, to enter Mesopotamia was ‘to pass through the shadow 
of what had been, to feel that the actual is over-weighted by too great a burden of 
history’.87 The modern-day peoples of Mesopotamia lived quite literally in the shadow 
of the civilizations that Hogarth and his contemporaries had travelled to encounter. 
Hogarth argued that people who were directly descended from some of the greatest 
civilizations led pitiful and backward lives because their races had spent their energies 
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in another era, and simply had no more to give. He believed that the contemporary 
populations of ‘the plains of India, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt, and the hills of 
Greece, Italy or Spain’ were afflicted by a crippling ‘Oriental Fatalism’, and asserted 
that ‘their peoples have been, each in turn, the protagonists of human progress, and 
advanced all the race a little way on the common road; but it is many centuries since 
the last fell out of the leading place’.88 Hogarth concluded that ‘the more strenuous 
the ancient life, the greater the exhaustion and the more obvious the fatalistic habit 
now’.89 In this analysis, Hogarth offered a view of contemporary Mesopotamia that 
was informed not by his familiarity with the modern-day region, but by his 
understanding of its past civilizations. His explanation of ‘Oriental Fatalism’ reflected 
the widely held belief in the contemporary stagnation of Mesopotamian culture, and 
his nostalgia for the grandeur he associated with Mesopotamia’s history rendered the 
present reality of the lives of Mesopotamians a disappointment to him.  
  At the heart of Hogarth’s understanding of the people of the east was 
his belief in the idea of progress. This secular and linear idea of time conceived of 
different peoples as ‘irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time, some 
upstream, others downstream. Civilization, evolution, development, acculturation, 
modernization *…+ are all terms whose conceptual content derived, in ways that can be 
specified, from evolutionary Time’.90 But what is striking about Hogarth’s description 
of Mesopotamia’s peoples is that they were not simply considered to be backward in 
their development, as such a hierarchy might suggest; Hogarth’s analogy makes it clear 
that they had lost a lead they had once had.  Ancient Mesopotamians had given 
Mesopotamian civilization a head start, but it had fallen behind, allowing other 
civilizations to overtake it.  
   References to the former greatness of Mesopotamia abound in travel 
narratives and other descriptions of the land; in each case, this former glory is 
contrasted unfavourably with the barbarism or backwardness of its contemporary 
people and culture. Louisa Jebb described the inhabitants of Baghdad at prayer: 
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Thus prayed the dwellers of the city four thousand years ago. And with the 
same light with which you lit the pomp and splendour of the works of their 
time, you light the decay and ruin and hideous desolation of the present.91  
Invoking God in what she understood as primarily a biblical land, in this passage Jebb 
drew attention to the decline the city of Baghdad had suffered.   She emphasised the 
unchanging elements of Mesopotamian life to draw the reader’s attention to the very 
pronounced change that had come over the city itself. Although, the ‘same light’ 
shines on the unchanging ritual of prayer in her description, the light that had fallen on 
‘the pomp and splendour’ now fell on the ‘decay and ruin and hideous desolation of 
the present’. Sykes was also struck by the contrast between the reality of 
Mesopotamia and its glorious past; his paper described a land once rich with culture 
and civilization, but now a shadow of its former self: 
If we peer back into the darkest antiquity, we find a land densely peopled by a 
cultured race; mighty mounds still mark with permanence their fleeting 
sojourn, huge canals and dykes, some containing water even now, remain to 
show us where man once was. *…+ When Alexander appropriated the Persian 
Empire, the modern Jazirah contained many wealthy cities *…+. A large 
agricultural population flourished on the banks of the rivers to which I have just 
drawn attention.92  
For Sykes too, Mesopotamia was a place of past grandeur that had been allowed, over 
the centuries, to deteriorate. Sykes’s description stressed the distance between 
contemporary Mesopotamia and its former prosperity: to see it, one was obliged to 
‘peer back into the darkest antiquity’. Once again, Sykes looked into Mesopotamia’s 
past to a ‘cultured’, ‘wealthy’ land filled with busy, productive people.  
  Where these travellers did not conceive of Mesopotamia as a place in a 
state of decline, they understood it as a place where time had stood still. This 
combined with their emphasis on the importance of Mesoptoamia’s history to render 
the region a frozen image of its own history in their descriptions: a relic of its own past.  
In her preface to Amurath to Amurath, Bell insisted that in the lands through which she 
had travelled: 
Conqueror follows upon the heels of conqueror, nations are overthrown and 
cities topple down into dust, but the conditions of existence are unaltered and 
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irresistibly they fashion the age in the likeness of the old. ‘Amurath an Amurath 
succeeds’ and the tale is told again.93  
Bell’s emphasis on an unbroken repetition of history goes to the heart of the British 
understanding of Mesopotamia in this period. For the people of Mesopotamia nothing 
had nor could change: each new regime and each new chapter was simply a repetition 
of what had come before.  
  Bell’s quotation, which is also the title of her book, is taken from 
Shakespeare’s King Henry IV, Part II and evokes the bloody legend of the Ottomans in 
Elizabethan England. Upon his accession to the throne, Prince Harry emerges to 
reassure his brothers that he would not become a tyrant. He states: 
Brothers you mix your sadness with some fear 
This is the English not the Turkish court, 
Not Amurath an Amurath succeeds, 
But Harry, Harry, 94  
 
Karl Wentersdorf argues that Shakespeare is alluding to the Ottoman Sultan Murad III, 
who ruled the Empire from 1574-95 and was known in England as Amurath.  
Wentersdorf maintains that the Ottomans were seen as ruthless and bloody tyrants in 
Elizabethan England. He notes that Amurath was infamous because immediately upon 
his accession he ordered the murder of his five brothers.95  
  Bell’s use of the Anglicisation of the name Murad, Amurath, is all the 
more significant because she was an accomplished linguist. Indeed, Bell used her 
familiarity with oriental languages to assert her authority as an expert in the region 
throughout the text that follows this preface. Although she undoubtedly humanised 
the people of Mesopotamia, Bell also stressed the exoticism of her travels for her 
readers. One way in which she did this was to incorporate the invocations to God that 
form a part of the Arabic speech pattern. These were reproduced at regular intervals, 
reminding the reader of the difference of her interlocutors: ‘“True, true,” said the Arab 
beside us. “Wallah, so it is”’. 96 Similarly, Bell employed her own frequent use of these 
turns-of-phrase to signal her knowledge of the region, its languages and customs to 
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her readers, reproducing these phonetically to remind us that she was conversing 
fluently in a foreign, oriental tongue.   
   Bell’s use of the anglicised name, Amurath, was a statement of her 
knowledge of the history and culture of the lands that she went on to describe. In the 
contemporary political climate, Bell’s emphasis on the unbroken and unbreakable 
cycle of repetition, which for her constituted the history of the Ottoman Empire and its 
peoples, was reflected in her reference to the many sultans called Murad. Amurath or 
Murad was the name of no fewer than five Ottoman sultans who reigned between 
1359 and 1876. They included Murad IV who re-conquered Baghdad after a long siege, 
which ended in the massacre of the garrison and of the citizens of the city within. For 
Bell, Mesopotamia was trapped in an endless cycle of repetition that its people were 
incapable of breaking.  
  Bell’s preface was the most evocative of the numerous ways in which 
the descriptions of many British travellers and journalists of this period demonstrated 
their perception of Mesopotamia as a place frozen at an early or primitive stage of its 
development.  As they travelled around Mesopotamia, travellers often noted that 
practices which they associated with Mesopotamia’s ancient civilizations – those 
whose history had drawn them to Mesopotamia and fuelled their interest in the region 
– were still in use in contemporary Mesopotamian life. This led British commentators 
to conclude that the people of Mesopotamia had simply not ‘evolved’ or ‘progressed’ 
since. In one example, Bell noted: 
The fires under the troughs of molten bitumen sent up their black smoke 
columns between the trees; half-naked Arabs fed the flames with the same 
bitumen, and the Euphrates bore along the product of their labours as it had 
done for the Babylonians before them. So it must have looked, this strange 
factory under the palm-trees, for the last 5,000 years, and all the generations of 
Hit have not altered by a shade the processes taught them by their first 
forefathers.97 
In Bell’s description, modern Mesopotamians had not ‘progressed’ in any way since 
the advances of ‘their forefathers’. Bell’s image of the ‘half-naked Arabs’ evokes for 
her audience the stereotypes of the barbarous ‘other’, and her emphasis upon the 
unchanging elements in Mesopotamian life is reflected in her reference to the river 
Euphrates. For her audience, the Euphrates had flowed since God had created Heaven 
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and Earth; Bell describes the timeless river as carrying its load in the early twentieth 
century in exactly the same way as it had done for the Babylonians thousands of years 
earlier. Her description underlines the inertia that she identified with Mesopotamia: 
‘for the last 5,000 years all the generations of Hit have not altered by a shade the 
processes taught them by their first forefathers’.  
  Bell was looking at a contemporary scene, but imagined that she could 
see, in the contemporary lives of Mesopotamians, how the Babylonians had lived five 
millennia before. Indeed, it was this point that made the biggest impression on one of 
Bell’s reviewers. Writing for the English Review, the anonymous reviewer described Hit 
as the place: 
Where the primitive furnaces of asphalt-burners are still smoking and stinking 
as they smoked undoubtedly in the days of Herodotus, and stank to produce 
the tributes to Bitumed exacted by Thothmes III.98  
That a relatively short review of a long book should have picked up particularly on this 
scene suggests that it made an impression on Bell’s readers. It exemplified, for the 
reviewer, the primitivism Bell had identified with Mesopotamia. In ‘the finest book of 
Eastern travel produced in England’, Bell had described a country where one could 
look upon a contemporary scene and see how a civilization had lived thousands of 
years earlier.99 For Bell, and for at least some of those who read her work, 
Mesopotamia functioned as a living exhibit of its own past.  
  Similarly, Mark Sykes dwelt upon Mesopotamia’s glorious history, devaluing its 
present: 
The empire of Alexander fades into Parthian and Seleucid dominion, the 
empires of the Macedonians are swallowed up into that of the great republic, 
the dominion of the Parthians is changed to that of the Sassanian Persians, the 
Roman Empire of Augustus resolves itself into that of Constantine, and 
eventually the two ever-clashing forces of antiquity, Byzantium and Persis, are 
suddenly merged into one rule under the khalifs; yet through all these 
centuries and all these vicissitudes, read it as we will, the Jazirah seems to be 
ever the same.100  
Sykes’s emphasis on the seemingly unending stream of empires while ‘the Jazirah 
seems to be ever the same’ echoed Bell’s statement that ‘“Amurath an Amurath 
succeeds” and the tale is told again’: both evoked a land trapped in an endlessly 
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repetitive cycle – one that, consequently, had not progressed for many centuries. 
British commentators were surprised to encounter even the most basic signs of 
‘civilization’ or ‘progress’. Upon finding a river crossing, Bell commented:  
To my amazement it was provided with a practicable bridge of boats, by which 
we crossed, glorifying the works of man, it was the first, and I may add the only 
bridge over the Euphrates that I was privileged to see.101  
The fact that Bell had seen no other such bridges suggests that they were indeed rare. 
But her shock at this most basic of conveniences was not simply a reflection of her 
surprise at seeing a rarity; it was also a reflection of the entrenchment of her 
understanding of Mesopotamia as an unchanging place.  
  These accounts suggest that British commentators on Mesopotamia in 
the years that preceded the First World War placed far more emphasis upon its past 
than either on its present or its future. Even when they speculated upon the region’s 
future potential, they did so with reference to the prosperity they associated with its 
ancient civilizations. These accounts describe a complex denial of co-evalness, in 
Johannes Fabian’s terms: not merely an assertion of a European or British advanced 
state of evolution, but regret at a civilization that had declined.102 In these accounts, 
Mesopotamia and its inhabitants were not merely ‘backward’; they had, in Hogarth’s 
words, fallen ‘out of the leading place’.103 It is this fall from grace – the distance 
between the prosperity these travellers associated with an older Mesopotamia and the 
reality of its impoverished towns and people – that defined their representations of 
the region and its inhabitants in this period.  
 
 
Appropriating Mesopotamia  
 
  As Geoffrey Nash has noted in relation to nineteenth-century British 
travel to the Middle East, part of the attraction of travel to the east was that ‘Middle-
Eastern societies and peoples were at once exotic, primitive and stationary, and 
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connected to the Western imperialist nations as their originals’.104  However, the 
travelogues examined here took this affinity one step further. In the writing of these 
travellers, the elements of Mesopotamia’s history that were seen to be the 
progenitors of a western civilization were understood exclusively to be the early part 
of a western, rather than an eastern or Mesopotamian, cultural heritage. Not merely 
an ‘affinity’ or a shared heritage, but an appropriation of what they valued in 
Mesopotamian culture can be seen in the accounts that follow.  
  In order to cope with the incongruence between the Mesopotamia of 
the British imagination and the reality of contemporary Mesopotamia, a two-fold 
process of acquisition operated. Mesopotamia’s historical or archaeological artefacts 
were acquired for, and transported to, Europe for display and consumption in 
European cultural and educational institutions. Less transportable elements of 
Mesopotamia’s history and culture were also appropriated by Europe. Those elements 
of its history and culture that were seen to be the progenitors of a western civilization 
were appropriated to a western discourse, which native peoples were perceived to be 
incapable of engaging with or understanding the significance of. This can be seen as 
part of the process of defining the Orient for western consumption that Edward Said 
identifies in Orientalism (1978).  
  Said argues that in order to cope with the threat posed by the Orient, 
the Occident created, through its academic institutions, an Orient that was seen as 
primarily an object of research, and secondarily as an object of ridicule and disdain. 
Such a mindset of cataloguing was certainly part of British attitudes towards 
Mesopotamia in the early twentieth century. This was illustrated in definitions of 
Mesopotamia’s people, their character and culture that can be seen in these accounts. 
Sykes devoted the majority of his paper to the definition of ‘the Arab’ or ‘the Kurd’: 
The pure Arab is a very strange being indeed. His mind is complex and cultured; 
there is no Arab of pure race to whom rhetoric, subtle argument, poetry, and 
histrionism do not appeal; he is able to take a broad view of matters, or to 
discuss reasonably on any subject within the range of his experience, and yet, 
when dealing with any material object, he seems almost a perverse 
dunderheaded clown. Work he loathes and abhors; his argumentative capacity 
provides him with an excuse; he announces that work is dishonourable and 
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degrading. Consequently he avoids the point that he is incompetent, lazy, and 
incapable, and says that cultivating the ground, pitching a tent in a reasonable 
way, doctoring a horse, cooking food, building a house, are contemptible 
employments beneath the dignity of man, and leaves the baffled western in the 
ridiculous position of a worthy but rather underbred person who has no finer 
instincts.105  
Sykes’s definition of ‘the pure Arab’ is authoritative. Delivered in a long list, it would 
have asserted the breadth of Sykes’s expertise, and his familiarity with Mesopotamia 
and its inhabitants – as it was designed to do. Significantly, Sykes claimed to be able 
see through the Arab’s rhetoric to realise that it was a tendency for laziness, rather 
than a real belief that it was beneath him to work, that lay at the heart of the Arab’s 
disdain for manual labour. Sykes’s exposition on the character of the Mesopotamian 
Arab continued for some pages before he turned his attention to ‘the Kurd’, whom he 
categorised as the ‘most unsophisticated and gullible person in the world’.106 He 
compared and contrasted the Kurd with the Arab. In particular, he distinguished the 
Kurdish mind as ‘Western *...+ albeit undeveloped, in contradistinction to that which 
we would associate with the Oriental’.107 There is little nuance or ambiguity to be 
found in such remarks; they can be read as an assertion of Sykes’s knowledge and, 
therefore, power over the orient. 
  Sykes’s accounts of the characteristics of the Jazirah’s Arabs and Kurds 
were coupled with equally detailed accounts of some of Mesopotamia’s other races, 
and descriptions of the region’s climate and geography. His paper was given as a 
lecture to the Royal Geographical Society in London, at which Gertrude Bell was 
present and participated in the discussion that followed.108 Gertrude Bell’s account of 
her journey through Mesopotamia in 1909 was framed around her interest in the 
ancient archaeology of the region through which she travelled. She devoted the 
majority of her narrative to descriptions of her search for, and account of, 
archaeological artefacts or sites. These form the central focus of the account she gives 
of her travels; they are often long and detailed and accompanied by photographs and 
diagrams to illustrate her points. Bell described one site of archaeological significance 
in the following way: 
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On the opposite bank the great castle of Halebîyeh lifts its walls from the river 
almost to the summit of the hill, a towered triangle of which the apex is the 
citadel that dominates all the defile (Fig. 46) Twenty minutes lower down, the 
Mesopotamian bank is crowned by the sister fortress of Zelebîyeh. It is a much 
less important building. The walls, set with rectangular towers, enclose three 
sides of an oblong court; the fourth side — that towards the river — must also 
have been walled, and it is probable that the castle approached more nearly to 
a square than at present appears, for the current has undermined the 
precipitous bank and the western part of the fortifications has fallen away. The 
masonry is of large blocks of stone, faced on the interior and on the exterior of 
the walls, while the core is mainly of rubble and mortar. There are six towers, 
including the corner bastions, in the length of the east wall, and between the 
two central towers is an arched gate. [...] 
The name Zelebîyeh carries with it the memory of an older title; in the heyday 
of Palmyrene prosperity a fortress called after Zenobia guarded the trade route 
from her capital into Persia, and all authorities are agreed that the fortress of 
Zenobia described by Procopius is identical with Halebîyeh. Procopius states 
further that Justinian, who rebuilt Zenobia and Circesium, refortified the next 
castle to Circesium, which he calls Annouca. The Arab geographers make 
mention of a small town, Khânûhah, midway between Karkîsîyâ (Circesium) and 
Rakkah, and the probable identity of Annouca and Khânûkah has already been 
observed by Moritz. But I think it likely that the flourishing mediaeval Arab 
town was situated not in the confined valley below Zelebîyeh but at Abu 'Atîk, 
where the ruin field is much larger. It may be that there was a yet older 
settlement at Abu 'Atîk, and that the stone foundations there belonged to the 
town of Annouca which stood at the head of the defile, while the castle of the 
same name guarded the lower end.109 
This is an excerpt from a relatively short account Bell gave her readers of 
Mesopotamian architecture. She devoted pages upon pages to these very detailed 
descriptions and their accompanying diagrams. In addition, she provided details of 
how and where she found the sites, often correcting their plotted situations on maps. 
This had the dual effect of informing the reader who may have wished to follow in her 
footsteps, and also of demonstrating her knowledge of these areas, their history and 
modern significance. Bell recalled: ‘I wished to examine two towers which stand upon 
the crest of a high ridge about half an hour to the east. They are called by the Arabs 
The Windmills, but in reality they are tower tombs’.110 It is likely that Bell did know 
more about the archaeological significance of such ruins than the local people, for 
whom they may have simply become familiar landmarks, as her description suggests. 
But in her emphasis on the distinction between her knowledge of the true nature of 
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such sites and the ignorance of Mesopotamia’s inhabitants, she was asserting her 
knowledge of the orient and actively re-defining it: cartographically, archaeologically 
and semantically.  
   In other accounts, Mesopotamians were perceived to understand only 
the monetary value, ascribed by western buyers, of the archaeological artefacts they 
found. Writing in the catalogue to the Exhibition of the Faience of Persia and the Near 
East, held at the Burlington Fine Arts Club in 1907, Charles Hercules Read despaired of 
‘the innate mendacity of the Oriental Nomad’.111 Reflecting generally on the problems 
of amassing ancient artefacts from the east, he lamented the fact that ‘if a vase be 
really from excavations in Asia Minor he will surely declare it come from the 
neighbourhood of Teheran [...]. Whatever the reason, the story of the cosmopolitan 
oriental is untrustworthy, and thus, though ample new material is daily coming into 
the market, it provides us little sure ground for additions to the history of the wares’.112 
Although Read did not refer to Mesopotamia directly, this sort of complaint was 
frequently made about the peoples of the east as a whole. Drawing on the stereotype 
of the mendacious ‘Oriental’, Read’s claims asserted the power of western knowledge 
over ‘the East’. Only through western interpretation, he suggested, could the raw 
materials of Eastern artefacts be transformed into trustworthy knowledge, a preserve 
of the West.  
  This process is epitomised in Henry Layard’s nineteenth-century 
excavations for the British museum. Layard was made famous in the mid-nineteenth 
century by his discoveries of Assyrian palaces in Nimrud and Kuyunjik in northern 
Mesopotamia. His two books, Nineveh and Its Remains (1849) and Nineveh and 
Babylon (1853), and the Assyrian remains his excavations secured for the British 
Museum’s collections were very well received in Britain.113 More than half a century 
after Layard’s excavations, his legacy still played an important role in the way British 
travellers perceived Mesopotamia. David Fraser mythologized Layard’s achievement 
until its epic status rivalled the grandness of the empires he had uncovered: 
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Across the Tigris stand the mounds that are all that remain of the glories of the 
capital of Assyria. Nineveh has a history that stretches throughout a period 
nearly 2000 years long, ending with its fall about the 6th century before Christ. 
From that time until Layard with reverent hands unveiled the palaces of 
Assurbanipal and Sennacherib, and unearthed the literary chamber containing 
the famous deluge tablets, the ruins of Nineveh, for two thousand five hundred 
long years, have slept undisturbed.114  
Fraser’s description evoked the grandeur of the Assyrian empire, and the awe it 
inspired in British travellers. His description also highlighted the important role 
Layard’s excavations continued to play in creating an interest in Mesopotamia’s 
ancient civilizations in Britain. Layard’s work had brought Mesopotamia’s ancient 
empires to life, ‘unveiled’ the power of the Assyrian kings to the world. His excavations 
played a pivotal role in transporting Mesopotamia’s history from the pages of history 
books into the exhibition galleries of the British Museum and the imaginations of 
British travellers to Mesopotamia in this period.   
  The traveller Ely Bannister Soane’s often irreverent account sums up the 
frequency with which Layard and Nineveh (they were almost synonymous) were 
mentioned by western travellers. ‘I suppose it must be the proper thing when writing 
of Mosul, to expatiate upon the antiquity of Nineveh’, he quipped, ‘but so much has 
already been written, that to attempt adequately to treat of it here would be 
presumption. Suffice to say, that around Mosul, the modern city, which stands 
opposite the ancient Nineveh, sometime capital of Assyria, are the remains of Nineveh, 
old and new, while in the neighbourhood are Kalah, Asshur, Hadra, and Khorsabad’.115 
Despite the fact that Soane saw himself as outside the traditional mode of 
representation, with his emphasis on the ‘modern city’ of Mosul rather than on the 
ancient, he too defined Mosul in relation to Layard. His use of the biblical names for 
the area opposite modern-day Mosul, the ancient site of Nineveh, which he also 
identified as the biblical Kalah, placed his narrative very much in line with others who 
travelled to Mesopotamia in this period. The prevalence of the descriptions Soane 
refers to must be a reflection of the popularity of Layard’s excavations, and their 
familiarity for the audience for whom travelogues like Soane’s were published. 
Layard’s important discoveries had been some of the earliest and most significant to 
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the study of Mesopotamia’s early civilizations. It was within this context – one that 
misplaced Mesopotamia’s ancient history within a western frame of reference – that 
Mesopotamia was understood by these British travellers to Mesopotamia. 
  For some travellers, Layard’s excavated artefacts in the British Museum 
became the genuine article, and travellers looked for representations of them in 
Mesopotamia, the land of their origin. The Assyrian reliefs that Gertrude Bell 
encountered in Mesopotamia reminded her of those that Layard had excavated and 
transported to London; Bell wrote that in Mesopotamia ‘the myriad soldiers of the 
Great King, transported from the reliefs in the British Museum, marched through the 
gates of Asshur; the captives, roped and bound, crowded the streets’.116 This 
perception relocates their place of origin to a British institution and away from the 
land where they had actually been created. Mrs Hume-Griffith advised her readers 
that ‘Nineveh is best seen to-day at the British Museum or the Louvre, Paris, as both of 
these places contain many interesting and valuable remains of that city.’117 For her, 
Europe’s appropriated artefacts better represented Mesopotamia’s ancient history 
than Mesopotamia itself.   
   For Bell, even the real-life practices of Mesopotamians were taken 
straight out of the reliefs that Layard had uncovered. She recalled watching a group 
people crossing a river using ‘an inflated goat-skin’ as a float. She remarked that she 
‘had not seen this entertaining process, except on the Assyrian reliefs in the British 
Museum, and I watched it with unabated zest during the greater part of an 
afternoon.’118 In this description, Mesopotamia’s inhabitants are once again 
transported to a different time; in their use of the inflated goat skins they had become, 
for Bell, an animated image of Assyrian life – which for her was indelibly associated 
with Henry Layard’s discoveries.   
  This dislocation of the origins of the Mesopotamian artefacts that 
Layard had transported to London can be seen as part of a wider appropriation of 
Mesopotamian history and culture in the early twentieth century. British travellers and 
commentators used different methods to appropriate the less easily transportable 
elements of Mesopotamian history and culture to a western discourse. They described 
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the history they sought in travelling to Mesopotamia in a way that perceived 
Mesopotamia’s ancient civilizations as the progenitors of a western rather than 
eastern or oriental civilization. In so doing, they appropriated Mesopotamia’s history 
and culture, like its archaeological artefacts, as their own. On her arrival in Baghdad, 
Louisa Jebb reflected: 
They [the Arabs and their boats] had borne us from the wilds and fastnesses of 
the unconquered East to the gateway of the Western invasion; through the 
dreariness and desolation of desert lands, through the magnificent isolation of 
gorgeous mountain scenery, past the ruined evidences of ancient Western 
civilisations still mocked by the persistence of squalid tribal huts; and now, 
having deposited us to draw our own conclusions in this decayed city of the 
Khalifs, they hurried on, lapping scornfully in their course at the rocking 
pleasure-boats of messrs. Sasson’s representatives and the white steam launch 
of HM British vice-Consulate.119  
Just as Edwin Pears had noted that the future railway would traverse ‘the sites of the 
most ancient western civilizations’,120 thus appropriating the civilizations he admired as 
western, upon her arrival at this paradigmatic Eastern city, most identified as the 
capital of Abbasid power, Jebb was dismayed by the ruined evidences ‘of ancient 
Western civilisations’. Not only did she understand the ancient civilizations of 
Mesopotamia as the origin of western civilization, but so far were they from any 
Eastern cultural history in her mind, that they were ‘mocked’ by the very conditions of 
existence of Eastern peoples: ‘the persistence of squalid tribal huts’.  
  Some British travellers and commentators defined Mesopotamia 
primarily as a biblical land. Mesopotamia was identified as the land through which two 
of the rivers of the Garden of Eden flowed:121  
 A stream flowed in Eden and watered the garden; beyond Eden it divided into 
four rivers. The first is the Pishan *…+ the second is the Gihon, it flows around 
the country of Cush. The third is the Tigris, which flows East of Assyria and the 
Fourth is the Euphrates.122  
Many places within Mesopotamia were known by their biblical or ancient names; thus 
the biblical Erech also refers to ‘Sumerian  Uruk , Greek  Orchoë , modern  Tall al-
Warka'.123 For Louisa Jebb it was Mesopotamia's biblical significance that gave what 
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she otherwise saw as a barren, lifeless, uncivilized land its raison d’être. As she 
travelled through Mesopotamia’s desert, Jebb reflected that: 
[It] had always been silent and would be silent for ever more - a dead, 
unconscious silence, with no significance save of absence of life.  
And yet still for us ‘the wind uttered’ and ‘the spirit heard’ his vainglorious cry: 
“Is not this the great Babylon that I have built for the house of the kingdom by 
the might of my power and for the honour of my majesty?”  
 The silent answer to it lay at our feet. And, listening, we heard the 
solemn warnings of Daniel, the sorrowful forebodings of Jeremiah, and, above 
all, the ironical voice of Isaiah:- 
“Let them stand up and save thee, Mappers of heavens, Planet observers, 
Tellers of new moons, from what must befall thee.”124 
Here Mesopotamia’s biblical significance breathed life into the otherwise lifeless 
desert, ‘a land which had never been alive with the stir of humanity even in far-off 
ages’. Indeed, it was western, Christian ears that could hear the word of God in an 
otherwise desolate land.  
  Soane’s narrative, like the accounts of his contemporaries, is also 
peppered with references to the biblical or ancient significance of the places that he 
encountered: ‘This Daur, or Dura as it was anciently called, has a very old history 
indeed, for we read of it in the Bible’.125 Mark Sykes told his audience that ‘Ain el Arus 
is a famous shrine, and is the legendary site of the marriage and wedding festivities of 
the prophet Abraham’.126  William Willcocks also conceived of Mesopotamia as 
primarily a biblical land. As discussed, he saw his project as the restoration of the 
Garden of Eden.127 Such identification of Mesopotamia as a biblical land also located it 
within a western discourse.  
  Willcocks illustrated this conflation of ancient, biblical and modern-day 
names when he told his audience at the Royal Geographical Society that: 
The second river was Gihon, the modern Hindia, the Chebar of Ezekiel, who lies 
buried on its banks, the Ahava of Ezra, the Pallacopus of Alexander, and the 
Nahr Kufa of the early khalifs. It is represented as encompassing the whole land 
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of Kis or Kutha or Cush, the father of Nimrod, the beginning of whose kingdom 
was Erech and Akkad and Calneh and Babylon.128  
On Willcocks’s 1912 map of Lower Mesopotamia, the process of super-imposing 
western names on the Mesopotamian landscape is demonstrated geographically. 
Willcocks’s map noted the modern place names of the cities and geographical features 
of the landscape; in addition, his annotations pointed out sites of ancient or biblical 
significance. His map showed the ancient sites of Sumer, Akkad and ‘Ur of the 
Chaldees’.  He also located Babylon next to the modern town on Hit; the town of Anah 
was annotated as the ‘Garden of Eden of the Semites’, and the map shows the site of 
the biblical Erech.  
[PTO] 
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Figure 5. Sir William Willcocks’s map of ‘Lower Mesopotamia’, 1912.
129
 
To understand Mesopotamia primarily as a biblical land involved a renaming of 
Mesopotamian places – literally a re-definition of Mesopotamia rooted in a western, 
Judaeo-Christian tradition.  
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  Many of these travellers used the classics as guides to contemporary 
Mesopotamia, or contextualised their narratives with reference to the histories of the 
Hellenistic or Roman empires. Such references located the region’s history and culture 
within a western tradition of learning. Gertrude Bell and Louisa Jebb identified the 
classics as the best guides to Mesopotamia, and both referred to the descriptions of 
Herodotus.130 Bell traced the journeys of Alexander, Julian, and other figures of 
classical antiquity, as she travelled:    
It was not to those red-bound volumes which we are accustomed to associate 
with travel that I turned, but to the best of all guide-books to Mesopotamia, 
the Anabasis and Ammianus Marcellinus. In a moment I was back in the ranks 
of the Ten Thousand and of the Roman legions, but what a change had come 
over them since we parted from them at Anah! Cyrus had fallen in the 
disastrous confusion of Cunaxa, which, but for his fatal wound, might have 
crowned his campaign with victory. Julian, misled by omens, had turned away 
from Ctesiphon.131  
Bell’s emphasis on these texts can be seen as a reminder to the reader of her extensive 
knowledge of Mesopotamia’s history, culture and languages, and an effort to assert 
her authority within a male-dominated tradition. Moreover, she was consciously 
dissociating herself from tourists whose ‘red-bound’ Baedeker guides she rejected, so 
demonstrating her more serious engagement with the region. Melman argues that 
women’s travel narratives should be distinguished from men’s because ‘in contrast to 
the hegemonic Orientalist discussion, women’s discourse on the Orient evolved 
outside the main locations of “metropolitan knowledge and power”’.132  
  However, in Bell’s case this was not entirely applicable. Although she 
was a woman functioning within a male domain, she was a respected and remarkably 
well-connected one. Bell’s education, her familial connections and the society she 
moved in set her apart from her female contemporaries.  But perhaps more than the 
advantages afforded her by her social status, her intelligence and self-confidence led 
her to demand her place within the male patriarchal tradition, rather than to function 
outside it in the way that Melman describes. Far more than Louisa Jebb, Bell was part 
of the (patriarchal) establishment; her contribution at Mark Sykes’s lecture led the 
Chairman to conclude by expressing his desire that more women were in attendance: 
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‘Miss Lowthian Bell has paid a very just tribute to the Society. We are always very glad 
to obtain papers from ladies, and we are most anxious that they should join with us in 
every possible way in extending geographical knowledge’.133 
  Moreover, references to the classics were also common in the 
narratives of her male contemporaries. Ely Soane, for example, described the town of 
‘Daur’ in the following terms: 
Here the Roman army, after Julian was dead, attempted the passage of the 
Tigris *…+ and here Jovian, who succeeded Julian, having retreated from 
Ctesiphon, made a treaty with the Persians which gave them back the northern 
Mesopotamian provinces. Here at the same ford attempted by the Romans, we 
saw a caravan of asses being swum across the river, their drivers effecting the 
transit by wading part of the way and swimming the rest.134  
Soane, too, located Mesopotamia within a history of the Roman Empire. David Fraser 
reflected the importance of history to his understanding of Mesopotamia when he 
concluded that ‘*in Mesopotamia+ every inch of ground is classic, and redolent of 
Chaldean, Assyrian and Parthian, among the more ancient civilizations, and of Roman, 
Persian and Arab, among the later’.135  The fact that references to the classics were not 
solely used by female travellers suggests that they should be seen as part of a broader 
conception of Mesopotamia, which located its history and culture within a western 
tradition of learning. References to the classics, like the importance attributed to 
Layard’s excavations and the emphasis on Mesopotamia as a biblical land, were an 
important part of the definition of Mesopotamia’s ‘civilized past’ as western.  
 
 
The ‘Other’ Mesopotamia 
 
  Although these British travellers saw much that was familiar in 
Mesopotamia, many elements of Mesopotamia remained alien to them. 
Mesopotamia’s alterity was most often expressed in orientalist stereotypes, which 
depicted the region and its inhabitants as not only different, but inferior to those who 
described them. In these accounts, Mesopotamian men were depicted as afflicted with 
‘Oriental Fatalism’; they were seen as lazy and fundamentally incapable of any 
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initiative or positive action. Fraser saw ‘groups of white-clad Arabs [who] sat in the 
arches smoking and gazing into space’.136   Similarly, Bell wrote of a homogenous group 
who ‘no matter what their degree, all wore the singularly abandoned aspect to which 
only the Oriental on a journey can attain’.137   Mesopotamia’s women were either 
entirely ignored by British travellers and commentators or, where they were 
considered, were sexualised and depicted as non-participants in Mesopotamian life. 
Louisa Jebb described a typical scene in the following way: 
The plain is suddenly dotted with bending, praying forms, groups of excited 
talking Arabs, isolated, contemplative, smoking individuals, fussy superior 
Turkish officers flicking the specks of travel off their smart uniforms; veiled 
women peep from behind the curtain of a closely packed conveyance; a small 
Arab child plants himself with outstretched legs in front of us, and sucks his 
thumb in complete absorption as he gazes upon us like a little wild animal.138  
Jebb’s description grouped the people she encountered into defining clusters.  Even 
the ‘smoking individuals’ she noted were not individual at all, but, like the others she 
described, were a group defined by their solitude. None but the small child – who in a 
continuation of the barbarity she associated with Arabs in general is a ‘little wild 
animal’ – are distinguished by any individual characteristics. The women who ‘peep’ 
silently from behind their veils lack all distinguishing traits; hidden behind a partition, 
the women are here reduced to their peeping gaze: a fleeting presence, 
undistinguished by any mark of individuality.   
It is clear that though the terms ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabs’ might be interpreted 
to include Arab women, women were rarely included by these epithets. In Jebb’s 
description above, the women were not included in the ‘groups of excited talking 
Arabs’.  In a later passage, Jebb observed an approaching group: ‘first came half a 
dozen Arabs, then a veiled woman, then a donkey’.139  The term Arab here referred 
only to the Arab man, whilst the Arab woman was distinguished from the group by the 
addition of a description of her gender. Mark Sykes, too, noted that ‘the Arabs may be 
divided roughly into two kinds – those who work a little, and those who do nothing at 
all’.140  This would suggest that he believed all Arabs to be afflicted by fatalistic 
laziness.  However, later in his paper Sykes told his audience that some Arab tribes had 
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‘the habit of leaving a great portion of the work to the women, and it is no uncommon 
thing to see a woman with a child on her back either ploughing or digging a canal while 
her husband dozes in the tent’.141 Sykes’s example makes it clear that he did not 
include Arab women in his conclusion that all Arabs were lazy and incapable of hard 
work.  He used ‘Arabs’ to refer only to Arab men.     
  Where Mesopotamian women were described in greater detail, they 
were overtly sexualised. For example, Bell recalled an encounter with a woman whom 
she described as ‘the famous Shemash’: 
We gave the mare a feed of corn – her gentle, hungry eyes were turned 
appealingly on our full mangers; but to Shemash I was harder hearted, though 
her eyes were more beautiful than those of the mare. She came suppliant as I 
sat dining on the Mudir’s roof at nightfall and begged me to recover her 
husband’s rifle, which lay below in the hands of the government. Her straight 
brows were pencilled together with indigo and a short blue line marked the 
roundness of her white chin; a cloak slipping backwards from her head showed 
the rows of scarlet beads about her throat, and as she drew it together with 
slender fingers, Fattuh, Hussein and I gazed on her with unmixed approval.142  
Bell allied her female gaze and perspective on Shemash with those of her male 
companions. This can be read as another instance where Bell identified herself within, 
rather than at the periphery of, both patriarchal modes of power and oriental life. The 
unification of her gaze with that of her companions implied that Bell was not merely a 
western spectator, but that she also saw this woman as her eastern travel companions 
did. Therefore, despite the fact that the person describing her was a woman, the 
perspective is a male one that sexually objectified Shemash.  
  Bell highlighted the power imbalance between herself and Shemash; 
she wrote that Shemash ‘came suppliant’ and ‘begged’ her to help. In so doing, Bell 
evoked an image of herself as Shemash’s potential rescuer: a traditionally male role. 
Whether Bell’s gaze was truly an eastern one, as her comment would have the reader 
believe, is more debatable. Bell’s description exoticises Shemash; she did not merely 
draw the reader’s attention to the traits of her beauty, such as her beautiful eyes, but 
to those exotic traits that only an oriental woman might have. Bell described the indigo 
between Shemash’s brows and the veil that slipped backwards to reveal suggestive 
‘scarlet beads’ about her throat.  Bell’s description evokes the classic orientalist trope, 
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whereby the Arab woman’s veiled and modest attire hides a seductress. Said writes 
that ‘the association between the Orient and sex is remarkably persistent’;143  he 
argues that the power of orientalist discourse was at least in part underpinned by the 
image of the Arab who ‘produces himself endlessly, sexually, and little else’.144 In 
reproducing these orientalist tropes, Bell entered into their power over the people she 
described.  
Similarly, David Fraser described a group of women he saw bathing as 
he travelled by boat down the Tigris: 
We whisk round a little cape and come full upon a tiny bay with sandy shores, 
where within a few yards are desporting themselves a bathing party of women 
and children. They are so astonished at our sudden apparition that they just 
stand transfixed as we first catch sight of them, and remain so until we are 
swept out of sight. One soft-rounded figure with glistening russett skin will be 
standing knee-deep in the water, with her back to the river and her hands 
dipped to splash a little flock of crowing infants. She delays the splashing and 
just turns her head to see us pass. Another full blown rose perhaps stands in an 
attitude of languid amusement watching the play, her feet in the water, arms 
thrown up, and hands behind her head, Psyche to the very life. Half-grown girls 
running about like fawns suddenly halt on one foot and stare at us with their 
big brown eyes. In the rear will be pairs of squatting figures, one braiding the 
other’s hair, the other watching the process in a little flashing mirror. For 
background there are boiling pots, grey old women busily washing, and great 
patches of coloured garments spread out to dry upon the silver sand. Grouped 
here and there is the fascinating variety of corn-coloured, golden, peach-pink; 
creamy, glowing skin, covering figures in every attitude of grace and 
abandonment, with never a rag to hide the curved and swelling lines.145  
Fraser’s description of the Mesopotamian women is reminiscent of the orientalist 
paintings by artists such as Eugene Delacroix, Jean Leon Gérôme, William James 
Muller, John Frederick Lewis and Thomas Seddon. David Scott writes that orientalists 
‘turned to the Orient as an exotically different world which became a real alternative 
to their own’,146 but also because they saw in the east the origins of their own 
civilizations: 
European painters and writers were nevertheless also anxious to explore in the 
East the historical and ideological roots of classical and Christian civilization in 
their Hebrew and Egyptian origins, to rediscover and renew the elements of 
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Oriental culture which the West had over the centuries absorbed into its 
own.147 
Like these British travellers and commentators of the early twentieth century, the 
orientalists conceived of the east as both the progenitor of western civilization and as 
barbaric and exotic in its contemporary existence. Fraser’s description is reminiscent of 
Jean Leon Gérôme’s 1903 painting View of Medinet El-Fayoum: 148 
Figure 6. Jean Leon Gérôme, View of Medinet El-Fayoum 
Gérôme was a well-known painter and sculptor who taught at the Ecole 
des Beaux–Arts. His paintings of the Orient are exemplary of the genre; indeed, his 
Snake Charmer was used on the dust jacket of Said’s Orientalism in 1978.149 In her 
1983 essay ‘The Imaginary Orient’, Linda Nochlin argues that the realism of orientalist 
paintings, exemplified by the work of Gérôme, fools the viewer into believing that 
what they represent is a realistic, impartial view of the east. Drawing on Orientalism, 
she argues that, on the contrary, orientalist paintings reproduced the cultural 
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prejudices and stereotypes of the east held by the painters’ societies. Consequently 
orientalist paintings often represented the men of the orient as lazy or barbaric and its 
women as sexually available. Arguing for the adoption of Said’s ideas in the field of art 
history, Nochlin asserts: 
Surely it may most profitably be considered as a visual document of 
nineteenth-century colonialist ideology, an iconic distillation of the Westerner’s 
notion of the Oriental couched in the language of a would-be transparent 
naturalism.150  
  View of Medinet El-Fayoum is one of Gérôme’s much later and less 
discussed works, and was first exhibited just a year before his death, at the Salon of 
1903.151   In both Fraser’s scene and Gérôme’s View of Medinet El-Fayoum, the women 
appear to frolic unaware or undisturbed by the stranger’s gaze. Gérôme’s painting, like 
Fraser’s later description, depicted the ‘soft-rounded figure*s+’ of oriental women.  
Fraser’s descriptions of the girl who ‘delays the splashing and just turns her head to 
see us pass’, or those ‘half-grown girls running about like fawns [who] suddenly halt on 
one foot and stare at us with their big brown eyes’ suggest that, like the orientalist 
painters, Fraser is hinting that these women are enjoying the male gaze upon their 
naked bodies. Like the lounging odalisques of the orientalists, Fraser’s women sport 
‘an attitude of languid amusement’ and are ‘figures in every attitude of grace and 
abandonment, with never a rag to hide the curved and swelling lines’. Fraser’s use of 
Psyche to describe one of the women places his scene in a tradition of western art and 
evokes the paintings of bathing women in the orient, which would have been familiar 
to his audience.   
  In Ways of Seeing John Berger argues that in the history of western art: 
Men act and women appear. Men look at women. Women watch themselves 
being looked at. This determines not only most relations between men and 
women but also the relation of women to themselves. The surveyor of woman 
in herself is male: the surveyed female. Thus she turns herself into an object- 
and most particularly an object of vision: a sight.152  
This imbalance of power, which objectifies the female body, is all the more 
problematic when one considers Gérôme’s painting or Fraser’s description of oriental 
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women. The naked body of the oriental woman is objectified on a sexual level, as a 
western woman’s body would be by the male gaze, but she is also disempowered 
racially. Although Nochlin does not discuss Gérôme’s View of Medinet El-Fayoum, she 
concludes that: 
Like many other art works of his time, Gérôme’s Orientalist painting managed 
to body forth two ideological assumptions about power: one about men’s 
power over women; the other about white men’s superiority to, hence 
justifiable control over, inferior, darker races, precisely those who indulge in 
this sort of regrettably lascivious commerce.153  
Like Gérôme’s painting, Fraser’s description of the bathing women objectified the 
women’s bodies sexually and asserted his power over them.  
 
 
Mesopotamia’s Inhospitable Climate 
 
  Mesopotamia’s alterity also manifested itself in its inhospitable climate 
and geography. European travellers struggled to cope with the arid deserts and 
fluctuations in temperature that seemed to assault their senses. David Fraser quipped 
that ‘June in Mesopotamia and adjacent regions is like summer in Hades, and fit for 
none to travel in but salamanders, corpses and correspondents of the Press’.154 Sykes 
argued that Mesopotamia’s climate rendered it unsuitable as a potential western 
colony, and concluded that ‘we must remember that the idea of European colonization 
is hardly one that can be entertained. *…+ The Jazirah is not a country for white men to 
work in’.155 Mesopotamia’s climate was seen actively to repel the European; the 
implication of Sykes’s paper was that it was a place that could only be inhabited by lazy 
Arabs. In many accounts, Mesopotamia was described as a barren, lifeless place; Jebb 
described ‘a dreary country of broken grey stones with no sign of vegetation or life of 
any kind’.156 And for Gertrude Bell it was at times ‘a horrible wilderness, stony, 
waterless and devoid of any growing thing’.157  
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  The inhospitable Mesopotamian desert was the most repellent aspect 
of Mesopotamia’s climate and geography to British travellers, yet it seemed to 
fascinate them.  In one passage from Amurath to Amurath, Bell described a scene she 
had witnessed, where two parties came before a Kadi or Judge to settle a dispute: 
The sheik came in dressed in the full panoply of the desert, black-and-gold 
cloak, black kerchief and white under-robe; his skin was darkened by the sun, 
his beard coal-black. The merchant was a shaven, white-faced townsman in a 
European coat. The pair were, to my fancy, symbolic of the east and the 
advancing west, and I backed the west *…+. *After+ a few moments of angry 
recrimination they were both dismissed to gather further evidence; but the 
Kadi called the sheikh back and shook his finger at him. “Open your eyes, oh 
sheikh,” said he. “Asia, open your eyes”!158  
For Bell, the two men were literally as different as black and white: the shaikh was 
identified by his ‘black-and-gold cloak’ and ‘black kerchief’; ‘his skin was darkened by 
the sun’ and ‘his beard coal-black’ was to be contrasted with the ‘white-faced’  
townsman with his shaven face and ‘European coat’. The Shaikh was conflated with 
the desert, which for Bell, however exciting, was a backward place, directly opposed to 
legal order, Europe, the West and progress.  
  The extremes of heat and cold in the desert seemed actively to reject 
the presence of British travellers. It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the desert 
seemed to magnify their negative perceptions of the country. Bell wrote that ‘even 
those who cannot properly be numbered among the criminal classes catch an infection 
from the lawless air of the desert’.159 And if Mesopotamia was generally perceived as a 
place populated by simple, backward people, the desert was positively primordial. This 
primitivism did not always carry with it the negativity of other perceptions of 
Mesopotamia as a backward place. Instead, the desert was often seen as a comforting 
place in which to connect with the essentials of one’s soul.  
  Priya Satia maintains that British travellers went to Arabia in search of 
this primordial sense of peace, but also because it was the very difficulty of surviving in 
the desert that appealed to them; they wanted to emulate the almost superhuman 
Bedouin who chose to make this inhospitable climate their home. She argues that 
British travellers believed that if they could acquire the qualities of the Bedouin, these 
would combine with their European qualities to render them superior to the desert 
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peoples themselves.160 This idea can be seen in some of Bell’s descriptions of the 
desert: 
Now no-one rides into the desert, however uncertain the adventure, without a 
keen sense of exhilaration. The bright morning sun, the wide clean levels, the 
knowledge that the problems of existence are reduced on a sudden to their 
simplest expression, your own wit and endurance being the sole determining 
factors – all these things brace and quicken the spirit.161  
In this extract, Bell clearly saw the desert as a challenge to be overcome, almost 
relishing the uncertainty and problems she identified as part of desert travel. She 
thrived upon the obstacles presented by the desert, savouring the opportunity to test 
her ‘wit and endurance’ against its challenges.  
  Similarly, Louisa Jebb reflected: 
But when you lie on your back on a sandy desert with nothing within 
measurable distance of you, and the rain beats mercilessly down or the wind 
howls through the crevices of your garments, you are conscious of battling 
against great primeval forces akin to the unknown elements of your own being; 
you cannot escape from them, for there is no shelter round the corner: you are 
brought up face to face with something fundamental; all the little accessories 
with which we have learnt to shield ourselves fall away, and you are just there, 
stripped yourself, and in the middle of naked realities.162  
Jebb was clearly proud to have survived her battle against the ‘great primeval forces’ 
she described. Her vision of the desert draws the reader’s attention to its challenges: 
the rain is merciless and the wind howls. Like Bell, Jebb saw the desert as a place that 
forced travellers to look deep within themselves for the resources to survive.  In her 
insistence that the desert stripped (European) travellers of the luxuries afforded them 
by the modernity of their western culture, and her use of words such as ‘primeval’ and 
‘fundamental’ to describe the difficulties posed by the desert environment, she 
stressed the distance between her own, ‘modern’, civilization and that of the desert. 
  More often, however, travellers revelled in the other-worldliness of the 
desert landscape. Evoking the magical world of the Arabian Nights, their descriptions 
of the desert describe a place that plunged them into a world of mystique and spiritual 
beauty. Thus, Bell writes: 
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The thin blue smoke of the morning camp fires rose out of the hollows and my 
heart rose with it, for here was the life of the desert, in open spaces under the 
open sky, and when once you have known it, the eternal savage in your breast 
rejoices at the return to it.163  
Bell’s return to the desert was also a return to a primordial state; she rejoiced in the 
feeling only possible in a barbaric, ancient and unchanging place that awakened ‘the 
eternal savage’ in her.  
  The mystification of the desert as an other-worldly place reached its 
pinnacle in the idea of the mirage. The mirage was described as physical distortion of 
the senses affected by the desert landscape. Sykes related to his audience his 
experience of a mirage: 
The atmosphere which is at once clear and hazy, produces a very curious 
illusion – a stone 800 yards away appears to be close at hand, while a mountain 
on the horizon which is not more than 6 miles away appears to be treble the 
distance; the two effects combined give an impression of a vastness and space 
that it is difficult to describe in words. The sky, which in spring is often cloudy 
and overcast, throws strange streaky shadows over the landscape, and a dull 
indefinite line of grey on the horizon will change suddenly to a clear bright 
ridge of yellow hills, which is equally quickly transmuted to a dark, forbidding 
range of purple mountains; the wadies form trailing serpents of olive-green and 
brilliant flowers; the rolling steppes run in lines of grey and green, thus marking 
the good grazing-land from the stony tracts. On the sky-line herds of camels 
move almost imperceptibly to and fro cropping the grass, while on the hillsides 
dappled flocks of sheep speckle the country with splashes of black and brown 
and yellow. The larks while in the air, sing cheerily. Now and again a rare 
thunderstorm comes rushing across the land – a dark curtain of black, from 
which the huge falling drops smite the dusty ground, the hills and distant plains 
vanish, the horizon closes in, the ground turns yellow and red, the yellow 
lightning sends an unearthly sheen upon the grass, and for ten minutes we are 
in a strange unknown world of rushing waters, roaring wind, and rolling 
thunder. The storm passes over, the camels and sheep begin to move again, 
the larks are once more in voice, and, save for a little brightness in the sky, the 
desert is as it was before.164  
The mirage, which would play an important role in the way the Mesopotamian 
campaign was conducted and perceived during the First World War, was the epitome 
of the mystification of the Mesopotamian landscape. As Sykes’s description suggests, it 
was an entirely alienating and physically disorientating phenomenon. It was an 
experience that could only be found in the east and that Sykes found ‘difficult to 
express in words’. The desert was the extreme: the place where not even one’s own 
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senses could be trusted, and where the landscape itself seemed to repel the British 
traveller.  
  Nevertheless, here too British travellers saw similarities with their own 
western experience. Bell reflected that:  
To travel in the desert is in one respect curiously akin to travelling on the sea: it 
gives you no premonition of the changed environment to which the days of 
journeying are conducting you. When you set sail from a familiar shore you 
enter on a course from which the usual landmarks of daily existence have been 
swept away.165 
Even where Mesopotamia was at its most exotic, its furthest away from the European 
or familiar world, its most other, somehow travellers found a way to relate it back and 
understand it through a familiar experience.  Yet, like Mesopotamia itself, its attraction 
was ultimately that it was an alien, and alienating, experience. As Bell put it:  ‘you set 
sail from a familiar shore’, but ‘you enter on a course from which the usual landmarks 





  There is a remarkable consistency to the ways in which the inhabitants 
of Mesopotamia were represented by the travellers, journalists, archaeologist and 
orientalists that this chapter examines. The prevalence of the stereotypes that Edward 
Said identified as part of an Orientalist discourse is significant. In the decades since 
Said’s Orientalism was published, scholars have drawn attention to the fruitful points 
of contact that can be seen between the west and its others. Rather than seeing such 
interactions as fragments of a discourse that asserted its power over the peoples it 
described, defined and created, scholars have sought to examine the more nuanced 
relations between peoples despite the imbalance in power between them: to seek out 
a productive human interaction in the ‘interstices’.166  
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   James Clifford has suggested that travel should accordingly be ‘seen as 
a complex and pervasive spectrum of human experiences’.167 He maintains that if we 
pay closer attention to the heterogeneity of travel experiences, to their peculiarities, 
‘practices of displacement might emerge as constitutive of cultural meanings rather 
than as their simple transfer or extension. The cultural effects of European 
expansionism, for example, could no longer be celebrated, or deplored, as a simple 
diffusion outward – of civilization, industry, science, or capital’.168 Billie Melman, too, 
has objected to a critical tendency to: 
 Look at travel as a form of domination. The occidental traveller’s gaze, the 
explorer’s eye, has been made an emblem of the unequal relations between 
Europe and the Orient. So much so that another aspect of exploration is 
forgotten: the comparison between self and ‘other’, between societies and 
between cultures, that travel makes possible.169  
 
Homi Bhabha has called our attention to the ‘“in- between” spaces’ in which people 
meet and interact.170 He has highlighted the importance of the ambiguities to be found 
in the cracks of the stereotypes that are so prevalent in representations of the other.  
  Yet, despite its limitations, Said’s analysis of an interlocking web of 
images – and stereotypes – that define and assert their power over the orient remains 
a powerful way in which to read the interactions described by the men and women 
whose accounts have been examined here. Whilst acknowledging the importance of 
seeing beyond, or in, the fissures within such discourses of power, the extent to which 
these travellers and writers did reproduce an orientalist discourse must also be 
acknowledged.   
  British travellers went to Mesopotamia in search of the history, culture 
and mystique they associated with the east. What they found amongst, or perhaps 
(literally) beneath, the surface of the exotic was an image of themselves. They found in 
the history of Mesopotamia aspects of what they already knew or, as the search for 
Layard’s triumphs illustrates, what was already familiar in a land that was unfamiliar 
and understood by them as inferior and barbaric. Mesopotamia was experienced as a 
place that brought them face to face with a long-forgotten part of who they 
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understood themselves to be. It was a place that they recognised, but that was in 
essence alien to them. By appropriating the familiar as their own and understanding 
what was other to be Mesopotamian, British travellers and commentators could 
continue to homogenise the people and places of Mesopotamia as oriental, eastern 


















The Mesopotamian Campaign 1914-1916 
 
The First World War was perceived and described by British commentators as both a 
war of European civilizations and as a war for civilization – ‘the Great war for 
civilisation’ as the medals awarded to servicemen proclaimed. Pre-war descriptions of 
Mesopotamia both highlighted its importance in the history of what was perceived as 
European or British ‘civilization’, and contrasted this with Mesopotamia’s perceived 
contemporary backwardness and barbarity. For those who were sent to fight in the 
‘cradle of civilization’, these ideas resonated in complex ways, which coloured British 
servicemen’s impressions of both Mesopotamia and its peoples. Concepts of ‘race’ and 
‘civilization’ also impacted on how British military personnel viewed, and interacted 
with, their ‘native’ colleagues in the Indian army, as they compared and contrasted the 
behaviour of the races they ruled with those they were only beginning to contemplate 
ruling directly.  This chapter will explore how concepts of civilization combined with 
theories of race and ideas about empire to shape wartime British perceptions of 
Mesopotamia and its peoples.  
  Official or governmental perceptions of Mesopotamia have been 
thoroughly documented in works such as Briton Cooper Busch’s Britain, India and the 
Arabs, Elizabeth Monroe’s Britain’s Moment in the Middle East and Peter Sluglett’s 
Britain in Iraq.171 This chapter will not attempt to examine the way British or Indian 
governments viewed their role in the future of Mesopotamia. It will concentrate 
instead on individual reactions to the region, in an attempt to sketch how people on 
the ground saw, and interacted with, Mesopotamia and its peoples during the first 
years of the war. It will also trace how Mesopotamia was presented to the British 
public in contemporary media coverage, letters home and in subsequent publications 
that described these first years of the campaign.  Many of those who had travelled to 
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Mesopotamia for their own purposes in the years that preceded the war, men and 
women like Reginald Campbell Thompson, Gertrude Bell and St John Philby, returned 
as sought-after Arabists to serve their country as political officers during the war; this 
chapter will also examine the impact of the First World War on their perceptions of 
Mesopotamia. In particular, it will examine British perceptions of Mesopotamia 
through an analysis of the defining episode of the Mesopotamian campaign: the siege 
of Kut and its immediate aftermath.  
  The siege of Kut defined the Mesopotamian campaign, both for those 
who fought in Mesopotamia, and for the British public at home. It was the first phase 
of the Mesopotamian campaign to receive sustained, detailed coverage in the British 
press. The British papers, which had paid scant attention to the Mesopotamian 
campaign’s successes up to this point, began following the campaign, which everyone 
believed was on the verge of capturing Baghdad and restoring British prestige in the 
East after the humiliating evacuation at Gallipoli. Coverage of what became the first 
British army to surrender with its colours since the battle of Yorktown in 1781 was the 
British public’s first significant exposure to the campaign in Mesopotamia.172 Indeed, 
the siege continues to define the Mesopotamian campaign; the events surrounding 
the fall of Kut are often the main, or only, episode of the campaign detailed in modern 
histories of the First World War. The surrender of Major-General Charles Townshend’s 
beleaguered garrison was a shocking end to the seemingly unstoppable success that 
Indian Expeditionary Force D (hereafter IEF D) had enjoyed since the start of its 
operations in Mesopotamia, in November 1914.  
The fall of Kut caused a public outcry, partly because it came in lieu of a 
much publicised approaching success, but particularly as ministers were forced to 
admit that medical facilities had been grossly inadequate during Townshend’s retreat 
from Ctesiphon and subsequent entrapment at Kut. The Vincent-Bingley Commission’s 
report, commissioned by the government of India to investigate the shortcomings of 
the medical services, failed to allay public anxiety and was followed by the 
Mesopotamia Commission.173  This British parliamentary commission was charged with 
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investigating the military failings that had led to Townshend’s humiliating defeat. 
Chapter three will look at the perceptions of Mesopotamia that are revealed in the 
Commission’s hearings, papers and final conclusions. The siege of Kut can be seen as a 
microcosm of the early Mesopotamian campaign; the pressures of the siege and the 
hardships of the gruelling march to the Anatolian prisoner-of-war camps bring into 
clearer focus the racial tensions that this chapter will investigate.  
  Those who were sent to Mesopotamia to serve their country during the 
First World War shared many of the same cultural references as the travellers, 
archaeologists and journalists who had come before them, but they encountered 
Mesopotamia and its peoples under fundamentally altered circumstances.  The men 
and women who had sought Mesopotamia out in the early twentieth century had 
done so of their own volition. Their trips were often difficult and their journeys 
sometimes fraught with danger, but they were ultimately carried out for pleasure. In 
Donald Maxwell’s record of the time he spent in Mesopotamia, A Dweller in 
Mesopotamia: Being the Adventures of an Official Artist in the Garden of Eden, he 
reflected that:  
To have travelled in the land where Sennacherib held sway, to have walked 
upon the Sacred Way in Babylon, to have stood in the great banquet hall of 
Belshazzar’s palace when the twilight is raising ghosts and *…+ to wander in the 
moonlight into narrow streets in Old Baghdad, with its recollections of the 
Arabian Nights: these things are to make enduring pictures in the Palace of 
Memory.174   
It is difficult to differentiate Maxwell’s wartime impressions of Mesopotamia from 
those of the travellers, writers and archaeologists who had come before him. Like 
them, his focus was on the importance of Mesopotamia’s past and, like them, he 
identified Mesopotamia as the land of the Arabian Nights. But Maxwell’s recollections 
are tinged with nostalgia for his romantic vision of Mesopotamia during the war, which 
is not to be found in the impressions of the travellers and commentators of the pre-
war years. The nostalgia of the travellers of the early twentieth century had been for 
the grandeur of ancient Mesopotamia or for the primeval peace that they had found in 
the desert, never for Mesopotamia in its contemporary state.   
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  But during Maxwell’s time in a land that had been characterised by the 
travellers that had come before him as frozen in its development – a living museum of 
its own history – Mesopotamia would undergo a period of modernisation and change.  
Wartime pressures would bring modern technology, railways and power stations, and 
an Indian-style administration that began to transform Mesopotamia. This chapter will 
trace British perceptions of Mesopotamia as it changed from an exotic travel 
destination, which was familiar because it was seen as a living illustration from the 
pages of the Old Testament or childhood editions of the Arabian Nights, to a 
battlefield of the First World War.175  
 
 
The Mesopotamian Campaign 
 
  Indian Expeditionary Force D was the fourth contingent of Indian troops 
sent to help the British war effort. Force A had been deployed to France, and Forces B 
and C had been sent to East Africa. The Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, 
reluctantly authorised the despatch of part of the 6th (Poona) Division in October 1914. 
The Ottoman Empire had yet to enter the war, and Hardinge was wary of any action 
that might suggest to the Muslim population of India that Britain was looking for a 
confrontation with the Caliph; he was also afraid that troop levels in India itself were 
being depleted to dangerously low levels.176 Despite these concerns, the 16th Brigade 
of the 6th Division, led by Major-General Delamain, reached Bahrain in October and, 
once war with Turkey had been declared, in November 1914, Delamain and his men 
landed on the Persian island of Fao.  
  Delamain’s orders were to protect the British Government’s investment 
in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company by securing its pipeline at Abadan, in Persia.  He was 
also to maintain good relations with local Arab leaders and, as the prime minister, 
Herbert Asquith, put it in his announcement to the House of Commons, ‘generally to 
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maintain the authority of our flag in the East’.177 Later that month, General Sir Arthur 
Barrett arrived in the Gulf with a further two brigades; under his command, IEF D 
captured the Mesopotamian port of Basra in November 1914, and by December they 
had occupied Qurna, further north on the Tigris. In April 1915, General Sir John Nixon 
took command of IEF D and, later that month, Major-General Charles Townshend 
arrived in Mesopotamia to take charge of the 6th Division. Under Nixon’s command, IEF 
D captured the towns of Amara, Nasiriyah and Kut-al-Amara by September 1915. In 
October, Nixon sent a telegram informing his superiors that he was ready to ‘open the 
road to Baghdad’.178   
  The period between the first arrival of British troops in the Gulf in 1914 
and Townshend’s advance to Kut in September 1915 was a remarkably successful one 
for the relatively small and ill-equipped force. Townshend and his troops had been 
particularly successful; the 6th Division had been responsible for many of IEF D’s 
advances after April 1915. With the help of the Royal Navy in amphibious attacks, they 
had captured all but Nasiriyeh. By October that year, it was Townshend’s troops that 
had reached Aziziyah, and their advance to Baghdad being debated in London and 
Simla.   
 
 
First impressions of Mesopotamia 
 
  Despite the initial success enjoyed by British and Indian troops in this 
early period, the campaign in Mesopotamia was perceived as irrelevant to the final 
outcome of the war: ‘the beginning of a side-show’, as Reginald Campbell Thompson, 
then a Captain in the Indian Political Service in Basra, titled this chapter of his 
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unpublished wartime memoir, With the Intelligence to Baghdad.179 Some, like Captain 
Harold Dickson, resented their despatch to Mesopotamia and tried hard to secure a 
posting on the Western Front, where they believed the war would ultimately be 
decided. Whilst still in Britain, Dickson wrote to his mother complaining that he was 
‘sick to death’ that his efforts to remain in Europe had proved unsuccessful.180 Dickson, 
of the 29th Lancers, would later join the political service and make a career for himself 
in the Middle East, but in August 1914, having ‘used up all [his] efforts in the past week 
to try and get a job in Belgium’, he reluctantly set off for India. 181 Once he knew that 
he was on his way to the Persian Gulf, he looked forward to what he hoped would turn 
out to be a ‘big show’ and the possibility of the capture of Baghdad.182 Despite these 
early hopes, Dickson’s knowledge of Arabic and the fact that he knew ‘heaps, having 
read a great deal about it’,183 he wrote home to his mother in December 1914 that he 
and his men were ‘longing to get to France’.184   
  Dickson was by no means alone in his desire to be on the Western 
Front. Vice-Admiral Wilfred Nunn captained the Espiègle (one of the crafts that 
accompanied IEF D during this phase of the campaign). In his memoir, Tigris Gunboats, 
Nunn recalled that ‘to be in the East at the time was a disappointment to all in the 
Force. Most of the soldiers were wishing themselves in France’.185 By February 1915, 
despite the continuing success of the Mesopotamian campaign, Harold Dickson’s 
feelings had not changed. In a letter home he again explained his resentment: 
I wish we could all get transferred in a body to France. I know we are doing our 
little bit for the empire here, but one naturally wants to be at the heart of 
things. The Germans are going to take a lot of beating.186  
For Dickson, at this time, the only positive aspect of the campaign was that he and his 
men were doing their ‘little bit for the empire’. This description did not reflect the level 
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of sacrifice being offered by Dickson or his troops; these men had volunteered to serve 
their country in the ‘Great War’ and were risking their lives, often under very difficult 
circumstances; these were not insignificant contributions to the war effort. Harold 
Dickson’s comments highlight the fact that this seemed a very great sacrifice in a 
theatre of war that was not perceived by the men fighting it as relevant to Britain’s 
ultimate victory. It was difficult for him to see that this was a justifiable use of precious 
manpower and resources when the ‘real war’ on the Western Front showed no signs 
of a quick Allied victory. Dickson did not only wish that he, personally, could be sent to 
France, but also that the troops in Mesopotamia ‘could all get transferred in a body to 
France’; he simply did not believe that Mesopotamia as a theatre of war was a 
worthwhile investment of manpower or resources.  
  These sentiments continued to be expressed throughout the campaign. 
Major-General Ladislaus Richard Pope-Hennessy arrived in Mesopotamia in September 
1916 to take up his post as the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, Oxfordshire 
and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. Still reeling from the shock of the surrender of the 
garrison at Kut, Pope-Hennessy wrote home to his wife that ‘no dead Turk brings the 
end of the war nearer, while a dead German means a fraction of a minute off the 
duration of the war’.187   This was one of the fundamental problems of the campaign in 
Mesopotamia: many of those who were sent to serve there did not perceive it as a 
worthwhile theatre of war, and the Ottoman Empire was not perceived to be the real 
enemy.  Articles in the British press even suggested that the Ottomans were essentially 
German puppets, or that Turkey had been tricked into entering the war by Germany.188 
This inevitably made it more difficult for those men and women to endure the 
difficulties that they confronted in Mesopotamia.  
  Unlike Dickson, Reginald Campbell-Thompson had requested a 
commission somewhere where his knowledge of Arabic could be put to use. The title 
he gave his chapter may not have reflected his personal feelings about the 
Mesopotamian campaign, but rather the general impression of the campaign in 
Mesopotamia.189 Even when British servicemen did not resent their despatch to 
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Mesopotamia, they were plagued by the knowledge that the Mesopotamian campaign 
was badly understood and, consequently, little appreciated by people at home. The 
British media published brief notices of IEF D’s achievements as the force made its way 
north, but not until Townshend’s ill-fated advance towards Baghdad did they devote 
very much space to longer commentary on its progress. Understandably, the Western 
Front featured far more prominently in media coverage of the war; yet often the 
coverage of the Gallipoli campaign or of the protection of the Suez Canal was also 
more detailed than that of the early stages of the Mesopotamian campaign. The latter 
was, as a report in the Nation in December 1915 indicated, perceived as ‘subsidiary to 
the operations in the main theatre of war’.190 Servicemen often commented on the 
lack of media coverage of their campaign, viewing this as confirmation that they were, 
as A. J. Barker put it in his history of the campaign, ‘the forgotten Army of the First 
World War’.191   
   In one letter published in the Manchester Guardian in May 1915, an 
‘Englishman in the Persian Gulf’ complained to his mother ‘that the home papers 
publish no news at all of the Persian and Mesopotamian fighting’.192 He wrote that the 
lack of media coverage was particularly ‘hard on the troops engaged, who have done 
splendidly in a peculiarly wicked country’.193 The Manchester Guardian gave the 
campaign more coverage than most papers, publishing a small number of letters home 
from Mesopotamia, such as this one, and other occasional articles on the campaign. 
Nevertheless, in common with most British publications, the majority of its coverage 
was limited to brief updates of IEF D’s progress. Harold Dickson, too, complained in 
letters home to his mother that ‘the papers we see scarcely mention anything of the 
doings of our forces here. Nor are our casualties even printed in one list, they appear 
to be purposely spread out over many days’.194 As the anonymous serviceman’s letter 
indicates, this was particularly difficult to bear when those serving in Mesopotamia 
believed that they were serving under especially difficult conditions in ‘a peculiarly 
wicked country’. 
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  Servicemen felt neglected not only by the lack of interest shown by the 
British media, but by the scarcity of resources – and consequent discomfort – they 
experienced in Mesopotamia. Lord Hardinge described the Mesopotamian campaign 
to the Mesopotamia Commission in 1916 as ‘the “Cinderella” of all the expeditions’; he 
attributed this to the fact that ‘the late secretary for war *Kitchener+ did not take an 
interest in any expedition for which he was not himself more or less responsible’.195 
William Bird was a private in the 2nd Battalion Dorsetshire Regiment (16th Indian 
Infantry Brigade, 6th Poona Division); his diary of the first weeks he spent in 
Mesopotamia is dominated by the scarcity of food. He often recorded his hunger; 
upon arrival at Basra in November 1914, Bird recalled: ‘we were so hungry that my 
chum Rusty Hellard and I went and bought one rupee of Arab chapattis and eight 
annas of dates, and we sat down and ate the lot and they seemed beautiful to us’.196 
By December that year, Bird noted that ‘the food now is improving although there is 
not enough. Sometimes we have to cut cards to see who’s to have certain things’.197   
  Harold Dickson wrote home that he and his troops were ‘suffering a 
good deal of hardships’:  
Heat is fearful & we have no tents whatsoever. Not a particle of shade in the 
shape of trees and bushes. It is a real hard time we are having. We have been a 
week on the march & our supply question got more of a problem as we go on. 
We are not exactly on short ration, but we are on hard fare. NO sugar, bully 
beef, no milk, no lime juice, no vegetables at all. Dirty water to drink (pea 
soup). If only heat would subside. To cap our trial[s] we have a howling hot 
wind blowing all day raising one big dust storm from morn till night.’198  
In annotations to the war diary of the 28th Field Battery, 9th Brigade, Meerut Division, 
Royal Field Artillery captain H.B. Latham, who arrived in Basra in November 1915, 
wrote of the ‘appalling’ conditions he and his colleagues endured.199 Latham 
complained of the rain that ‘seemed to be never ending’ but also of the scarcity of 
food supplies.200 He noted that ‘the men in the trenches and in the *unreadable+ line 
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had the best luck - as food was more plentiful there - but even there - with one tin of 
“Bully” amongst five officers for luncheon, one used to watch automatically how much 
the others took’.201 Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to imagine why so 
many British servicemen thought Mesopotamia was ‘a loathsome county’.202  
  Not all those serving in Mesopotamia had to endure the hardships Bird, 
Dickson and others described. St John Philby, serving as a political officer in Basra, 
noted in his memoirs that he and his colleagues ‘often attended one or other of the 
local music-halls to hear the singing of Olga, Marcia and other popular artistes 
originating from Aleppo’.203  Philby recalled dining lavishly at the officers’ mess on 
wine and other luxury supplies left behind by German troops, and reflected that ‘it was 
sometimes difficult to think that we had anything to do with the war that was going on 
up-river’.204    
  Gertrude Bell, who arrived in Mesopotamia in 1915, and the wives of 
political officers were the only British women in Mesopotamia for the first two years of 
the campaign, as nurses were only sent to Mesopotamia in 1916. Many of these 
women, such as Belle Cox, wife of the Chief Political Officer and later British High 
Commissioner in Baghdad, Sir Percy Cox, seem to have left no record of their 
experience Mesopotamia. However, Emily Lorimer [née Overend], who had 
accompanied her husband David Lockhart Lorimer to Mesopotamia, left a record of 
her time as political officer’s wife and, later, editor of the British Government Press 
publication, the Basrah Times.205    
  Lorimer was an accomplished linguist who attained first-class honours 
degrees in French and German from the Royal University of Ireland and Somerville 
College, Oxford, where she taught Germanic philology until her marriage. Her letters 
home, which were a mixture of private letters and ‘family diaries’ intended for 
circulation to many family members, described a very different world from that 
experienced by the majority of British and Indian troops, especially those serving 
outside Basra. Particularly before her editorship of the Basrah Times, Lorimer’s letters 
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to her mother are full of requests, and thanks, for fashionable clothes and details of 
her busy social life. Her correspondence also reveals that it was only a privileged few in 
Basra who lived in relative luxury: 
We have been having the most terrific weather, wind and heavy rain and the 
whole place is a swamp; it is pretty bad even for the people down here at the 
base who are in tents or huts; one officer who came in yest. told us that that 
the entire hut in wh. he is living was flooded a foot or so with nice thick mud; 
they had to take spades and literally dig out their blankets. But if it is bad for 
them it must be 20 times worse for the unfortunate troops in the field.206  
As these comments indicate, Lorimer was aware that regardless of any discomforts she 
might have endured as a result of the Mesopotamian climate or people (whom she 
found dirty and vulgar), she lived in relative luxury. She was particularly aware of the 
hardships faced by men outside of Basra, because she worried constantly about the 
welfare of her husband, and wrote regularly to her mother that she would have 
foregone all of her comforts in Basra to be able to live closer to him.  
  As Lorimer’s concluding comments indicate, things were much worse 
for those serving in the field. It is unsurprising, considering the vast difference of 
experience between those stationed in Basra and those who served elsewhere in 
Mesopotamia, that Dickson wrote home that he had seen ‘with huge amusement’ the 
statement by the secretary of state for India, Austen Chamberlain, ‘that we were all 
getting ice, soda water, electric fans etc etc’.207 Like the anonymous serviceman 
published in the Manchester Guardian, Dickson complained that such a misleading 
statement ‘isn’t really cricket *…+ as the vast majority of our army is far north of Basra 
living under the hardest of conditions’.208 It was difficult enough for servicemen to 
endure the hardships of war: the harsh Mesopotamian climate, the scarcity of food 
and other supplies, and the difficult relationship between British forces and the 
population of Mesopotamia. But many servicemen felt that their contribution to the 
war effort was simply not appreciated back home and, like Harold Dickson, wanted 
‘people at home to realize a bit what we are experiencing’.209  
  Regardless of the level of comfort in which they lived, or the period 
during which they arrived in Mesopotamia, British servicemen, nurses, journalists and 
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other commentators were united in their hatred of the Mesopotamian climate. As 
Humphrey de Verd Leigh, who was an officer of the Royal Naval Air Service Seaplane 
Squadron in Mesopotamia in 1916 recalled, in the spring and summer Mesopotamia 
was ‘beastly hot’.210 Donald Maxwell described the region far more romantically and 
favourably than many of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, he reflected that ‘there is 
an unenviable competition between places situated in the region of Mesopotamia and 
the Persian Gulf as to which can be the hottest’.211 Lieutenant-Colonel Tennent of the 
Royal Flying Corps noted in his memoir, In the Clouds Above Baghdad, that 
Mesopotamia was: 
Famous at least for its climate; the humid heat hangs heavy on the lungs, 
everything is saturated, ink runs on the paper, and the matches will barely 
strike. Endure the day, but the night brings no relief. There is no freshness in a 
Busrah summer, and the ravages of prickly heat, mosquito, and sand-fly 
combine to shrivel all impulse and desire.212  
 
Tennent’s description of the climate in Mesopotamia was typical of reactions to the 
heat throughout the campaign. This combined with seasonal flooding to bring an 
oppressive humidity and insects (particularly sand flies, which spread disease among 
the men), making Mesopotamia, as Harold Dickson noted, ‘a bad country for 
troops’.213    
  Dickson referred to the Mesopotamian summer as ‘the unhealthy 
season’, writing to his mother in mid-February 1915 that, even at that time of the year, 
‘the heat is coming on’ and ‘the country is getting flooded everywhere, vast marshes of 
some hundreds of miles are appearing, *…+ & the mosquitos *sic+ are making their 
appearance’.214  Private Berry, who served as driver with Royal Field Artillery in 
Mesopotamia, recalled Mesopotamia as a country of ‘terrific heat’ filled with ‘sand 
flies *…+ centipedes and scorpions’; he remembered with some amusement ‘many 
Indian troops collapsing with the heat there; even they couldn’t stand it so I don’t 
know what they expected us to do about it. [Laughs] For some men the heat proved 
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too much to bear’.215 Berry recollected that two of his drivers ‘could stand no more, 
next we knew they just blew their brains out, they couldn’t take any more *…+. It was 
sad to us of course, it’s probably off the record, but it’s quite true’.216 Captain 
Thompson reflected wryly on Tennyson’s oft-quoted poem:  
If it be the accursed heat of summer one sweats thinking with desiccated 
humour of Tennyson’s prince and his silly verse, how many a sheeny summer 
morn he was borne past the highwalled gardens of Baghdad, pleasurably, we 
are to suppose: if winter, one shivers in the winds that sweep over the bistre 
landscape.217  
The men who served in Mesopotamia during the First World War had very little 
patience for romantic images of the region, such as that offered by Tennyson, which 
had dominated pre-war descriptions of Mesopotamia. While David Fraser had revelled 
in Tennyson’s verse as he approached Baghdad less than ten years earlier, for 
Thompson the idea that one might be able to enjoy a ‘summer morn’ anywhere in 
Mesopotamia was ridiculous.   
  As Thompson’s memoir indicates, there was no relief to be found in the 
Mesopotamian winters, which were cold and wet and offered hardships of a different 
kind. When Mesopotamia was not described as unbearably hot and humid, it was 
described as extremely cold and muddy. The mud caused no end of trouble for British 
servicemen, and many came to despise it and the country that had inflicted it upon 
them. Emily Lorimer’s description of the mud was very typical: it was an all-pervading 
plague that seemed to get everywhere and stick to everything. Major Alexander 
Anderson, later Sir Alexander Anderson, was a major commanding the Volunteer 
Artillery Battery, which was one of the units that would take part in Townshend’s 
attempt to capture Baghdad, and was besieged at Kut. In his diary of the time he spent 
in Mesopotamia, Anderson wrote that ‘no one who has not experienced 
Mesopotamian mud can have any conception of what it is like. It is unique’.218 He 
described it as a substance that  ‘sticks to your feet and makes them heavy as lead and 
is slippery like ice to walk on, so that it takes your utmost care to avoid falling and you 
feel glued to the spot you are on’.219 Pope-Hennessy recorded that his ‘camp *was+ 
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ankle deep in sticky mud’ and concluded: ‘I don’t think I have ever hated anything so 
much on earth as I hate this country’.220 Even Gertrude Bell, who was familiar with 
Mesopotamia and extremely fond of the country, wrote home in March 1916 that she 
had walked home ‘in imminent peril of a mud bath at every step’ because ‘when it 
rained walking in Basrah became a real feat of athletics, the roads being composed 
wholly of the constituents of pure mud’.221    
  Though mud is most often associated with the experiences of soldiers 
serving on the Western Front, it also dominated the lives of those who were sent to 
serve in Mesopotamia. In a series titled ‘Campaigning in the Mud – Trials of British 
soldiers in Many Lands’, the Manchester Guardian published a letter from ‘Sergeant A. 
Kingdom 2nd battalion Norfolk regiment, to his mother at Thetford’.222 From their 
disembarkation ‘in mud and water’, the lives of Kingdom and the men he served with 
were plagued by the Mesopotamian mud.223 He wrote home that he and his men 
‘marched all the next day through mud. [They] lay in the wet mud on the desert all 
night, and moved away early again in the morning, to find the enemy in position’.224 
Like Anderson, Kingdom was most struck by the operational difficulties that the mud 
caused. He described how ‘rifles were absolutely choked inside with mud, and the bolt 
action and sights had to be made to work before an accurate fire could be effected’.225 
Some men resorted to using their precious water supplies to clean their rifles, despite 
the fact that ‘water is so scarce and slush worth a gold piece an ounce’.226 In another 
letter published in the Manchester Guardian, ‘An Englishman in the Persian Gulf’ told 
his mother that ‘no story of the mud is exaggerated. It couldn’t be’.227 He described 
watching: 
A mule corps coming in when it was impossible to tell where a man began and 
mule ended. They were like a herd of centaurs carved out of Clay. I have seen 
Indian troops that could not be told from white troops, they were so caked 
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with mud dried white in the sun, guns that might be ambulance wagons, and 
wagons that might be mud forts.228 
The men who served in Mesopotamia were convinced that theirs was the worst lot. 
Not only did they have to serve in a country that they hated in terrible conditions, but 
they did so in a theatre of war that Lord Curzon described as ‘secondary’ in the House 
of Commons.229   
  It was only later, as troops were sent to Mesopotamia from the Western 
Front and other theatres, that servicemen in Mesopotamia felt that others began to 
appreciate quite how difficult their task in Mesopotamia had been. Some recently 
arrived men like Lieutenant Malcolm Murray Thornburn of 2nd Battalion, Black Watch, 
who arrived in Mesopotamia in January 1916, wrote that ‘those who have experienced 
war in France do not know what war is’.230 Emily Lorimer recorded the reaction of 
recently arrived troops in January 1916 in her letters to her family: 
We had very heavy rain last week wh. turned the whole place into a swamp 
and must have impeded our troops very much; however, the ground is drying 
up again now. Many of the new tro[o]ps have come out here from France, and 
were inclined beforehand to think they were coming to a picnic sort of warfare; 
they say that France is a picnic compared to this.231   
The horror stories of men drowning in mud on the Western Front were yet to take 
place in January 1916.  Although their lot may not actually have been the hardest, 
those who fought in Mesopotamia were always plagued by the fact that the hardships 
they suffered were endured in a theatre of war that would always be considered 
‘subsidiary’.  
  In an interview for the sound archive at the Imperial War Museum, 
General (then Lieutenant) Henry Hampton Rich, who served in the 120th Rajputana 
Infantry, was asked why he believed that the siege of Kut was still not well understood 
or documented. Rich told his interviewer that this was obvious: ‘it was a complete 
small side show *…+. It was worth nothing, it didn’t matter what happened to us.’232 It 
was this perception of the Mesopotamian campaign – expressed by those serving in 
Mesopotamia as well as by the contemporary media and modern histories of the war – 
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that made the hardships of war in Mesopotamia so difficult for British servicemen and 
women to endure.  
   British travellers to Mesopotamia in the early twentieth century 
identified Mesopotamia as the land of the Arabian Nights and the setting for many of 
the stories of the Old Testament. Those who were sent to Mesopotamia during the 
First World War also identified Mesopotamia with these familiar tropes.  Donald 
Maxwell’s memoirs suggested that even those servicemen who did not make the link 
between Mesopotamia and these familiar ideas could not escape the connection 
because:  
The natives have got up, in a most superficial way, the things which they think 
will interest the Englishman. Every group of palm trees more than twenty in 
number is pointed out as the Garden of Eden, every bump of ground more than 
six feet high is the mount on which the Ark rested, and every building more 
than fifty years old is the one undoubted and authentic residence of Sinbad the 
Sailor.233    
For most British servicemen Mesopotamia was a terrible place to be sent to fight, 
made all the worse because it was supposed to be the mythical land of the Arabian 
Nights or –  all the more ironic to British men and women struggling to survive its 
climate –  the Garden of Eden.   
  In his 1969 history of the siege of Kut, The Siege, Russell Braddon 
suggests that the contrast between ‘a mud hut village huddled round an open space 
from the centre of which grew the stump of an ancient tree’ and servicemen’s 
preconception of what the Tree of Knowledge should really have looked like ‘shocked’ 
British servicemen, who were offended by the Arab attempt to pass it off as the 
genuine article.234 Braddon argued that it was this kind of behaviour, which ensured 
that ‘the British regular detested Mesopotamia’.235  His conclusions draw attention to 
the gap between what pre-war accounts of Mesopotamia had led Britons to expect of 
the ‘land between the rivers’, and its reality in the early-twentieth-century. It is in the 
gap between expectations and reality that the resentment expressed by these 
servicemen and women began to fester into loathing.  
  References to the Arabian Nights and to Mesopotamia as the Garden of 
Eden were common: Qurna, on the Tigris, was rumoured to be the actual site of the 
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Garden, which caused outrage and disbelief in the servicemen who were stationed 
there. Margery Thomas, a nurse who arrived in Mesopotamia after surrender of the 
garrison at Kut, recalled in her memoirs ‘that Kurna is supposed to be the site of the 
Garden of Eden’ and that ‘a soldier in the Dorset *regiment+ is reputed to have said: “If 
this is the Garden of Eden, it wouldn’t have needed an angel with a flaming sword to 
keep me out of it!”’236 Similar anecdotes pepper many accounts of British servicemen’s 
experiences of Mesopotamia. Dorina Neave recounts this same story in her history of 
the siege of Kut, Remembering Kut: Lest We Forget! 237    
  Colonel Frederick Sadleir Brereton’s novel of the Mesopotamian 
campaign, On the Road to Baghdad, introduces Mesopotamia and its peoples to a 
young readership as ‘a nasty place, up north of the Persian Gulf  – heat – mosquitoes – 
Arabs’.238 On the Road to Baghdad is a boys’ adventure story that follows two young 
subalterns of the Indian Army, Geoff and Phil, on their adventures from the hill 
stations of India to their posting in Mesopotamia during the 1915 advance to Baghdad. 
Amidst the adventures with natives and brushes with death that the genre calls for, On 
the Road to Baghdad follows the events of the actual Mesopotamian campaign very 
closely. Brereton’s characters often voice the opinions that actual servicemen and 
women espoused. Upon his arrival at Qurna, Philip comments: ‘“Garden of Eden 
Indeed! *…+ Where’s the garden?”’.239 This was typical of reactions to Qurna, and to 
Mesopotamia more generally; Brereton’s narrator goes on to explain why: 
And well might Phil have turned up his nose, have scoffed, and have shown the 
most infinite displeasure, for rains had set in since the occupation of Kurnah, 
and the whole country-side was soaked. That smooth, sandy and gravelly 
desert was covered a foot deep in sticky, sandy, mud different from any mud 
encountered elsewhere; mud which clung to the boots, which piled up on the 
feet of those who trudged about the camp, and who must needs carry about 
with them so much extra weight.240  
The description the narrator gives of the Mesopotamian mud is almost exactly like that 
given by Alexander Anderson: it was a unique substance that stuck to everything and 
weighed down troops, so that they were effectively carrying an extra load. Moreover, 
Philip’s attitude towards Mesopotamia as the supposed site of the Garden of Eden 
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mirrors that adopted by many British servicemen. The extremes of heat and cold, mud 
and rain, or a sun that was dangerously strong, made Mesopotamia a very difficult 
place in which to fight. But the incongruence between these conditions and the 
Garden of Eden, in particular, seemed to make Mesopotamia almost too difficult to 
bear. Like Philip, most British servicemen stationed in the southern regions of 
Mesopotamia resentfully concluded: ‘“Garden Indeed!” The place was a muddy 
swamp, set amidst the most depressing surroundings’.241 
 
 
Discourses of Race and Civilization 
 
  Discourses of race and civilization were central to the ways in which the 
campaign was perceived by British men and women in Mesopotamia during the First 
World War. They also figured prominently in contemporary and subsequent 
representations of the campaign in the British media, histories and memoirs of the 
campaign, and fictional representations of war-time Mesopotamia. It is impossible to 
understand the ways in which British servicemen perceived the Mesopotamian 
campaign without reference to ‘biological’ or ‘scientific’ theories of race, which 
assumed that human beings could be split into distinct and unchanging races, each of 
which had its own particular traits, morals and characteristics.  
  In part, the prominence of race in British perceptions of Mesopotamia 
during the First World War can be linked to the centrality of concepts of race in the 
recruitment practices and perceptions of the Indian and British Armies.242 The theory 
of martial races – ‘the belief that some groups of men are biologically or culturally 
predisposed to the arts of war’243 – was central to the recruitment practices of the 
Indian Army, particularly after the 1880s when fears of Russian designs upon Britain’s 
Indian empire prompted changes to the recruitment strategy of the Indian Army.244 
The martial races were believed to be located in northern provinces of India, such as 
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the Punjab and Nepal, where it was believed that the cooler climate had helped to 
make men hardier and more warlike. George MacMunn described the martial races as 
‘largely the product of the original white races’, which were believed to have come to 
India and brought with them the indo-European language Sanskrit.245  The provinces 
populated with martial races were also those that had put up the hardest resistance to 
British control. Conversely, men from the more southern provinces – particularly 
Bengal – were thought to be the least martial:  they were believed to have been made 
lazy by the heat and feminised by their desire for western learning.  
  The Indian Rebellion of 1857 led the Indian Army to adopt a recruitment 
strategy based on the idea of ‘balance’; in an effort to ensure that another mutiny 
could never again be possible, a policy of divide and rule led to a broad and 
heterogeneous recruitment of men from across India and from a range of different 
castes.246 However, fears of Russian expansion eastwards led the Indian army to adopt 
a new recruitment strategy in the late nineteenth century; men from the ‘martial 
races’ were sought in an effort to create the strongest possible force – one that would 
be able to defend India against a European foe. The pressures of wartime recruitment 
meant that men had to be sought from a wider spectrum, but David Omissi concludes 
that ‘by 1914, about three-quarters of the Indian infantry came from the Punjab, Nepal 
or the North West Frontier Province’.247 The theory of martial races, therefore, 
continued to play an important role in the ways in which ‘native’ soldiers of the Indian 
Army were viewed by their British commanders in Mesopotamia and India.248   
   In his evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission in 1916, the 
Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, Sir Beauchamp Duff, explained that India had 
found it difficult to recruit soldiers for service in Mesopotamia because not all races 
were suitably martial. He agreed with the commissioners that ‘you cannot get any 
really good fighters down South’, and concluded that ‘the Mahratta is the most 
southerly race that is really any good’.249 Though the commissioners questioned Duff 
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on the suitability of other races in India for non-combatant service in the Indian army, 
none questioned his basic premise that some races were unsuitable for military service 
because they were simply not martial enough.   
  In the memoir of his time spent as viceroy of India, My Indian Years, 
Lord Hardinge reflected upon his visit to Mesopotamia in 1915; he recalled meeting 
the first Indian soldiers to win the Victoria Cross with great pride, and noted:  
It was curious that the two Gharwali battalions composed of men who must 
originally have been a cross strain between Rajputs and Ghurkhas, and who 
were rather looked down upon in the Indian Army, fought the best.250   
Hardinge sought to highlight the bravery and loyalty of the men whom he had met on 
his visit, but it is impossible to understand his compliment fully without placing it in the 
context of the theory of martial races.  Describing the soldiers as a ‘cross strain’ evokes 
images of animal breeding or husbandry. Such language suggests an understanding of 
race rooted in biological or scientific theories of race.   
  Although race was seen as a trustworthy indicator of character, morals, 
fighting-ability and loyalty, it was not particularly well understood and often conflated 
with creed. This, too, may have had its roots in the Indian Army’s recruitment 
practices, which identified Sikhs and Muslims as belonging to ‘martial faiths’, thus 
conflating race and faith.251  Once it was decided that an Indian force was to be sent to 
the Gulf in anticipation of Ottoman hostilities, British officers had concerns about how 
the Muslim soldiers under their command would react to being sent to fight against 
their fellow Muslims: the Turks.  Although not all of the Indian soldiers were Muslim, 
accounts – particularly of the siege of Kut – suggest that many British servicemen did 
not know enough about the differences in culture between Indian soldiers to 
understand, or to appreciate, that Hindu or Sikh soldiers would have had no loyalty 
either to the Caliph or to the Turks.  
  In his memoir, My Campaign in Mesopotamia, Charles Townshend 
wrote at length of the problems he encountered in dealing with his ‘native’ soldiers; in 
particular, he worried constantly about their loyalty without any regard for the 
differences between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. He complained that his Indian troops 
were weaker and less loyal than his British troops and recalled, for example, that in the 
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aftermath of the retreat to Kut al-Amara, ‘the scarcity of British officers among the 
Indian battalions was a constant nightmare to me. *…+ General Houghton told me that 
he could not answer for the safety of his sector of defence unless I removed the Indian 
battalion’.252 Townshend’s account made no distinction among the ‘Indian soldiers’; to 
him they were all of doubtful loyalty. His comments suggest that General Houghton 
also did not distinguish between different creeds of Indian soldiers, treating them all as 
suspect.   
  General Sir Fenton Aylmer, who commanded the Tigris Relief Force’s 
initial attempts to relieve Kut between January and March 1916, also complained of 
the Indians under his command, sending a message to Townshend that he too had 
problems with the ‘want of moral’ *sic+ in his ‘Indian troops’; ‘it is my handful of 
Norfolks, Dorsets, Oxfords who are my sheet-anchor here’, he wrote.253 Aylmer did not 
distinguish between the different creeds of Indian troops under his command, 
grouping them all as Indian and therefore inferior and lacking in ‘moral*e+’. He went 
on: 
We do not want inferior drafts of Indian recruits from India, such as my 
battalions were filled up with after the battle of Kut-el-Amara, in September 
last. Mellis, Delamain, Hamilton and Houghton will bear me out in this. One or 
two good all-British divisions are what we want. 
Now is the time to demand good white troops from overseas – an army corps 
to save and hold Mesopotamia, if the government considers it worth 
holding.254 
Aylmer’s message outlined the ways in which many of the most senior commanders in 
Mesopotamia saw the men serving under them; if Aylmer’s message is to be believed, 
some of the most senior commanders in the field  believed that Indian troops – no 
matter what creed - were inferior to ‘good all-British divisions’.  It was this ‘inferiority’, 
rather than the terrible conditions under which the men under his command had 
attempted to break into the besieged garrison, on which Aylmer blamed his failure to 
relieve Kut. In Aylmer’s analysis of the situation, race was the most important factor, 
taking a central place in his assessment of both the performance of troops under his 
command thus far, and of what he would be able to achieve in the future.  
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  Some soldiers serving in Mesopotamia were sympathetic to the 
hardships faced by their Indian colleagues but did not, or could not, distinguish 
between them in any sophisticated way. Aubrey Herbert was a Member of Parliament 
and keen traveller. He joined the Irish Guards in 1914, despite his poor eyesight, and 
spent much of the war in the Middle East, serving in Hogarth’s Arab Bureau in Cairo, 
Gallipoli and Mesopotamia. His diary contains a conversation he had with an Irish 
officer who ‘said that when the war broke out, he, and many like himself, saw the 
Mohammedan difficulty. They had themselves been ready to refuse to fight against 
Ulster; why should Indians fight the Turks?’.255 But even this officer, whose comments 
were remarkably sensitive, given the climate in which they were made, conflated 
‘Mohammedans’ and Indians, treating them as one and the same. Herbert noted in his 
diary that ‘Indians’ ought not to have been sent to fight in Mesopotamia, ‘on this 
ground, which to them is holy’.256  Here again race and creed are conflated.  
  Some British servicemen in Mesopotamia had a better understanding of 
the diversity of cultures and faiths in the ‘native’ regiments, but they did not have any 
real knowledge about the significance of these differences. Reginald Campbell 
Thompson recalled that in the misery of the retreat from Ctesiphon in December 1915, 
‘looking after the Indian wounded was a difficult business and I knew no Indian 
dialect’.257 Although his description of Indian languages as dialects reminds the 
modern reader that he was, in many ways, a product of the imperial ideologies of his 
day, Thompson was among the more racially aware officers in Mesopotamia. Although 
he knew very little about the Indian troops, he knew that there were differences 
between them and that those differences should be respected: ‘I knew *…+ that caste 
existed, and that to care for it was paramount’.258 Thompson recalled that they ‘rigged 
up two or three rough fireplaces of bricks or stones on the iron decks of the barges, 
and then by enlisting the help of a magnificent old Indian officer, detailed men of the 
different castes to make the flat round bread’.259 Although the ships that carried the 
wounded Indian soldiers back down to Basra transported them in terrible conditions, 
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Thompson’s account suggests that some effort was made to ensure that they received 
the appropriate treatment, from men who spoke their languages.  
  David Omissi argues that the use of collective stereotypes gave the 
British in India an illusory sense of control and understanding of the native peoples 
they ruled:  ‘to predict a man’s behaviour it was necessary to know only the collective 
attributes of the group to which he belonged’. 260 Omissi maintains that ‘in keeping 
with this attitude, the British often used the singular when referring to collective social 
entities’ such as ‘the Pallan’.261 Collective stereotypes of this kind were also used in the 
same way by those trying to understand Mesopotamia during the campaign. As 
Chapter One illustrated, stereotypes about ‘the Arab’ or ‘the Kurd’ were in evidence 
long before the Mesopotamian campaign.  
  In February 1916, the British government took control of operations in 
Mesopotamia; from this point on, the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army (then Sir 
Beauchamp Duff) would receive his orders from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 
The main result of the change in leadership was financial, as more men and resources 
became available for the campaign. The British government issued two publications 
designed to inform British servicemen of the basic facts on Mesopotamian language, 
geography, history and peoples: The Handbook of Mesopotamia and The Arab of 
Mesopotamia.  
  The first of four volumes of The Handbook of Mesopotamia contained 
chapters on the ‘Climate, Minerals, Fauna and Flora, History and Inhabitants’ of 
Mesopotamia as well as a section of the ‘transliteration of Arabic, Persian and Turkish’ 
and useful vocabulary.262 The handbook had sections devoted to ‘Arabs and Kurds’ that 
refer to ‘the Arab’ (always as ‘he’) or ‘the Arabs’ or ‘the Kurds’. In the section titled 
‘characteristics’, the guide explains that ‘the Arab mind is lively, imaginative, and 
subtle *…+ yet in practical issues, where constructive ability, energy, and dexterity are 
needed, they often seem to the European more or less incompetent and lazy’.263 
Although the guide begins by describing the heterogeneity of Mesopotamia’s Kurds, it 
goes on to treat them as members of one identifiable ‘race’ or ‘type’ whose 
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characteristics could be clearly described: ‘these people, though not nearly so 
intellectual and imaginative as the Arab, have a shrewd appreciation of practical 
issues, and are far superior to the Arab in energy, enterprise and industry’.264 Like the 
descriptions of Indians cited by Omissi, these brief descriptions of some of the peoples 
of Mesopotamia were a way of simplifying their heterogeneity and diversity in order to 
give the illusion of knowledge and control.   
  The Arab of Mesopotamia was ‘a pamphlet *…+ on subjects relating to 
Mesopotamia’ meant for ‘those whom the fortune of war has brought to these 
regions’.265 It was published anonymously but is now known to have been written by 
Gertrude Bell.  The title essay of the collection, ‘The Arab of Mesopotamia’, described 
in great detail the tribes and peoples of Mesopotamia, drawing heavily on scientific 
discourses of race. The essay is premised on the presumption that ‘the Arab of 
Mesopotamia’ could be described, and its usefulness lay in the assumption that the 
collective stereotypes contained within it would be of practical use to servicemen 
when dealing with Mesopotamia’s population. Bell explained, for instance, that ‘the 
inhabitants of the Euphrates marshes above Nasiriyah’ were ‘far down in the scale of 
civilization’.266 Unlike The Handbook of Mesopotamia, Bell’s essay went into great 
detail about tribal hierarchies and other differences between the Arabs of 
Mesopotamia. But, much like The Handbook, she ultimately returns to the collective 
stereotypes or types in order to ground her argument.  
  Her description of Arab Shaikhs, in particular, drew heavily on scientific 
theories of race; she described Ibn Sa’ud (‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sa‘ud 
who later founded the modern state of Saudi Arabia) as having: 
The characteristics of the well bred Arab, the strongly marked aquiline profile, 
full-fleshed nostrils, prominent lips and long narrow chin, accentuated by a 
pointed beard. His hands are fine with slender fingers, a trait almost universal 
among the tribes of pure Arab blood, and in spite of his great height and 
breadth of shoulder he conveys the impression, common enough in the desert, 
of an indefinable lassitude, not individual but racial, the secular weariness of an 
ancient and self-contained people, which has made heavy drafts on its vital 
force and borrowed little from beyond its own forbidding frontiers.267  
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Bell’s detailed description is not really of Ibn Sa’ud but of ‘the well bred Arab’, literally 
a more refined type of Arab, who, for Bell, was personified by the Shaikh. It is clear 
that she admired him greatly for his ‘daring’ and ‘grasp of statecraft’,268 but underlying 
what is otherwise a detached description, couched in the language of racial 
determinism, her description of ‘the well bred Arab’ contains an undertone of sexual 
attraction. She described him as ‘a man of splendid physique’ and admired his 
‘deliberate movements, his slow sweet smile and contemplative glance of his heavy-
lidded eyes’.269 Nevertheless, words and phrases such as ‘traits’ or ‘pure Arab blood’ 
position her analysis alongside ‘scientific’ discourses of race, without which such 
considerations would be meaningless.  Significantly, Bell described the traits she could 
not admire in Ibn Sa’ud as ‘not individual but racial’.  
  Bell’s essay went on to describe other Shaikhs in a similar vein, but with 
markedly less praise; she described Shaikh Khaz’al as ‘a tall man, massively built, with 
strongly marked but coarsely moulded features of a distinctly Semitic type which 
vouches for his Arab descent’.270 Here, Bell’s analysis is more matter-of-fact: the 
undertones of admiration are markedly absent, but once again racial types are central 
to her description.  It was through the prism of these discourses that she understood 
the peoples of Mesopotamia and, consequently, through them that the peoples of 
Mesopotamia were introduced to British servicemen during the Mesopotamian 
campaign. Whilst it was inevitable that Bell’s own opinions and personal relationships 
should colour the descriptions she offers anonymously in The Arab of Mesopotamia, it 
remains significant that these were not personal reflections – as many of the accounts 
so far discussed have been – but an official publication. These discourses were, 
therefore, central to the vision of Mesopotamia the British government offered 




  Throughout the campaign, British servicemen developed a fear and an 
intense dislike of the peoples of Mesopotamia. They generally referred to them as 
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‘Arabs’, making little distinction between the different ethnic groups who lived in the 
region. Many were aware that Mesopotamia also contained Kurds, and some 
servicemen were aware that many other ethnic groups such as Armenians, Jews, 
Chaldeans, Yezedis and Sufis also lived in Mesopotamia. But in this early phase of the 
campaign, British and Indian servicemen were unlikely to encounter Mesopotamia’s 
Kurdish communities, who were mainly situated in its mountainous north, and 
grouped all others under the general term Arab.   
  In their most benign, and most frequently encountered form, the Arabs 
were the purveyors of food stuffs and other commodities purchased by British 
servicemen. As Donald Maxwell described, ‘they are all women who do the selling – 
weird figures in black carrying baskets of eggs and occasionally chicken. Gesticulating, 
shouting, shrieking, they rush along beside the up-going steamer and keep even with 
it’.271 Campbell Thompson remarked that ‘by 1916 our troops had almost made a habit 
of buying all sorts of junk’ from women, who ran alongside British river-craft ‘wearing 
red and dark gray *…+. One suckled her babe as she ran, she carrying it sitting on her 
shoulders’.272 Chapter One suggested that in the years before the First World War, 
Arab women were often described by Britons in ways that sexualised them; the 
pressures of war stripped away much of the romance that had characterised these pre-
war descriptions. The remoteness of the women of Mesopotamia and their custom of 
veiling themselves was a source of fascination – and some hostility – for British men 
and women during the campaign.  
  Mary Ann Brown arrived to serve as a staff nurse in Mesopotamia in 
December 1916. She went on an excursion with some officers and friends to a local 
Arab village in March 1917, and recorded in her diary: 
The women were drawing water from the river in their queer copper jugs, as 
we came near them they covered their faces, because they must not let strange 
men look at them indeed they need not be afraid as they are dirty enough and 
the majority of them ugly enough, as soon as we go past they have a good 
squint at us out of one eye, the children are queer dirty little brats.273  
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Brown’s description of these women could not be more different from those of the 
travellers of the early twentieth century, although her description of the children is 
reminiscent of Louisa Jebb’s vision of Mesopotamia. Here, the children are a dirty, 
verminous presence. Throughout the diary she kept of her time in Mesopotamia, it is 
clear that Brown was afraid of the people of Mesopotamia, whom she described as a 
threatening presence. In the description above, her fear manifests itself in a lack of 
understanding or empathy. She did not seek to understand why the women veiled 
themselves, but resentfully concluded that they need not have bothered, as they had 
no sexual allure to hide.  
  Donald Maxwell’s drawing of the women vendors is titled ‘Sirens in the 
Narrows’, but the sexual connotations of this title are mitigated by the satire of his 
description of the women at work. He described them as ‘yelling amazons’ who ran 
frantically after the boats trying to ‘open up negotiations for eggs while the frenzied 
and now almost demented sellers left behind rend their clothes and shot imprecations 
at their rivals’.274 On one of the rare occasions when Kurds were described in this early 
phase of the campaign, Thompson described two Kurdish ‘Amazons’: ‘Kokhah Nerjis 
(Narcisuss) and Ayeshah Nerjis’ who ‘fretted and grew bored at not attacking’.275 As 
British men and women struggled to survive in Mesopotamia, their descriptions of 
Mesopotamia’s women reflected their growing hostility.  As British commentators 
ceased to identify Mesopotamia primarily as the land of the Arabian Nights and began 
to see it simply as a battlefield, the women of Mesopotamia became associated with 
warfare in British servicemen’s descriptions. It is significant that the name of one of 
the Kurdish ‘amazons’, ‘Ayeshah’, calls to Reginald Campbell Thompson’s mind Rider 
Haggard’s ‘She Who Must Not Be Named’ – an evil woman of alluring beauty who was 
capable of great violence.276 By 1915, ‘the soft-rounded figure[s] with glistening russett 
skin’ of David Fraser’s descriptions were becoming, for British servicemen serving in 
Mesopotamia, warrior women: ‘redoubtable amazons’ who longed to attack British 
troops.277  
  British servicemen rarely encountered Mesopotamia’s women in 
situations other than those described above. As a result, the majority of their 
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descriptions of Mesopotamia’s peoples were of Arab men, who were referred to as 
‘the Arab’ or ‘Arabs’. British servicemen believed that ‘the Arabs’ had no concept of 
loyalty and were impressed only by shows of military prowess; Thompson noted that 
‘with the British success at Basrah, the neighbouring Arabs *…+ became more 
friendly’.278  The ‘Arabs’ were seen as a people ‘who made a habit always of turning on 
a beaten ally’,279 and were at all times ‘prepared to play the old game of Mr. facing-
both-ways’.280 As Major Norman Bray put it in his biography of the traveller and 
political officer Gerard Leachman: ‘Arabs are swayed by near events and are essentially 
opportunists’.281  
  Bray described Leachman as a ‘sportsman, explorer, leader of men, 
demi-god amongst the great Bedouin tribes’.282 Of these accolades, Leachman’s 
greatest, for Bray, was his ability to bring ‘his flock’ of Arabs under control.283 Bray was 
dismissive of what he described as Leachman’s ‘violent fits of berserk rage, of his 
beatings and abuse of the wild Arab’,284 concentrating his narrative on Leachman’s 
ability ‘to link the wavering Arabs to the British cause’.285 These were widely held 
perceptions of Mesopotamian Arabs. Wilfred Nunn recalled that upon their arrival at 
Basra in 1914, ‘it was considered advisable that no time should be lost in showing our 
ability to make headway against the Turks, as the attitude the Arabs would adopt 
depended largely upon the impression we made at this stage’.286  
  The belief that ‘the wavering Arabs’ were liable to turn on their allies in 
the event of a defeat was firmly entrenched in the minds of those in charge of military 
planning, as well as those fighting in Mesopotamia.  Worries about the ‘moral effect on 
the Arabs’ led to an over-emphasis on the importance of ‘British prestige in the East’ 
and the need to impress ‘the Oriental mind’ with ever greater and continuous military 
success. As Arthur Hirtzel, Political Secretary of the India Office, told the Mesopotamia 
Commission in 1916, ‘it was thought *…+ that the effect of standing still would be to 
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turn the [Mesopotamian] tribes against us, that they would think we were not going 
on because we could not’.287   
  British servicemen in Mesopotamia believed that it was impossible to 
guarantee Arab loyalty, particularly after a defeat; this made ‘the Arabs’ more vilified, 
and more hated, than their enemies, the Turks. Although the Turkish regular troops 
were the official enemy, ‘Johnny Turk’ was perceived to be an honourable man who, 
like themselves, was fighting for his country. This British admiration for and affinity 
with their Ottoman opponents may have had its roots in long-entrenched attitudes, 
fostered by Britain’s support for the Ottoman Empire. Geoffrey Nash has noted that 
‘the Turks were admired – especially by Victorians – as an ancient imperial race with 
whom the British shared common characteristics of stoicism and taciturnity’.288  As 
Brereton’s narrator puts it in On the Road to Baghdad: ‘your Turk is a gentleman 
whatever else you may say of him’.289  
  Brereton personifies this image of the honourable Turk in the character 
of Tewfic Pasha, who reluctantly captures the novel’s young heroes, Geoff and Philip. 
Tewfic Pasha bemoans his country’s role in the war ‘with our ancient friends the 
British’,290 and tells the young subalterns: ‘this I have done as a loyal man, and one 
who does his utmost for is country; though all the while I know that it is not my 
country for which I fight’.291 His comments reiterate the belief expressed widely in the 
British press: that Turkey was manipulated by German influence. It is for this reason 
that the Tewfic Pasha tells Geoff and Phil: ‘I know that it is not my country for which I 
fight’. ‘Johnny Turk’, British servicemen believed, would not hurt them if it were not 
for the necessity of war; their hatred was, therefore, reserved for ‘the Arabs’, whom 
they believed attacked British and Indian troops in a cowardly fashion – in the dark or 
from a distance – so that they could not defend themselves.   
  Sergeant Kingdom wrote home, in a letter that was published in the 
Manchester Guardian, that ‘it is all right fighting the Turks, but the Arabs use big 
muzzle rifles with an enormous lead bullet which will smash anything, and not make a 
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pretty little hole like the Turks *…+. The black powder from the Arabs’ rifles also causes 
so much smoke that it is impossible to see the actual firer’.292 As early as January 1915, 
therefore, British servicemen had identified Arabs as the villains of the Mesopotamian 
campaign, and this image of Mesopotamia’s Arabs was beginning to be communicated 
to British audiences.  
   Malcolm Thornburn recorded his antagonism towards ‘the Arabs’ in his 
diary:  ‘Every Arab I would shoot, the devils! Two of our stretcher-bearers – who do 
not carry rifles – were stripped naked by them the morning after the battle, and in 
broad daylight too!’293 It was just this sort of behaviour, attributed to Arabs, that made 
British servicemen despise them; Thornburn’s anger stemmed, in large part, from the 
fact that the ‘Arabs’ had attacked defenceless stretcher-bearers after – not during – a 
battle. His comment on the Turks’ behaviour in the same battle, however, was: ‘he is a 
stubborn and good fighter’.294 In January 1916, when Malcolm Thornburn was 
convalescing in Basra, he reflected: ‘the Turk, I think, is a clean fighter – why he did not 
blow my brains out when on the ground I don’t know and they could easily have put 
the bayonet thro’ my middle’.295   
  Like Malcolm Thornburn, many Britons serving in Mesopotamia 
resented Arabs far more than their Turkish opponents. Because the Arabs were 
perceived to have no loyalty to anyone, British servicemen’s accounts also emphasised 
Arab attacks on their ‘allies’, the Turks. Brereton’s novel describes the Arabs as ‘just as 
likely to turn against the Sultan and help an invader’,296 and Reginald Campbell 
Thompson reflected that it did not really matter that after the battle of Shaiba the 
victorious British and Indian troops had been too exhausted to pursue the Turks, as 
‘the Turkish allies, the Arabs, saw to that, and cut up the poor devils in their headlong 
retreat over ninety miles of sand waste’.297 It is unsurprising, given these perceptions 
of Mesopotamia’s Arabs, that Aubrey Herbert recalled a story told to him by a British 
officer who ‘said a Turkish prisoner, a friend of his, had said to him: “Let’s have a truce 
and both kill the Arabs”’.298  
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  The main problem posed by ‘Arabs’ was that they sniped at British and 
Indian troops continually; Harold Dickson’s letters are full of accounts of the snipers 
who beset his troops. He wrote home in December 1914 that he and his men were 
‘having great fun with snipers at night. It is a new development in the fighting & is 
caused by Arabs not Turks’.299  Once again, Dickson’s letter emphasised that the real 
enemy was not the Turk, but the ‘Arabs’. He described how these men ‘come close to 
camp at night & open fire’, killing men as well as horses.300 He wrote of his ‘great joy’ 
when their attempts to capture these snipers proved successful.301 Dickson’s letters 
reveal that the continual sniping was a source of great stress for British serviceman, 
preventing them from having any respite day or night.302  
  Whilst the snipers were a nuisance to men serving in Mesopotamia, as 
Malcolm Thornburn’s comments indicate, it was the reputation that the ‘Arabs’ 
acquired for being ruthless, cruel and for preying on the weak, sick and wounded that 
made them hated by British forces. Harold Dickson explained to his mother: 
This is a rotten country to fight in really in spite of its archiological interest: our 
great complaint is that it is inhuman: we take prisoners & look after them but 
we dare never leave wounded men lying on the ground because the enemy 
who now are wild desert Arabs cut them in pieces. This wounded question 
worrys one a great deal. It hampers our cavalry reconnaissance work greatly.303 
[sic] 
British servicemen worried constantly about what might happen to vulnerable men left 
out on the battlefield. Horror stories of what the Arabs were capable of doing created 
an image of them as ruthless and honour-less predators. Arabs were described by 
servicemen as an ever-present, but often invisible, threat that would manifest itself 
without warning. Words such as ‘marauding’ and ‘swarming’ were often used to 
describe the ‘gangs’ of Arabs who were perceived to plague British troops. Malcolm 
Thornburn wrote from his hospital bed in January 1916: ‘a few who never got in at all 
and lay out all night, and got stripped naked by Arabs suffered more; but I doubt if 
there are many such survivors’.304 In this account we can see the fear associated with 
the Arab menace. In contemplating the fate of those left behind, Thornburn was 
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implicitly counting his own blessings. It was this ever-present possibility that a 
serviceman might find himself wounded, vulnerable and at the mercy of ‘Arabs’ that 
fed the fear and hatred of Mesopotamia’s inhabitants.  
  In his memoirs of the retreat from the battle of Ctesiphon, R.C. 
Thompson alluded to the dread and hostility felt towards ‘the Arabs’. Thompson 
recalled that the wounded Indian soldiers who ‘were lying chock-a-block on the upper 
deck open to the sky, with one blanket each’ required ‘bales of compressed hay to 
keep off bullets from the casual Arab’.305 He commented that though the transport for 
the wounded was inadequate as ‘there were no arrangements for so large a number of 
wounded men’, he was relieved that ‘we had the ships to carry them off’ rather than 
‘leave them to the Turks, or still worse, the Arabs’.306 Aubrey Herbert’s memoirs also 
alluded to this deeply-entrenched fear of ‘the Arabs’; he remembered being told of ‘a 
sick officer in the 21st brigade *who+ found five Arabs in his tent and lost everything.’ 
Herbert’s only comment on the story was that it was ‘lucky for him that was all he 
lost’.307  
  In the letter that was published in the Manchester Guardian, Sergeant 
Kingdom reflected that ‘they are a blood thirsty lot, these Arabs, and when the men lie 
wounded they will shoot you at a yard’s distance. A subadar of the natives was shot in 
this way’.308 The prevalence of such descriptions of ‘Arab’ behaviour in the letters of 
those serving in Mesopotamia would have conveyed this image of them to their 
families in Britain, and as letters like Kingdom’s began to be published, these 
perceptions of Mesopotamians began to reach a wider audience.  
  Captain Barnett arrived in Mesopotamia in January, as part of the Tigris 
Relief force. Barnett’s dislike of Mesopotamia’s peoples was far more trenchant and 
vehement than that expressed by most servicemen in Mesopotamia, but he was 
particularly enraged by the looting of British and Indian graves, widely attributed to 
Arabs. Barnett noted in February 1916 that he had seen: 
Many graves dug up by Arabs and our good tommies lying stripped and 
exposed also Indians. Heaven help any Arabs we catch at this game. I swear I 
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will shoot or stick them and leave them to linger their miserable lives out if it 
does not kill them – the unutterable swine.309  
Barnett’s anger at the desecration of British and Indian graves is understandable. Like 
the fear of being left wounded on the battlefield, the anger expressed by British 
servicemen like Barnett stemmed not merely from patriotic protectiveness of the 
honour of those who had given their lives in battle, but also from the possibility that 
such an insulting fate may one day befall their own graves. No wonder then that 
Barnett described the Arabs as ‘quite immoral and liars and thieves of the worst 
description’, and suggested: ‘all Arabs caught at this game are to be shot.  Also I think 
we may manage to make a false grave with dynamite in it and blow a few of the swine 
to Jehannum which is their name for hell’.310   
  The belief that Arabs robbed British and Indian graves was widely held. 
Reginald Campbell Thompson also recalled the ‘pathetic funeral’ of one of the Indian 
soldiers, and reflected: ‘all we could hope was that we should not be seen doing this, 
lest ghoulish Arabs disturb him for the sake of the blanket in which he was 
wrapped’.311 Such behaviour was seen as simply inexcusable by British servicemen, and 
added greatly to the hostility British servicemen felt for the Arabs of Mesopotamia.  
  There is no way of separating the reactions of British servicemen to 
actual Arab attacks on wounded soldiers or the looting of servicemen’s graves from 
growing resentment of Mesopotamia’s inhabitants based merely on their reputation 
for such behaviour. Once the hatred of Arabs, expressed in so many servicemen’s 
accounts, was entrenched, it is impossible to tell whether events fed a growing fear, or 
whether fear and resentment fed a growing mythology. The reputation of Arabs for 
sadistic levels of violence is well-illustrated by the following incident recounted by A. J. 
Barker in his history of the campaign. Barker relates the story of Major Wheeler and 
‘his Indian Officer’ who led the 7th Hariana Lancers in a charge at the battle of Shaiba, 
in April 1915: 
As Wheeler grasped the standard he was shot, the Indian officer was pulled 
from his horse. Once they had got him on the ground the Arabs then seized the 
wretched Indian, poured oil over him and set him on fire; his still smouldering 
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body was recovered later in the day. Wheeler was awarded a posthumous 
Victoria Cross and the Indian officer the Indian Order of Merit.312  
Barker’s description of Major Wheeler dying horribly, still gripping the enemy 
standard, is designed to elicit sympathy for a heroic officer and to contrast this 
heroism with the behaviour of ‘the Arabs’. It is significant, also, that Barker did not feel 
that it was important to name Jemedar Sudhan Singh, ‘the wretched Indian’ whose 
awful death he described so vividly.313 William Bird appears to have witnessed the 
aftermath of this terrible scene in person. His diary entry for 13 April, 1915 records: 
When we arrived on this mound, we found one European Major of our cavalry 
dead, and stripped naked, he was also mutilated beyond our recognition, and 
also a native cavalry officer of our cavalry all alight, and practically burnt to a 
cinder. These men were probably wounded during a charge the cavalry made, 
about one hour before we supported them. The General has recommended the 
major for the VC and in my humble opinion he deserves it.314 
Bird’s regiment was one of those in action at the battle of Shaiba, and though he did 
not name the officers, the circumstances appear too similar for this not to have been 
the same incident. It is impossible to imagine the impact such a scene would have had 
on troops fighting in Mesopotamia. It was undoubtedly atrocities such as these that 
bred the fear of ‘the Arabs’ evident in the accounts of British servicemen in 
Mesopotamia at this time. It is significant, however, that while Bird did not attribute 
the atrocities committed to Arabs, Barker retrospectively did. The incident is a good 
example of how atrocities, later attributed to Arabs, have lived on and been 
reproduced in the work of historians of the First World War.  
  
 
‘The Arab’ Portrayed to British Audiences  
 
  Letters published in British newspapers, such as those from Sergeant 
Kingdom and the anonymous ‘Englishman in the Gulf’, were some of the first 
descriptions of Mesopotamia and its peoples available to people in Britain during this 
period. Sir Mark Sykes visited Mesopotamia in 1915; in contrast to the usually limited 
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coverage of the campaign, his visit and comments were published extensively in the 
British press. In his report, which the Manchester Guardian commented would ‘make 
most people realise for the first time the character of the land and people among 
whom the advance [to Baghdad+ is taking place’, Sykes reflected on the improved lot of 
the peasants of Mesopotamia: 315 
Our men, both horse and foot, reached the town soon after they had gone. For 
the last week the Turkish commander had been maintaining his prestige by 
daily hangings and shootings, and his last act before leaving had been to shoot 
six individuals for desertion, spying, or cowardice. Enter the victors; within an 
hour the women were chaffering milk, dates, and sweet limes, men were 
patrolling the dirty little streets, a governor was established in an office – tired 
troops were standing in the sun while billets were sought for them, and most 
unbelievable of all, the Arab cultivators were dropping in to complain of a 
certain horseman who had ridden through a crop of beans, and of a supply and 
transport officer who had parked his belongings in a garden. If ‘Frightfulness’ is 
one theory of war, certainly the Briton has  another with ‘Carry on’ as the 
motto instead of ‘Kultur’ and in lieu of the Furor Teutonicus a kind of juris 
obsessio. 316 
As the Manchester Guardian reiterated to its readers, Sykes’s article stressed the 
fairness of British troops and their ‘positive obsession for justice’.317   Sykes’s article 
was clearly meant to serve as propaganda; he contrasted the ruthlessness of the 
Turkish commander and the German ‘Furor Teutonicus’ with the impeccable behaviour 
of British troops in Mesopotamia. His message to the British public was clear: British 
and Indian troops were fair, almost to a fault, to Mesopotamia’s Arabs.  But the Arabs, 
whom he described in the same article as a people who ‘will accentuate every mishap 
that may befall, plunder your convoys, threaten your hospitals, cut your telegraph 
wires, and supply you and your opponents with unreliable information’, were 
portrayed as simply ungrateful and eager to take advantage of the good nature of 
British and Indian troops.318    
  The purpose of Sykes’s article was not to give a representative picture 
of Anglo-Mesopotamian relations, but to extol the virtues of British forces. However, 
as many of those serving in Mesopotamia noted, things were not as simple as his 
article suggested to the British public. Some accounts suggest that Mesopotamia’s 
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inhabitants were caught in an impossible situation, afraid to show any sign of co-
operation with British and Indian authorities, for fear of Turkish reprisals in the event 
of a British withdrawal. For this reason, men such as Reginald Campbell Thompson 
commented that while the lack of loyalty shown by Arabs was unfortunate, ‘knowing 
how the Turks treated some of the unfortunates in Kut after the capture, none can 
blame them’.319  
  Aubrey Herbert also reflected on the consequences for the people left 
behind, in the event of a British retreat.  He noted in his diary that ‘this campaign has 
taught me why we have been called perfide Albion’, and rued the fact that when 
British and Indian troops were forced to ‘retreat before a vastly superior force *…+ the 
people who have come in with us get strafed’.320 Even Norman Bray mitigated his 
otherwise relentless critique of Arab ‘treachery’ by noting that ‘the Arabs were, in fact, 
in rather a difficult situation *…+. *They+ sought, as more or less primitive people always 
will, to forestall any dissatisfaction on the part of the Turks by an excess of zeal in their 
favour’.321 In Bray’s analysis, the Arabs’ disloyalty could be explained in Social 
Darwinist terms as the result of their particular stage of evolution. He believed that 
they simply had not attained a sufficiently civilised state of development to be able to 
comprehend and appreciate loyalty and honour, as an Englishman could. Nevertheless, 
his comments draw attention to a side of the Mesopotamian campaign rarely glimpsed 
in the reflections of the men who fought it, a reminder of the considerations 
obliterated by fear, resentment, and a lack of empathy in most servicemen’s accounts. 
  The impression that Sykes gave of the relationship between British and 
Indian troops and Mesopotamia’s peoples is brought into question by the diaries and 
letters of men who served in Mesopotamia during this period. Whilst it might have 
been true that when British authorities took control of an area they treated the people 
more equitably than the Turks would have done, it was not always true that British 
servicemen behaved fairly in their dealings with the people they encountered. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Barnett’s diary detailed many incidents of bullying and theft. On a 
number of occasions, Barnett stole goods from people he described as Arabs; in one 
incident Barnett commented simply: ‘Arabs swine. So take their eggs & milk & pay 
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after’.322 On another day later that month, Barnett noted that an Arab had refused his 
money for some eggs, so he ‘kept eggs and kicked Arab out of camp’.323 Barnett’s diary 
indicates that this kind of behaviour was endemic; every couple of days, Barnett 
recorded stealing goods or livestock from local people or bullying them into selling 
them at a lower price than they were asking. His entry for February 1, 1916 reads: 
‘Very hungry. Have been getting sheep. Procedure simple. Take 40 armed 
sepoys, surround flock and pick *…+ the fattest despite protests of Arabs. 
Afterwards give what amount we consider just - great grumblings.324 
 
The frequency with which Barnett recorded such behaviour, and the fact that he was 
able to commandeer troops to harass local people, suggests that his superiors would 
have been aware of his practices.  
  Norman Bray’s biography of Leachman made no attempt to hide the 
brutality with which he sometimes dealt with people. He described one incident where 
Leachman ‘had to go away down the river to teach a lesson to some Arabs who had 
fired on our ships’; in order to punish the men he believed were responsible, 
Leachman fired ‘a lyddite shell in the middle of the sheikh’s tent’.325   Bray’s only 
comment on Leachman’s behaviour was that this ‘probably taught them the error of 
their ways’.326 In a biography that was published in 1936, Bray, who was himself a 
political officer in Iraq in the twenties, cared little about whether or not the people in 
the tent were actually responsible for the attacks. Nor does it seem that he found the 
probability of the shell injuring or killing innocent men, women and children alongside 
those whom Leachman believed needed to be punished in any way problematic. 
  Priya Satia argues that the British Government’s use of air power in the 
post-war years to subdue Iraqi tribes was justified by the argument that bloodshed 
was part of the Bedouin lifestyle and that, consequently, the Bedouins valued the lives 
of their women and children little, and cared less than Europeans about death. Satia 
maintains that British political officers were some of the most enthusiastic proponents 
of these policies of mass punishment because they argued that:  
To Bedouin, war was a "romantic excitement" whose production of "tragedies, 
bereavements, widows and orphans" was a "normal way of life," "natural and 
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inevitable." Their taste for war was the source of their belief that they were 
"elites of the human race." It would almost be a cultural offense not to 
bombard them with all the might of the empire.327   
Leachman’s methods can be seen as precursors to the policies of air control and mass 
punishment critiqued by Satia. Norman Bray’s attitude towards Leachman’s methods 
was a product of this kind of rationale, fed, in its own way, by reductive racial 
stereotypes, akin to those discussed in this chapter.  
   Behaviour such as that described by Bray and Barnett was rarely 
mentioned in the letters, diaries and memoirs of British servicemen. They did, 
however, describe freely the means by which British and Indian troops sought to 
impose order upon the areas of Mesopotamia that they took control of. Upon his 
arrival at Kut-al-Amara, Townshend recalled that ‘in order to put a stop to the looting 
of the Arabs at the commencement of the siege I had caused twelve men who had 
been caught in the act to be tried by military commission and shot, pour encourager 
les autres’.328  The practice of rounding up looters to be shot as an example to the rest 
of the population does not tally with Sykes’s description of the restoration of normal 
life within an hour of the entrance of ‘the victors’.329  
  William Bird’s diary recorded the use of mock executions to procure 
information from prisoners330 and the harsh implementation of martial law in Basra: 
‘two men have been caught, tried and found guilty *of sniping+, and publically *sic+ 
hung. *…+ Several men have also been flogged, for not paying attention to the military 
law, such as, all lights out at 9pm’.331  Bird also noted the raids that he and his 
colleagues made on villages in the night: 
At dawn several companies fix bayonets and rush the houses, any house that 
refuses to open the door when we first knock, we immediately knock the door 
down, and make prisoners off [sic] all the male occupants, we then search 
everything and everywhere for arms, and should we find any we mark the 
owners ‘arms and resistance’ which means that they will be tried for both 
those offences. Those will probably be shot. Those that refuse to open their 
doors, and haven’t any arms, we simply mark them ‘resistance only’. Which 
means they will be tried for resisting military law, and are liable to a long term 
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of imprisonment or a good flogging. Those who attempt to run away are either 
shot as they run, or are caught by our ring of men outside the village. Those are 
treated as ‘combatants’, and meet their end on the scaffold.332  
The implementation of martial law was very different to the bullying and theft 
described by Barnett, or the violence meted out by Leachman; however, it is clear from 
Bird’s descriptions that the penalties for breaking the rules were severe, and it is 
doubtful that all the people punished would have understood why.  
  There is evidence that other officers were more concerned with the way 
Britain was perceived by the peoples of Mesopotamia. Barnett complained that they 
had been encouraged to ‘make Arabs friendly by kindness’,333 and Reginald Campbell 
Thompson recalled that even in the terrible retreat from Ctesiphon they ‘were not 
allowed to shoot their cattle from the steamer as we went down’, though the ‘natives’ 
continued to snipe at the retreating ships.334 Moreover, Aubrey Herbert and his 
associates tried hard to ensure the safety of the Arabs who had been trapped in the 
town of Kut when Townshend’s troops were forced to surrender.335 While Barnett’s 
behaviour was by no means the rule, it is difficult to believe that such coercion took 
place as rarely as it was recorded in the memoirs, letters and diaries of the men who 
served in Mesopotamia – particularly given the shortages of food described by 
servicemen.  If, martial law was applied in the way that William Bird described, British 
troops were not suffering from the ‘positive obsession for justice’ that by Sir Mark 





  The duplicity that British servicemen believed characterised the Arabs of 
Mesopotamia was transmitted to British audiences in fictional accounts of the 
Mesopotamian Campaign. The Navy in Mesopotamia was written by Cyril Cox under 
the pseudonym Conrad Cato and published in 1917. The book is split into two sections: 
a history of the navy’s role in the Mesopotamian campaign up to that point, and 
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several short stories about the lives of mariners serving in Mesopotamia. Captain 
Chalmers’s short story ‘O.C. The Desert’ was a tribute to the political officer Gerard 
Leachman; it was published in 1932, though it was set before 1920, when Colonel 
Leachman was killed during the Arab Rising. Patricia Stonehouse’s novel The Gates of 
Kut was published in 1917, under the pseudonym Lindsay Russell. Stonehouse’s novel 
is a romance in which the hero, Philip Territt, is sent to Mesopotamia as part of the 
Tigris relief force.  
  In each of these texts, a British officer disguises himself, or is disguised, 
as an Arab. The Englishman convincingly disguised as an Arab is a prevalent feature in 
contemporary fictional accounts of the Mesopotamian campaign.336 In each case, the 
disguise is good enough to fool their colleagues and even Arabs into believing that they 
are really Arabs until, at the end of each story, they reveal their true identity. In 
donning their disguise, these characters literally re-enact the duplicity British 
servicemen associated with the Arabs of Mesopotamia. 
  Cyril Cox’s story, ‘Unmixed Bathing’, is presented to the reader as a re-
telling of events that actually took place. A group of officers convince their colleague, 
Toby, to go shooting with them early the next day. The next morning they are 
‘considerably riled at receiving a note from Toby to say that he was sorry that he could 
not accompany them after all, because another pressing engagement had 
intervened’.337 The officers set off without Toby and soon encounter the Sheikh of 
Margill: ‘a white-headed Arab striding majestically along the river-bank, followed at a 
respectful distance by an attendant’.338 The Shaikh tells them that his six wives are 
bathing in a nearby lake and, to their surprise, informs them that ‘in honour of the 
great Navy of your country. If it would please you, you shall see my wives. But only 
from a distance’’’.339 Led by the Shaikh’s attendant, the men walk for hours in search 
of the Shaikh’s bathing wives, but never find them. Hot, tired and disappointed they 
eventually come upon Toby; having enjoyed a morning’s shooting with the guns they 
left behind, he merrily tucks into their picnic. After teasing them for a while with 
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comments such as: ‘“I’ve often heard of the Sheikh of Margill,” *…+ “Nice old bloke, 
isn’t he?’’’,340 and: ‘By the way, is he married?’,  Toby reveals the fact that he had been 
the Shaikh all along: 
Then Toby, having eaten a very satisfactory lunch quietly picked up a 
newspaper which had been lying beside him on the ground. Underneath it 
were disclosed the abba and ch-feea of an Arab Sheikh, and beside them a neat 
little japanned tin box, which anyone in the theatrical profession would have 
recognized at once as a make-up box.  
”I think,” said Toby, ”That he must have gone to bathe with his harem, as he 
has left his clothes behind.’’341  
   Chalmers’s much later story, ‘O.C. The Desert’, is also framed as a 
fictionalisation of events that actually took place. In the story, Colonel Leachman sets 
off from the Mesopotamian city of Kufa on a secret mission. Later that day, Chalmers 
arrests an Arab while he and his men are on patrol along the Tigris. The Arab refuses 
pigeon, cider or water, leading the narrator to comment: ‘truly he was an Arab of the 
fanatical Shiah persuasion. I felt I would be delighted to hand him over to the Political 
Officer at Kufa’.342 Chalmers consults Gertrude Bell, whom they encounter on the 
Tigris; the Arab refuses to speak to her, but she informs Chalmers that the tribe he 
claims to be from is not one she is familiar with: ‘“I see no mention of the Beni Fik. 
They may, of course, be a small tribe under the protection of a powerful one, such as 
the Beni Said or the Muntafik.”’.343 This is the reader’s only clue that the ‘Arab’ may 
not be whom he appears to be.  Chalmers decides to take the Arab back to Kufa. As 
night descends, the Arab is secured to the boat to prevent any attempt at escape, 
when to Chalmers’s surprise he speaks to him in English: 
“I say, old man, you must let me go.”  
I looked down astounded! My prisoner’s sharp guttural Arabic had tuned into 
smooth cultural English! I stared into his face. ‘Who the devil are you?’  
“Leachman.” 
“Leachman! Good heavens! Yes! But it’s only your tongue that gives you away. 
What’s the game?” 344 
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Leachman’s cover is so convincing that Chalmers and Gertude Bell – a figure of 
expertise – are entirely convinced that he is an Arab.  As Chalmers tells him, it is only 
his own confession that gives him away when he is ready to reveal his true identity. 
The story ends with Chalmers allowing ‘the Arab’ to escape, in order to maintain 
Leachman’s cover.  
  Patricia Stonehouse’s novel is a romance set against the backdrop of the 
siege of Kut. Philip Territtt is in love with Enid, the wife of his best friend, George 
Marcourt. The couple’s plan, to meet for one last illicit dinner before Territt leaves for 
Mesopotamia, is thwarted by the venerable Lady Emma Beckendon. Believing that 
Enid had simply changed her mind, a heart-broken Territt becomes engaged to young 
Beatrice Byndham and leaves for Mesopotamia. When news comes that Philip is 
believed dead after a brave but unsuccessful reconnaissance mission, both women 
mourn his death. In fact, the reader discovers that Philip Territt is not dead at all, but 
has been badly injured in battle. Lying amongst the corpses of his comrades, Territt is 
discovered by a Turkish officer as ‘the Buddoos *Bedouins+ hurried with the task of 
looting and pilfering from the pockets of those who lay so stiff and still, finished with 
all earthly possessions’.345  
  Like the Turk in Aubrey Herbert’s memoirs, the Ottoman officer hates 
the ‘Buddoos’ who rob the dead and wounded, and calls them ’‘thieves and robbers’, 
‘treacherous dogs’ and ‘Bedouin pigs’.346 The Turkish officer recalls that the British had 
treated the Turks fairly at Gallipoli and, upon hearing that Philip Territt had served 
there, decides to help him escape the clutches of the ‘treacherous and cruel Arabs’ by 
returning him to his colleagues.347 In order to do this, the Turk dresses himself and  
Philip in Arab clothing and, to complete the Arab disguise, escorts the weak Territt 
back to the British lines on camel-back. Upon their arrival, the men in the camp believe 
them to be Arabs and are immediately on their guard: ‘What did it portend? Who 
could trust a Buddoo?’.348 Their reactions convey the fear and distrust British 
servicemen felt towards Mesopotamia’s population. The men are relieved to discover 
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that the ‘Buddoo’ approaching their camp is ‘Phillip Territt, in the garb of an Arab *…+ 
come back, after all.’349    
  In each of these stories the duplicity, which British servicemen believed 
characterised the Arabs of Mesopotamia, is personified in the Arab who is not an Arab. 
The British officer in Arab clothing literally embodies the distrust British servicemen 
felt towards Mesopotamia’s Arab tribesmen. The fear surrounding the Arabs of 
Mesopotamia is expressed overtly in Stonehouse’s novel and Chalmers’s story. The 
Gates of Kut depicts the Arabs as thieves preying on dead and wounded, and contrasts 
this with the honourable Turk; like Brereton’s On the Road to Bagdad, it echoes the 
sentiments of British servicemen in Mesopotamia uncannily well for a novel published 
within a year of the events it fictionalises.  Philip Territt tells his colleagues: ‘“They are 
clean fighters and brave enemies, these Turks. I’ll say that for much for them”’,350 and 
describes how the Turk ‘“risked his own life every hour for three days”’ in order to 
save his.351 Chalmers’s story contrasts the treachery of the Arabs (who would later kill 
Leachman) with his loyalty, heroism and fair treatment. Chalmers asks Leachman 
about a story he has heard that Leachman had allowed an Arab who had tried to kill 
him to go free after only ‘a brotherly scolding’:352 
Leachman smiled. 
“If you had brought that fellow in he would have had to face a firing squad.” 
“Yes.  Poor devil.  I expect he’s reformed now.” 353 
  These stories can also be situated in a tradition of British travel 
literature in which a British traveller dresses as an oriental in order to gain an insight 
into the lifestyle or places forbidden to non-Muslims. Most famously, Sir Richard 
Burton dressed as a ‘Darwayash’ (Dervish) to gain access to the forbidden cities of 
Mecca and Medina: ‘the Moslem’s Holy Land, the jealously guarded Harím’.354 Burton’s 
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language betrays the power inherent in his penetration of the holy cities, which he 
sexualised and feminised as a harem in the preamble to the tale of his travels. Burton 
was honest about his motivation: he was eager to go where he was forbidden to enter, 
to see and describe what no European had seen before.   
  In the early twentieth century, E.B. Soane travelled from Istanbul to 
Baghdad in disguise. Upon his arrival at the city of Baghdad, he simply threw off his 
disguise, revealing, to the shock of his fellow passengers, his true, British, identity. In 
the narrative of his journey, To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, Soane 
described his mixed feelings at resuming his European identity once more: 
I felt a stranger and more lonely than I had done ever before. Gone was the 
coffee-house and the bazaar, of the multitudes of which I was one, and equal, 
with whom I spoke and laughed and fought and wrangled. They were far away, 
and I must learn to look upon them as upon strange and inferior beings, if such 
were now possible, and taking place again on the platform of Western birth, 
once more go on my way affecting to ignore their joys and sorrows – which had 
so lately been my own.355  
In this description, Soane reveals his affection for the people whose identity he had 
temporarily taken on, but also what it meant for a European to look upon the peoples 
of the east. As a European, Soane felt that he had to learn once more ‘to look upon 
them as upon strange and inferior beings’. This, for him, was part of ‘taking on the 
platform of Western birth’; his cultural inheritance was to take a superior perspective 
on the people whose identity he had so easily assumed. The very act of ‘becoming’ an 
‘Oriental’ gave Soane a power over those whom he fooled; from his more privileged 
stance as a European, Soane’s description suggests, he was able to lower himself to 
the status of eastern peoples, in order to gain access to a way of life that would 
otherwise have been impossible for him to experience.   
  In Chalmers’s story and in Stonehouse’s novel, the British officers have 
to fool the Arabs into believing that they are Arabs too: Territt in order to survive, and 
Leachman in order to subvert the Arabs’ disruptive activities. This can be read as an 
assertion of superiority, but also of control. Cox’s story, ‘Unmixed Bathing’, is much 
more light-hearted, and free of the darker descriptions of Arabs that are central to the 
plots of the other texts. However, in common with the others, it dramatises the 
duplicity British servicemen associated with Mesopotamia’s Arabs in such a way as to 
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give the impression of British power and control. It was the lack of control over the 
behaviour of the people British servicemen described as Arabs that frightened them 
most. Again and again, they returned to their belief that the Arabs could not be 
trusted. One never knew if the Arab was who, or what, he (and it was invariably a he) 
said he was. While the three texts differ in their portrayal of Mesopotamia’s Arabs, in 
each the act of ‘becoming’ an Arab is an assertion of control in a situation where 




The Siege of Kut 
 
  In late October 1915, General Sir John Nixon was authorised to 
despatch a force to capture Baghdad. From this point on, the Mesopotamian campaign 
became the centre of a great deal of media attention. British publications focused for 
the first time on what they believed would be the greatest military capture of the war 
so far: a panacea for Britain’s failing ‘prestige in the East’ and the frustration at the 
inactivity on the Western Front.  
  Having been promised reinforcements of two Indian divisions from 
France, General Nixon ordered Townshend to advance towards Baghdad with the 6th 
(Poona) Division. Townshend protested that he did not believe that his force was 
strong enough to take Baghdad against reinforced Turkish troops, but in spite of this 
Nixon ordered him onwards. Townshend’s troops advanced towards Baghdad in 
November 1915; they met Turkish troops at Ctesiphon, or Sulaiman Pak, on 21 
November 1915, but were forced to retreat on the 24 -25 November.  
  As Thompson’s memoirs indicated, the retreat was a terrible ordeal for 
all the troops involved; the scarcity of transport and medical care for the wounded led 
to terrible suffering. When news of the inadequacy of medical facilities reached 
London, it caused a scandal that led to the resignation of Austen Chamberlain, the 
secretary of state for India, and hastened a change of leadership in both India and 
Britain. Townshend and his men retreated to Kut al-Amara, which they reached on 3 
December 1915. The 6th Division was quickly surrounded and became besieged at Kut.  
118 
 
  Townshend’s decision to remain at Kut has been criticised, but he 
argued that the town was strategically important, and that in any event his troops 
could march no further. In particular, Townshend blamed his Indian troops, whom he 
believed were too weak to go on. ‘Never have I seen anything like the exhaustion of 
the troops after we reached Kut’, he noted in his memoir. ‘*The+ great bulk of the 
Indian troops could not move at all, though I got the British troops to work on 4th 
December’.356 As has been discussed, this was not the first or the only time that 
Charles Townshend would lament the ineptitude of his Indian troops. Although his 
views were shared by some, Townshend’s own reputation would come under attack by 
those who would contest his account of the siege of Kut. The remainder of this chapter 
will discuss different accounts of the siege of Kut, in an effort to assess how discourses 
of race and civilization shaped servicemen’s accounts, and how they continue to shape 
our understanding of the siege of Kut today. 
  Major-General Charles Townshend, who had made his name at the 
Siege of Chitral (4th March to 20th April 1895), believed that he and his men would soon 
be relieved. However, Townshend gave his commanders the wrong impression of how 
long his stores could last. As a result, Aylmer’s relieving force was obliged to attempt 
to break through Turkish defences in terrible conditions in January 1916. The battles of 
Shaikh Saad, Wadi and Hanna were lost at great cost of life. General Gorringe made a 
final attempt to relieve the garrison in March 1916, but this was also unsuccessful, and 
the garrison surrendered on 29 April 1916. It is estimated that around 23,000 men lost 
their lives in the attempt to relieve the garrison at Kut.357 The surrender caused a 
public outcry in Britain that focused media attention on the Mesopotamian campaign 
for the first time. Ministers defended themselves against charges that they had sent 
British and Indian troops into battle unprepared and ill-equipped because they had 
been blinded by ‘political’ considerations. Around ten thousand soldiers surrendered 
to Turkish forces in April 1916, and while Townshend was whisked off to spend his 
captivity in luxury, the tales of the suffering of the prisoners at the hands of their 
captors became infamous.  Around a third of the men who were captured by the Turks 
did not make it through their captivity. Many did not even make it to Anatolia: 
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weakened by the siege, their bodies simply could not cope with the long march into 
Turkey.358  
  The hardships of the siege of Kut and the march endured by the 
captured troops brought into stark relief the discourses of race and civilization that 
were central to the way the Mesopotamian campaign had been understood by British 
servicemen. Discourses of race continue to play an important role in the way 
contemporary historians discuss the siege of Kut. This stems, to some extent, from 
Townshend’s account of the siege, in which he attributed his surrender to the 
weakness of his Indian troops. As rations ran low, Hindu and Muslim troops refused to 
eat horsemeat along with the rest of the garrison. As a result, they became weak and 
suffered more from the diseases that were soon endemic in the garrison than other 
troops under Townshend’s command. Townshend made a concerted effort to change 
the minds of the men who would not eat horsemeat, seeking special permission from 
religious leaders in India, for example. But this made little difference, and the men who 
would not eat the meat grew ever weaker.     
  In his article ‘Sepoys and the Siege of Kut- al- Amara’, Nikolas Gardner 
argues that Townshend’s ability to successfully hold the city of Kut was significantly 
diminished by the large contingency of Indian troops under his command. Gardner 
maintains that Townshend and Nixon have been unfairly blamed by historians for the 
surrender of the garrison, and that not enough weight has been given to Townshend’s 
own analysis of the situation, which placed the blame squarely on the inferiority of his 
Indian troops. Gardner maintains that whilst it is true that the push for Baghdad was 
ill-judged, and although Townshend made a rescue operation all the more difficult in 
his failure to supply Aylmer with an accurate assessment of his food rations, it was 
ultimately the malnutrition of Townshend’s Indian forces, caused by their refusal to 
eat horsemeat, which doomed the siege of Kut to failure. He concludes that 
‘significantly *…+ the inability of 6 Indian Division to resist for a longer period, or to 
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assist the progress of the relief force, resulted largely from the conduct of its Indian 
members’.359  
  The siege of Kut can be read as a pressurized microcosm of the 
Mesopotamian campaign. The prejudices and misunderstandings that have been 
discussed with relation to the campaign as a whole were more clearly articulated 
during the siege, because men were trapped in close quarters and in a highly stressful 
situation.  The difficult relationship described between the Arabs and the British and 
Indian troops was re-created during the siege. Townshend reluctantly allowed around 
6,000 women and children to remain in the garrison at the behest of Sir Percy Cox, 
who feared the political consequences of allowing such a large number of civilians to 
perish in the desert. For Townshend’s part, he reflected that though he had ‘very 
reluctantly’ allowed the women and children to stay,360 he had ‘always bitterly 
regretted [his] clemency’.361 Being trapped in a camp with people whom they believed 
to be hostile and ready to turn on them at any time did not endear the Arabs to the 
men besieged at Kut, particularly after stores were discovered hidden in the town mid-
way through the siege. Townshend took several Arab men into custody to ensure the 
good behaviour of the others. For Townshend, it ‘went without saying’ that ‘they were 
in communication with the enemy [...], and [his] anxiety was based on the fact that 
many rifles must have been buried and concealed’.362  
   The siege highlighted how little British servicemen understood of their 
Indian colleagues, and, as food shortages increased to unbearable levels, resentment 
grew about how rations should be divided up. It was known that some of the ‘native’ 
troops were refusing to eat horsemeat. As Private Hockaday of B Company, 2nd 
Queen’s Own Royal West Kents recalled, this caused some resentment amongst the 
British troops. Hockaday told his interviewer that ‘the natives were authorised by their 
leaders that they could eat mules and horse-flesh, but they would not do so. So that 
made them have the double ration of flour to us. So instead of hanging out for four 
months or five months, we may have hanged out for a month longer’.363 He resented 
the fact that ‘the natives’ were given a double ration of flour, repeating this 
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information in his interview.  Like Townshend, Hockaday blamed the Indian soldiers for 
what he saw as the garrison’s premature surrender in April 1916. Private Finch, who 
served with 1st Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, also recalled 
that some Indian troops would not eat horsemeat, but did not have a clear idea of who 
had refused it, or why they did not want to eat it: 
Well in the siege there was quite a number of Mohammedans and they 
wouldn’t eat horse. If they had ate horse, instead of their ordinary cows, that 
siege would have lasted another month because I think there was more 
Mohammedans than there was Hindus, or vice versa – I don’t know which it 
was – one of them didn’t want to eat cattle … erm … horse. Anyhow, by wire 
they sent out to the head Mohammedan and he sent back to say that they 
could eat horsemeat and after that these natives started to eat horsemeat.364    
The mixture of resentment and lack of real understanding, as well as the conflation of 
creed with race was typical of reactions to Indian troops during the Mesopotamian 
campaign.  
  Townshend worried about the loyalty of his Indian troops throughout 
the siege of Kut. In his memoirs, he emphasised the lengths he had gone to, to 
accommodate their religious beliefs and the fact that he ‘never ceased to take every 
means possible of raising the moral *sic.+ of the Indian troops’.365 He complained that 
despite his efforts to keep the Indian men happy: 
Several cases of self-mutilation were detected *…+ among the men in one of the 
Indian battalions, who shot off their trigger fingers and pretended they had 
been wounded. *…+ All these men, twelve or thirteen of them – were tried and 
received heavy sentences. There were also two or three desertions by Indian 
soldiers to the enemy on 29th and 30th December, and I had several courts 
martial for cases of cowardice before the enemy and sleeping on post.366  
In his account of the siege of Kut, Ronald Millar gives a different impression of 
Townshend’s treatment of his Indian troops. Millar’s history of the campaign points 
out that other officers gave favourable accounts of the behaviour of Indian troops 
during the siege, even those who had lost their British commanding officers.367 Millar 
notes that ‘the Indian soldiers suffered especially from the cold. They started to wear 
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blankets over their heads and shoulders. Townshend heartlessly strictly forbade this 
practice as “unsoldierly”.’368  
  During the siege of Kut, Townshend became a hero in the British press. 
The papers marvelled at the courage he and his men displayed, and mourned their 
surrender. However, after his surrender, Townshend was imprisoned in great comfort 
at Prinkipo Island, near Constantinople. Although he was made a knight in 1917, as 
accounts were published of the suffering his men endured, he was perceived to have 
abandoned his men for a luxurious imprisonment and lost much of his popularity. He 
was also heavily criticised for his self-aggrandising portrayal of the events leading up to 
the siege of Kut, especially as other accounts emerged in which he was mocked and 
vilified.  
  It was the treatment of troops after the siege of Kut that made the 
greatest impact on British audience after the war. Accounts of the siege such as E. O. 
Mousely’s Secrets of a Kuttite and E. W. C. Sandes’s In Kut and Captivity gave terrible 
descriptions of the treatment of British troops at the hands of the Arabs and Kurds 
who accompanied them to Anatolia.369 Ronald Millar began his history of the siege 
with a description of the march to the prisoner of war camps: 
The wake of the column was strewn with human litter, the dead, the dying and 
others, unable to march any further, waiting for death from the rifle butts of 
their Arab guards. These Kurdish guards had gone on the rampage soon after 
the troops had marched out of temporary Turkish prisoner of war camp.370  
 
Millar’s description conveyed both the hatred of Mesopotamia’s native population and 
the confusion there remained about who was responsible for atrocities committed 
against captive Indian and British troops. Millar’s history of the siege switched easily 
between describing the guards who accompanied the captured troops as Arabs or 
Kurds, as if the two terms were interchangeable.  
  It is unclear from the accounts of those who survived the march who 
exactly mistreated the captured men, because the survivors could not, or did not, 
distinguish between their captors.  It is clear, however, that the troops who 
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surrendered at Kut were treated very badly on their march to Anatolia. F. G. Ponting 
was a non-commissioned officer in the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire 
Light Infantry. Ponting remembered being marched into a Turkish barracks in Baghdad: 
‘As we went along there they was throwing stones at us, spitting at us, tried to come 
and hit us, and we wasn’t at all popular’.371 But the worst aspect of their imprisonment 
was the march from Baghdad to Anatolia. Ponting recalled: 
We had a pretty rough time there, and that started the show going; that we 
started our march. *…+ It wasn’t hours they were talking in, they was talking in 
days. They said it would be about [unclear] days, the next march before you 
come to water. We got no water bottles, we got nothing to carry water with; so 
when we come to where the water was – you’re apt to lay straight away down 
and lap it up. But a lot of our fellows died through that, through typhoid germs 
and other germs that was in this water.372 
Ponting’s description of the treatment troops received upon their arrival at the Turkish 
barracks suggests that it was Turkish soldiers who mistreated the captured men. He 
was unspecific about who had led them to Anatolia, and his description of the march 
suggests that, although they were deprived of enough clean water and made to march 
for days at a time, they were not physically abused by their guards.  
  Private Hockaday also recalled the terrible hardships of the march to 
Anatolia, but his account was a little more specific about who was harassing the British 
and Indian troops:  
It wasn’t really Turks, it was all sorts dressed anyhow: Arabs and Kurds and 
everything. We were very weak at the time and used to march along *…+ as best 
as we could. But all the time they were behind you, hammering you come on 
‘imshi’ ‘yella’, hitting you in the back with a rifle. And if you fell out by the 
wayside you was left to lay and die if your comrades did not help you at all. And 
we went through many Arab villages and all the time they had to gallop up and 
down to keep them from getting at us, they would draw their knives across 
their throat and say, “English finish”, and spit on you and all sorts. And when 
you rested by night, they would go around while you were sleeping and steal 
anything they could lay their hands on. On the last day before Baghdad, I had 
my boots stolen, and I had to walk along – with the help of my comrades – I 
was very weak, *…+ and when they got to Baghdad there was a mob of Arabs 
there, throwing mud and spitting on us. And we eventually arrived up by the 
river, railway bank in Baghdad. They kept us there about a week and anyone 
[who] could stand at all had to go on another 200 mile march. Fortunately, or 
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unfortunately, *…+ I was too weak to go on with hundreds of others and we 
were left behind.373  
Descriptions like Hockaday’s of men being beaten for falling out of the convoy with 
exhaustion and of the theft of even the most basic equipment, such as boots, were 
very common. Though his description suggests that troops were neglected and ill-
treated by their guards, Hockaday did not imply that the men lived in perpetual fear of 
death at the hands of their captors. Hockaday was not sure who his guards were; he 
believed that they were not Turks, but could not distinguish between the others. His 
description of the terrible reception British and Indian troops received upon their 
arrival in Mesopotamian towns and villages also leaves it unclear whom mistreated or 
robbed the prisoners.  However, the words he recalled being shouted at troops who 
fell behind were Arabic: ‘imshi’, walk and ‘yella’, hurry up.  
  General (then Lieutenant) Henry Hampton Rich, who served in the 120th 
Rajputana Infantry, remembered that not all British prisoners were treated in this way; 
as an officer he was never made to march but was given a mule to ride.  He and his 
fellow officers only heard of the terrible suffering of their men upon their arrival in 
Anatolia:  
The conditions for the officers were hard but no more than that; the conditions 
for the men were absolutely brutal and hellish. How any of them survived it, I 
really can’t make up my mind. Because they were all ill – everyone was bound 
to have been ill – their boots were stolen from them, their helmets were stolen 
from them, but some got through. Roughly about 70 per cent of the British 
soldiers and 30 per cent of the Indians died on the march, or as a direct result 
from the march, when they got up to the camps the other end.374   
Rich’s description of the men’s suffering tallied exactly with the descriptions given by 
Hockaday and Ponting: the men were extremely badly treated by their captors and 
deprived of even their most basic kit. Rich also heard stories of the terrible treatment 
of troops by Arab villages along their route: ‘the Arab villagers had a very pleasant 
habit of going up on the hill-top behind and dropping rocks on them’.375 He also 
described the terrible treatment of the men by their captors: ‘When they arrived, dead 
tired and dead beaten and pretty sick, they were left in the open for a day, which was 
not too bad so they got some food and at night, they were shut in dungeons in the fort 
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*…+ barracks itself and they were not allowed out, even for purposes of nature, and as 
most of them had dysentery – well, it wasn’t very pleasant.’376 However, in common 
with Hockaday and Ponting, Rich did not specify who had mistreated the prisoners. 
Moreover, none of the men described the guards as being as brutal as Millar’s 
introduction suggests.  
  However, it is the most terrible stories told by survivors of the siege of 
Kut that are reproduced by modern historians. Gilbert, for example, quotes extensively 
from Mousely’s account of the march to Anatolia. Gilbert describes the march as ‘a 
veritable death march *…+ foreshadowing the Gestapo-organised death marches of 
Jewish concentration camp prisoners at the end of the Second World War’.377 The First 
World War depicts the brutally long marches, the stolen equipment, the lack of the 
most basic concern for the welfare of British and Indian troops, which Rich, Hockaday 
and Ponting described. However, Gilbert also uses Mousely’s emotive description of 
the march: 
The eyes of our men stared from white faces drawn long with the suffering of a 
too tardy death and they held out their hands towards our boat. As they 
dragged one foot after another, some fell and those with the rearguard came in 
for blows and cudgels and sticks.378 
Such a description was designed to elicit an emotional response from the reader: 
Mousely conveyed his impotence and anger at witnessing the maltreatment of his 
men. This does not tally, however, with Rich’s account: he was very clear that the 
officers had no idea of the suffering of their men until they reached the camps.  Gilbert 
intersperses his account of the siege with descriptions of the terrible reception troops 
received upon their arrival at Mesopotamian towns, lending them the weight of an 
objective historical account. He anonymously reproduces P.W. Long’s account, also to 
be found in Barker’s history of the campaign, which described the guards specifically as 
Arab, in a way that other prisoners did not, and depicted a level of violence that was 
not present in other accounts of the march: 
Finding, among seven naked corpses lying in a yard, one man who appeared to 
be alive, a fellow prisoner asked an Arab guard to give the man some water. “At 
that he picked up a water bottle and asked me to show him the man. 
Suspecting nothing, I did so, and the Arab walked round to his head, and 
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forcing open his mouth, inserted the neck of the bottle inside.  A few bubbles, a 
convulsive twist, and the poor fellow was dead, deliberately choked to 
death.”379  
Although it is clear that the men who were marched to Anatolia were treated 
appallingly by their captors, the description quoted by Gilbert’s modern history of the 
war is far more violent than those offered by Rich, Hockaday or Ponting.  Long’s 
description is also emotive, painting the Arab guard as a cold, evil man who killed the 
British soldier in his care in cold blood. As with any ordeal, there will always be 
different accounts of what took place during the march: it is impossible to know how 
much of the behaviour attributed to Arabs was actually carried out by Arabs, and how 
much of it was the result of the fear and hatred British servicemen attached to image 
of ‘the Arab’ in Mesopotamia. It is, however, clear that the men who surrendered at 
Kut-al-Amara went through a terrible ordeal, and that they were treated horrendously 
by those in charge of their transportation to Anatolia. Finally, it is the most terrible of 






  Discourses of race and civilization were central to the way that British 
men and women made sense of their experiences in Mesopotamia during the 
campaign. In part, this can be attributed to the centrality of such ideas to the practices 
of the Indian army, which had at its core an understanding of ‘native’ soldiers that 
relied on race as an organising principle. However, the importance of race and imperial 
ideologies in understanding Mesopotamia was also a reflection of their prominence in 
the mindset of British servicemen themselves. Faced with cultures and peoples they 
did not understand and who were seen as a threat throughout the campaign, British 
servicemen made sense of the people of Mesopotamia in the only way they knew: 
through the prism of familiar discourses of race and empire. As a result, 
Mesopotamia’s peoples were often homogenised into racial types, as India’s peoples 
had been, giving the illusion of British control. It was the lack of real control over the 
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behaviour of the peoples of Mesopotamia that led to a consummate fear of its 
inhabitants, most often described as Arabs. The duplicity and violence that British 
servicemen believed characterised Mesopotamia’s peoples led them to despise the 
Arabs as honourless, cowardly foes who preyed on the weak and wounded for nothing 
but material gain.  These descriptions of the Arabs reached their peak in the 
descriptions of the terrible treatment of British prisoners after the siege of Kut.  Here, 
the fear and hatred of the Arabs is manifested in a number of particularly violent 
accounts of the march to Anatolia, which have become the standard version of siege. It 
is impossible to know how much of this is true and how much a result of the 
perceptions of Mesopotamia’s peoples that developed during the campaign, but the 
image of the ruthless, duplicitous Arab was now fixed, and would impact on British 

















The Siege of Kut and its Aftermath in Britain 
 
Through a close analysis of the way that Townshend’s advance, entrapment at Kut, and 
eventual surrender were represented in the British press and contemporary literature, 
this chapter will discuss the impact of the siege of Kut on representations of 
Mesopotamia in Britain. It will also look closely at the debate surrounding the advance 
to Baghdad and its consequences in an effort to explore what the Mesopotamia 
Commission’s archives and contemporary political debates tell us about changing 
attitudes towards empire in Britain.  
  Although they had reported only brief updates of Indian Expeditionary 
Force D’s (IEF D) progress, as Townshend and his men made the bulk of their advance 
northwards, many British newspapers devoted extended coverage to their attempt on 
Baghdad.380 The press now described, in greater detail than they had ever given the 
campaign hitherto, the journey that had brought Townshend’s troops to within striking 
distance of Baghdad. The celebratory tone of press coverage in the run-up to the 
battle of Ctesiphon (22-24 November, 1915) described the 6th Division’s achievements 
as remarkable progress made by a small force of British and Indian troops, whose 
string of uninterrupted, and unlikely, successes had found them, as the papers 
triumphantly announced, ‘less than 50 miles from Bagdad’.381  
  Baghdad, the city of the Abbasid Caliphs, was seen as a suitably high 
profile target for Townshend’s troops. The occupation of the city was a thrilling 
prospect: a panacea for the stagnation of Allied forces on the Western Front and, as 
this chapter will discuss, a way to offset the humiliating withdrawal from Gallipoli. 
Writing in his Baghdad: City of Peace (1927), a history of Baghdad, Richard Coke 
described the city in the following terms:  
The fabled capital of the great Caliphs, the wonder town of the Arabian Nights, 
a place known to the dreams of every Western child. Baghdad, where the good 
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Harun was said to wander in disguise with his minister, Jafar the Barmecide, 
and sit chatting with his subjects in the coffee houses; Baghdad which suffered 
a more cruel fate than Rome itself, when the Mongol Tyrant massacred eight 
hundred thousand people without flinching and the waters of the Tigris ran red 
with human blood; Baghdad, that lay for centuries neglected, a crumbling, 
desolate, lifeless thing; Baghdad, the city of a myriad types of men, of 
wondrous, dark-eyed, close-veiled maids; Baghdad, the home of a million 
stories of lust and cruelty and passion and achievement and sometimes even 
humour; the city of the blazing sum by day, the treacherous cold and damp by 
night; what romance, what fascination in the very name, Baghdad!382  
 
In this introduction to the city, Coke illustrated the significance of Baghdad in the 
British imagination. An exotic, yet familiar place, Baghdad would have been well 
known to British audiences for the reasons he outlined. 
  As Coke’s allusion to ‘the great Caliphs’ suggests, Baghdad was 
identified primarily as the seat of the Abbasid caliphate. After the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 632, the growing Muslim Empire was ruled by Caliphs. Muhammad was 
succeeded immediately by his companion Abu Bakr, the first of four Rightly Guided or 
Rashidun Caliphs, who are so called because they were elected by the elders and 
approved by the Muslim community. After the murder of Ali, the last of the Rashidun, 
Muawiyah, the Governor of Syria, became Caliph and established the Umayyad 
Dynasty. The Umayyad Caliphs ruled from 661 to 750. Under the Ummayads, the 
Muslim Empire grew and was established as a unified and permanent force with its 
capital in Damascus. However, the ‘Golden Age’ of Muslim civilization is considered to 
have been under the Abbasid Dynasty. The Abbasids derive their name from the first 
Abbasid Caliph, the prophet’s uncle Abu al ‘Abbas. Under the Abbasid Dynasty, the 
capital of the empire was moved to Baghdad (except for a short period under al-
Mu’tasim (833-42), when the capital was Samarra in the North of Iraq). 
  Under the Abbasids, Baghdad grew to be one of the largest cities in the 
world. The city was built by the second Abbasid Caliph, al-Mansur; he sought to 
establish a new Abbasid capital where he could entrench the new ruling family’s 
power. Thus, at the centre of Abbasid Baghdad lay the Round City designed to keep its 
rulers aloof and separate from the populace; it contained the palace, barracks and 
offices. Markets and residential buildings, which were initially inside the city, were 
moved outside to protect the Caliph. The city was further improved under the rule of 
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al-Mansur’s grandson, Harun al-Rashid, and it was his reign that captured the British 
imagination. As Richard Coke’s description suggests, Harun al-Rashid’s role as one of 
the protagonists in Scheherazade’s tales had as much, if not more, to do with his fame 
in Britain, as his role as Caliph.  
  Figures for the population of Baghdad in the Abbasid period are as high 
as one million; this declined rapidly after the Mongol occupation of the city and the 
destruction of its irrigation system. The period of Mongol rule lasted until the city was 
conquered by Tamerlane at the beginning of the eleventh century. Baghdad was then 
ruled by various dynasties for short periods, until it came under Ottoman control in the 
sixteenth century. As Chapter One discussed, in Britain, the period of Ottoman rule 
was perceived to have been characterised by stagnation and corruption. Despite this, 
Baghdad continued to hold great significance in British popular consciousness. 
  Because Townshend’s retreat and subsequent entrapment at Kut al-
Amara came in place of his expected march into Baghdad, the story of the siege of Kut 
was followed closely by British newspapers. Although pride and happiness were 
quickly replaced with anger and recrimination after the battle of Ctesiphon and retreat 
to Kut, ‘the whole country watched with admiration the gallant struggle’ of Townshend 
and his men.383 By January 1916, British audiences knew the story of General 
Townshend and the 6th Division of IEF D well, and held their breath for a quick rescue. 
 
 
Media and Fictional Representations of the Siege of Kut 
 
  Patricia Ethel Stonehouse’s romance, The Gates of Kut, traces the 
changing responses to the story of the siege of Kut with accuracy, and is itself a 
reflection of just how far the siege of Kut al-Amara had entered the British popular 
consciousness.384 The hero of The Gates of Kut, Philip Territt, is injured during an 
operation with the Tigris Relief force. He returns home on the first hospital ship full of 
injured men from Mesopotamia. As his ship approaches land, the pilot turns to Territ 
and his friend and says:  ‘Half England is on the quay, […] and the other half at 
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Victoria.’385 Stonehouse describes the reception awaiting the wounded men from 
Mesopotamia: 
They heard the first cheers as they swung in, ringing cheers that brought a 
lump to the throat of the bravest man there. They were swinging into port, 
home at last, following that fussy bantam of a boat, that was clanging its bell 
importantly and proudly flinging the news ahead as it went: 
‘The hospital ship from Kut! The hospital ship from Kut!’ 
The reply came all at once from the land.386  
The description of ‘half England’ eagerly awaiting the return of the hospital ship from 
Kut reflects the popular interest there was in the Mesopotamian campaign by the time 
the garrison at Kut had surrendered, in April 1916. The atmosphere described is one of 
national solidarity, but also of a captivated audience who had become invested in the 
outcome of a story. The siege of Kut raised the profile of the Mesopotamian campaign, 
and elevated Townshend’s status to remarkable heights. By the time Townshend 
surrendered on 29 April 1916, he had become a heroic, almost superhuman figure in 
the British press. This, too, is evidenced by Stonehouse’s novel; as the wounded men 
returning from Mesopotamia approach land at last, the thoughts of the soldiers turn to 
Charles Townshend:   
That brave and gallant gentleman who had held Kut as perhaps no other man 
on earth would have held it, and who was now in far Mesopotamia with the 
last of his heroic band.  That others, on the black mass of the pier, thought of 
Townshend at that moment there was no doubt. For a voice cried aloud his 
name, and the sound of wild cheering followed.  
“Townshend! Three cheers for Townshend and his gallant little army!” 
And the cheers rang so loud that it seemed as in far-away Baghdad the echo of 
them must surely be heard, or the very spirit of them reach there and tell the 
splendid fellows that England had not forgotten. The cheers drowned almost 
the answering roar of the guns. So the hospital ship from Kut, with its broken 
freight came home.387   
As Stonehouse’s description suggests, Townshend and his men had become more than 
celebrities: they were heroes who had endured all in the defence of Britain’s honour.  
Such is Townshend’s popularity that he is on the mind of every person in the crowd 
who spontaneously burst into cheers at the thought of his conduct of the campaign 
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and the bravery of his men. Words such as ‘brave’, ‘gallant’ and ‘heroic’ emphasise the 
image of Townshend and his ‘gallant little army’ as heroes.   
  Stonehouse’s language creates an image of a brave ‘band’ of men on an 
adventure against all the odds.  Townshend’s force is described as a ‘little army’ or as a 
‘heroic band’, suggesting that the commander had been at the head of a small, 
unofficial force. Such language makes the achievements of IEF D appear all the more 
impressive, and their defeats seem less humiliating. It was admirable that a small, ill-
equipped force should have defeated the Turkish army on numerous occasions, and 
held out against them for months with dwindling supplies, but there was no dishonour 
in the surrender of such a small force against a much more powerful foe.  As will be 
discussed, the British press would adopt similar strategies in their coverage of the 
aftermath of Townshend’s surrender. Finally, the image of roaring guns reminds the 
reader of the grandeur of the occasion and of Britain’s military power. The guns drown 
out cheers so loud that Stonehouse’s narrator imagines that they might be heard in 
Baghdad; though temporarily set back, Britain’s military supremacy would once again 
be established in the east, and its guns would literally be heard in Baghdad.  
  Just as Territt and his comrades could find no fault in Townshend’s 
conduct during the attempt on Baghdad, so the British press and members of both 
houses of parliament had only praise for Townshend and his men. The papers built an 
image of Townshend as not only the hero of the Mesopotamian campaign, but also as 
a man who had spent a lifetime protecting the British Empire. John Bull reminded its 
readers that he was ‘the man who held the Chitral forts, and in so doing wrote a 
glorious page upon our Empire’s history’.388 In an article titled ‘The Hero of Kut. 
General Townshend’s Record. (From one who knows him)’, The Times too asserted 
that he was a fine solider, from a family of empire-builders, and informed its readers 
that Townshend had ‘leaped into fame as commander of the escort of the British 
Agent during the siege of Chitral’, and ‘fought in the Sudan Expedition of 1898’.389 The 
Nation declared that Townshend, ‘the hero of Chitral,’ was ‘not only a competent 
                                                     
388
 A.G. Hales, ‘SAVE GENERAL TOWNSHEND! IS IT TO BE GORDON AGAIN? – WILL YOU PERMIT IT?’, John 
Bull, 19 February 1916, p. 10. 
389




soldier with the varied experience that our Empire affords, but a compelling 
personality’.390  
  In the weeks before Major General Charles Townshend blew up his guns 
and surrendered the garrison at Kut al-Amara, A. G. Hales’s campaign to ‘SAVE 
TOWNSHEND!’ reached a crescendo.391 Writing in John Bull, Hales urged the 
government to throw all possible resources at the rescue of ‘the gallant warrior’ and 
his men, and begged Lord Kitchener to save Townshend as he had avenged Gordon 
before him.392 Hales was comparing Charles Townshend to General Charles George 
Gordon who lost his life to the Mahdi’s forces after the siege of Khartoum (12 March 
1884 to 26 January 1885). Hales made no allusion to the controversy that surrounded 
the battle of Omdurman in September 1898, evoking only the fact that the Minister for 
War was perceived to have avenged Gordon’s death by defeating the Mahdi’s 
successor, Abdullah al-Taashi.393 The comparison with Gordon of Khartoum presented 
Townshend to the British public not just as a brave, heroic soldier, but as someone 
who had given all, not only to Britain, but specifically in the service of expanding the 
British Empire.   
  When the British relieving force arrived in Khartoum, Gordon was found 
dead, his head allegedly cut off and given to the Mahdi on a stake. Gordon’s death 
caused a national outcry and led to what Roger Owen, in his biography of Lord Cromer 
(then Proconsul of Egypt), called ‘the British obsession with avenging Gordon’.394 In 
comparing Townshend to ‘Gordon of Khartoum’, Hales was drawing upon a well-
established and highly emotive trope of sacrifice in the service of empire. He was also 
contributing significantly to what could be described as the British obsession with 
rescuing Townshend of Kut. Press coverage of the campaign depicted Charles 
Townshend as a man whose career had prepared him perfectly for his current 
situation. His role was presented to the British public as upholding Britain’s honour and 
protecting India. This linked the campaign, in the popular consciousness, with the 
protection and expansion of Britain’s Indian empire.  
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  Although admiration for Townshend and his men was unstinting, 
pressure on the government to explain how this force had become besieged at Kut was 
mounting, even before the surrender of the garrison. Hales declared that if 
Townshend, like Gordon before him, was not rescued in time, he would have been 
‘butchered on the altar of *the government’s+ incapacity’.395  Whilst Townshend was 
held up as an exemplary soldier, the cabinet were merely ‘a bunch of laymen who have 
had the audacity to usurp soldierly powers to gamble with the lives of heroes’.396  
Although John Bull’s coverage of the siege of Kut and its aftermath was extreme, more 
moderately phrased echoes of the same sentiments could be found in other British 
publications in the run-up to the surrender at Kut al-Amara. The Times reported in 
February 1916: 
When we committed ourselves to the Baghdad adventure we took grave 
additional risks which were well known to those familiar with this region. 
Despite the preoccupations of other theatres of war, the country is watching 
with interest and admiration the gallant stand made by GENERAL 
TOWNSHEND. He has proved himself over and over again a first-class fighting 
general.397  
 
It is clear that any blame for the failures resulting from Townshend’s retreat and 
entrapment at Kut would not be laid at the door of General Townshend who, The 
Times declared, had ‘proved himself over and over again a first-class fighting general’, 
and whose ‘gallant stand’ was being watched with ‘interest and admiration’ by the 
entire country. The Times hinted that the blame lay higher up, with those who had 
made the decision to advance to Baghdad. It suggested that not only was the 
government wrong to authorise the advance, because it demanded that Townshend 
take ‘grave additional risks’, but that they did so in ignorance, or wilful dismissal, of 
arguments against such an advance that would have been obvious to anyone with a 
familiarity with the region. In so doing, the paper suggested, Asquith and his 
government had been either ill-informed, or simply willing to take unnecessary risks 
with the lives of ‘gallant’ soldiers.  
  After General Gorringe’s final attempt to relieve the garrison had failed, 
the Spectator warned that ‘a section on the Press will use that failure of our arms as an 
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instrument […] for inducing the people of this country to change their rulers rather 
than concentrate on the plain duty in front of them – the duty of carrying on the 
war’.398 But its call for restraint was very much in the minority.  
  The comments of Earl Kitchener in the House of Lords upon 
Townshend’s surrender were typical of reactions in parliament. Kitchener, one of the 
few cabinet members who had always objected to the attempt to occupy Baghdad, 
paid tribute to Townshend and his men;399 he told the House that they had done ‘all 
that was humanly possible to resist to the last, and […] their surrender reflects no 
discredit on themselves or on the record of the British and Indian Armies.’400 The 
Nation’s report on the surrender of the garrison typified the reaction of the British 
press to the news:  
General Townshend has been forced to surrender. He had held out much 
longer than anyone cognizant with his resources could have thought possible, 
and before giving in he destroyed his guns and ammunition. The force which 
passes into Turkish keeping is extremely small, rashly disproportionate to the 
risks it encountered in striking beyond Kut.401   
In common with other publications, the Nation’s report unconditionally praised 
Townshend and his men, and emphasised that their conduct had minimised the 
damaging effects of the surrender. In a tone very similar to that adopted in The Times, 
the Nation pointed out that Townshend’s force had been given a task far too large for 
its capacities. Although his force had always been ‘rashly disproportionate to the risks 
it encountered’, Townshend’s men had held Kut for an extraordinary length of time, 
and had destroyed their guns and ammunition.  Use of the word ‘rash’ was an unveiled 
criticism of the government’s decision to approve the advance. The loss of 10,000 men 
was, according to the Nation, of little military significance, as it was ‘extremely small’. 
  Almost as soon as Townshend surrendered, the media began to 
emphasise the difficulty of the task General Townshend and his troops had been given, 
and to claim that the force that the country had willed to be rescued, and that 23,000 
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men had died attempting to relieve, was not particularly significant.  The Times 
reassured its readers that: 
It is hardly necessary to say that the capitulation of the garrison of Kut has very 
limited military importance. The numbers involved are relatively small, and Kut 
itself is merely a squalid little Arab town […]. The enemy will doubtless exploit 
the episode to the utmost, but their efforts are already heavily discounted.402   
The Manchester Guardian, too, reflected that ‘the fall of Kut is a very unpleasant jar to 
proper pride, but it is not a great military misfortune’.403  The Nation went so far as to 
declare that ‘militarily, the surrender strengthens our position in Mesopotamia’.404 
This was part of the unstinting support demonstrated by the press for Townshend and 
his men, but it was also part of a concerted effort to save face in the aftermath of a 
humiliating military defeat.  
  The outrage expressed by the press and members of both houses of 
parliament was directed, instead, at Asquith’s cabinet, who had authorised the 
advance that had reversed the fortunes of Townshend’s force. The Times declared 
once more that there was ‘universal admiration for the long and brilliant stand which 
the beleaguered force has made against desperate odds’; this, however, did ‘not in the 
least excuse the authors of this wretched and quite unnecessary chapter of the war. 
The responsibility for the decision which has led to the unfortunate capitulation of the 
garrison of Kut must be probed to the bottom without delay’.405  Horatio Bottomley, 
the editor of John Bull, proclaimed that ‘the miserable tragedy of Mesopotamia is to be 
laid at the feet of His Majesty’s Government, a “tribute” to personal vanity, to political 
ambition and to ministerial ineptitude’.406 
  The level of anger and frustration expressed in such media coverage 
against Asquith and his cabinet is echoed in The Gates of Kut. Stonehouse’s critique of 
the government is conducted through the figure of George Marcourt. George, a 
member of the coalition government, personifies the well-meaning but inept 
politician. This is evident in his characterisation throughout the novel, and made 
explicit in the comparison between him and Phillip Territt. Territt is held up as 
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everything George Marcourt should have been: young, brave, passionate, intelligent, 
but most of all – a soldier. Throughout the novel, George Marcourt is implicitly 
compared to Philip Territt, because, unbeknownst to George, the two men are rivals 
for Enid’s affections. In contrast to the heroic Territt, George cannot see what is right 
under his nose; there are several instances when Stonehouse’s characters chastise 
George for missing what is obvious. Enid declares that ‘the funny thing about George 
*…+ is that he seems to study every bit of the newspaper, and yet often misses things 
that I see at a glance’.407 He is too obtuse to realise what his sister in law, Lady Emma, 
spots immediately: that Enid and Philip are in love. George does not notice the decline 
in his wife’s health after she and Territt are separated, nor does he notice her illness 
and weight loss after Territt’s death is mistakenly announced by the press. Lady Emma 
diagnoses him with ‘hypermetropia or long sight’,  and wonders if he is ‘blind not see 
the change in his wife?’408  
  In one passage of the novel Stonehouse’s subtle criticism of politicians, 
through the character of George, is made explicit: 
It was really a most momentous time in the history of England because it was 
whispered that some members were actually earning their salaries – an 
unprecedented thing. It does not seem possible that such a rumour could be 
true; but then, when there is a war on many unlikely things do happen.  
Anyhow George went a great deal to Westminster, and when Lady Emma once 
asked him how he liked it, he said, quite sincerely, they had very good meals 
there indeed.  
[...] 
If the truth be known, he slept as soundly as the other members during the 
long prosy speeches, and obeying the coalition commandments, put his trust in 
the Premier. What else, then, was to be done but eat and sleep in his 
appointed place? Now that George was ensconced in a very safe seat, Lady 
Emma Beckenden was growing quite optimistic about the war. It was she who 
told everybody, with a significant nod of the head, that the eye of the Premier 
was on George. Possibly it was, for Marcourt snored horribly when he fell 
asleep.409 
Stonehouse paints a scathing picture of politicians as useless parasites upon the 
nation. The narrator sarcastically states that the war had for the first time forced 
politicians to earn their living, ‘an unprecedented thing’, but goes on to describe British 
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politicians as men who did nothing but eat well and sleep through long, irrelevant 
speeches. George only thinks to comment that ‘they had very good meals there 
indeed’ when Lady Emma asks him how he likes the House of Commons, suggesting 
that his attention was on his lifestyle and status, rather than important points of policy 
or government.410 Finally, Stonehouse’s narrator intimates that the coalition 
government was merely Asquith’s puppet, and that the prime minister controlled his 
ministers, personified by the stupid but well-meaning George, to run the country 
exactly as he pleased.   
  Sentiments such as these were most closely expressed in Hales’s articles 
and in Horatio Bottomley’s editorials in John Bull. The paper regularly criticised the 
government’s running of the war; it argued that the men governing would have been 
more useful in military service, and that the ‘King must rule’ in their place.411 
Stonehouse’s characters often echoed the particularly harsh criticism voiced in John 
Bull’s pages.  John Bull declared that ‘throughout this business the politician has closed 
his ears to the truth – and buoyed up the nation with groundless hopes’.412  Several 
times the novel’s characters and narrator criticise the government for misleading the 
public, claiming that all was well with Kut when they knew better. Lady Emma 
Beckendon tells George that the whole nation, including the newspapers, knew full 
well that the prospects for Kut were not as good as the government’s releases 
suggested and that:  
They’ve known for weeks. George, when you get into Parliament, tell them that 
this suppression of news is a poor thing, that it serves no good purpose. I wish I 
were there in your place. I’d tell them that the country is beginning to have as 
much faith in the Coalition Government as an atheist has in the story of Jonah 
and the Whale.413  
  The anger felt towards politicians in the aftermath of the siege of Kut 
was more vehemently expressed in Rudyard Kipling’s 1917 poem Mesopotamia.414 
Kipling’s poem paints an unforgiving picture of the politicians who ‘left’ the ‘resolute, 
the young, /The eager and whole-hearted whom we gave’ to ‘thriftily to die in their 
own dung’. The word ‘dung’ suggests that the men had been treated no better than 
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animals, and evokes the reports of the men packed onto transport ships with little or 
no medical care, which had shocked British audiences. ‘Thriftily’ reminded readers of 
the inadequacy of resources for men serving in Mesopotamia as a result of the 
parsimony of the Indian Government. In a poem that has been described as one of 
Kipling’s ‘hate poems’,415 Rudyard Kipling portrays politicians as ‘idle-minded overlings’ 
who made an insincere show of remorse whilst they ‘thrust for high employments as 
of old’. The poem is a call for the people of Britain to demonstrate a genuine, lasting 
anger at the way their men had been treated, and never to allow the politicians whose 
‘slothfulness’ had ‘wasted’ young lives and ‘arrogance/ that slew’ to return to power. 
Kipling demands whether the British people would only ‘threaten and be angry for an 
hour’ and stand idly by while the men who allowed their war-heroes, ‘the strong men 
coldly slain/In sight of help denied from day to day’ rebuild their careers and be 
allowed to ‘come with years and honour to the grave’.   
  Once again, these sentiments closely resemble the criticisms made in 
John Bull in the weeks before Townshend’s surrender. In an article published on 15 
April, typically titled ‘The Crime Against Townshend – Butchered to Make a Fool’s 
Holiday’, A. G. Hales demanded that the British public made a stand against the 
government of ‘dunces and phrase-makers’ who had allowed ‘the ablest of British 
Generals now on active service’ and his ‘great men to be proud of’ to languish in Kut 
al-Amara, rather than sending ‘a proper force in full strength’ to their rescue.416 Hales 
demanded to know why ‘the people of Britain, stand by like a flock of sheep, and do 
nothing!’417   
  Ann Parry has argued that Kipling’s poem is a manifestation of the 
helplessness felt by the civilians left behind at home: ‘a helplessness made more bitter 
by the inaccessibility of politicians and military leaders to censure and, despite all the 
improvements in communications, by their distance from their loved one’.418 It is this 
inaccessibility of politicians that Stonehouse satirises and critiques through the 
character of George Marcourt, and that Lady Emma warns George against when she 
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tells him that ‘this suppression of news is a poor thing’.419 In an article published in 
September 1915, The Times indicated that its limited coverage of the campaign in 
Mesopotamia was due to lack of information from the Press Bureau. The Times 
commented that the news of Nixon’s victory ‘will be the more welcome to our readers 
because of the obstinate silence which the War Office has so long observed over these 
brilliant feats of arms’.420 
  News of the inadequacy of medical services after the battle of 
Ctesiphon had begun to reach London before Townshend’s surrender at the end of 
April. In March 1916, the Manchester Guardian reported that Austen Chamberlain had 
made a statement to the House of Commons acknowledging a ‘lamentable breakdown’ 
in medical services.421 This confirmed rumours of what Chamberlain now 
acknowledged to have been an ‘inexcusable shortage of medical supplies’.422 Reports 
of terrible failures in the medical and transport service in Mesopotamia continued to 
reach London and to be widely reported. Articles by Edmund Candler, detailing the 
suffering of the men besieged at Kut were also widely circulated, appearing in both The 
Times and in the Manchester Guardian. In a section on the men who had survived the 
siege of Kut subtitled ‘Dearth of Medical Comforts’, Candler described officers who 
‘had evidently undergone great privation, and were very thin and emaciated’.423 
   At the request of Sir Beauchamp Duff, the Commander in Chief of the 
Indian Army, the Vincent-Bingley Commission was appointed in March 1916.  William 
Vincent, Major General Bingley and Mr Rinsdale, a representative from the British Red 
Cross, were sent out to Mesopotamia to investigate alleged failures in the provision of 
medical care. In addition, the new commander of British and Indian forces in 
Mesopotamia, Lieutenant General Sir Percy Lake, asked that the Vincent-Bingley 
Commission also investigated the inadequacy of river transport and allegations that 
Townshend had expressed reservations before the advance. However, the pressure on 
the British Government to allow an independent investigation of what had gone wrong 
in Mesopotamia continued to mount.  
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   In the wake of Townshend’s surrender at Kut, a number of revelations 
by the popular press increased pressure upon the Asquith government to announce a 
commission of inquiry. One of the most important of these was the revelation that 
Charles Townshend had protested that the force at his command was insufficient to 
take Baghdad. Even before the fall of Kut, John Bull reported that General Townshend 
had ‘told the authorities that the task was impossible unless he had at least an army 
corps of two divisions’.424 The newspaper suggested that the Secretary of State for 
India, Austen Chamberlain, must have known about this, and that if that were the case 
then he had misled the country and was ‘not fit for office’.425   
  At the end of May, The Times reported that:  
Finding that the Turks had rallied at Ctesiphon after the defeat at Kut, he 
[Townshend] telegraphed to Sir John Nixon from Azizieh that if it was the desire 
of the Government to occupy Baghdad, “unless great risk is to be run, it is in my 
opinion absolutely necessary that the advance from Kut by road should be 
carried out methodically by two divisions or one Army Corps, or by one division 
supported closely by another complete division”.426  
 
This article, with its quotes from Townshend and other documentary evidence, caused 
a furore. It was in response to questions in parliament arising from the article that 
Chamberlain wrote to General Nixon, asking him to forward any communication from 
Townshend received before the advance on Baghdad. Despite continued assurances 
that any protests received by Nixon in October 1915 had never reached the India 
Office, members of parliament demanded to know more.   
  In addition to these concerns, in July 1916 The Times revealed that 
General Aylmer had been within reach of relieving General Townshend, but had turned 
back in error. The Nation’s report was critical of both Aylmer’s performance and the 
way it had been rewarded:  
It is admitted that General Aylmer could and ought to have relieved General 
Townshend when he fell back on March 7, choosing the longest way to 
replenish his water supplies. The shortest way led to Kut, where he was 
practically unopposed. But that seems never to have occurred to him; and 
when he was removed from his command it was for promotion. 427 
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Public outrage at perceived cover-ups and a string of military and medical failures 
continued to be voiced by the press and by members of parliament. The government 
promised to make public papers relating to the Mesopotamia campaign, but failed to 
do so after advice that their publication would compromise continuing operations. The 
press were frustrated by the lack of transparency in the government’s handling of the 
events leading up to the siege of Kut.  
  This frustration was only increased by the fact that it appeared that in 
July 1916, eight months after Townshend’s advance to Baghdad, none of the problems 
identified had been remedied. The Nation summed up popular opinion as expressed in 
the press in an article in July: 
It is more disturbing to hear that the transport difficulty, upon which the supply 
depends, has not yet been overcome, and there is no possible excuse for the 
incredible shortage of the medical service or for the unsuitable supplies […] 
which do find their way there. The case of 1000 wounded soldiers sent down in 
a ship with but one medical officer and one orderly in charge requires prompt 
investigation. The country wants something more than an assurance that “the 
supply of all immediate necessities” is engaging daily attention. Why were 
“necessities” ever wanting?428  
The Nation lamented the fact that the problems with transport had not been resolved, 
and declared that there was ‘no possible excuse’ for the apparent lack of adequate 
medical provision.   
                                    In a debate in June 1916, Edwin Montagu, Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury and later Secretary of State for India, was still being asked to confirm how 
much the government had known of Townshend’s protests. Montagu’s frustration was 
evident in his reply to Joynson Hicks, MP for Twickenham. Referring him to recently 
published papers where ‘he will see that before April last neither the Government of 
India nor the Secretary of State had any knowledge of the opinion which General 
Townshend had expressed to Sir John Nixon. Its existence was made known to His 
Majesty's Government by the Viceroy's telegram of 9th April.’429 Undaunted, Joynson 
Hicks went on to enquire how much the government had known about the imminent 
Turkish reinforcements, which had concerned Townshend. His question went to the 
heart of the concerns that would haunt the rest of Herbert Asquith’s premiership: 
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‘whether the advance upon Bagdad was decided on political rather than military 
reasons’.430  
  Many papers and members of parliament were keen to find out 
whether ‘political’ considerations had been allowed to interfere with sound military 
planning. In particular, Asquith’s cabinet were accused of authorising an impossible 
advance on Baghdad to take attention away from the withdrawal at Gallipoli. This 
criticism became particularly intense after it emerged that Townshend had informed 
Nixon that he did not believe that he could capture Baghdad with the force at his 
disposal. The Times commented that ‘the veil which concealed Gallipoli has been 
drawn again on the Tigris ever since the day when Mr. Asquith made his impressive 
but entirely misleading announcement that our forces were “within measurable 
distance of Baghdad”’.431 
   Horatio Bottomley wrote a number of scathing editorials in John Bull, in 
which he accused the government of a cover-up: 
I accuse His Majesty’s Government of using Mesopotamia as a set off for the 
gruesome and ghoulish failure of Gallipoli. I repeat that the cabinet was warned 
that it was a forlorn hope, and I declare that in spite of the protests of the 
soldier, our wretched “statesmen” insisted that the gamble of Gallipoli was to 
be covered by a possible victory at Baghdad – a victory which they were 
warned was beyond human accomplishment. *…+ Here you see the politicians 
gamble. Before we lowered our flag to the Turks in Gallipoli we were to wave it 
victoriously in the breeze at Baghdad. A pretty idea!432  
Like Patricia Stonehouse’s novel, Bottomley’s editorial unfavourably compared the 
‘soldier’ with ‘our wretched ‘statesmen’; he accused the government of using 
Townshend and his troops as a decoy for failures in Gallipoli. In a debate on 18 July 
1916, the prime minister was still reassuring angry MPs that: 
Important from the political point of view as the campaign in that particular 
aspect undoubtedly was, from first to last, political has never been allowed to 
override military considerations. Every step that has been taken has been taken 
by the Government on the consentient advice of all its military authorities.433  
 
 Under unstinting pressure from both houses of parliament and the 
press, however, the government announced two parliamentary commissions to 
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investigate failures in the Mesopotamian and Dardanelles expeditions. Once more, the 
Spectator was alone in its defence of the government. It warned that commissions of 
inquiry during the war would only ‘make every officer in a high position feel that he 
fights with a halter round his neck. That is not a feeling which liberates energy and 
inspires initiative’.434 Other publications warmly welcomed Asquith’s announcement, 
and declared that the commission would finally shed light on the failings that had led 
to a humiliating military defeat, and the inexcusable failures in medical supplies and 
transportation, which had led to the suffering of so many British and Indian troops.  
 
 
The Mesopotamia Commission 
 
  The Mesopotamia Commission was appointed in August 1916 and 
chaired by Lord George Hamilton. The other commissioners were Richard Hely-
Hutchinson (the Earl of Donoughmore), Lord Hugh Cecil, Sir Archibald Williamson, John 
Hodge, Commander Josiah Wedgewood, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, and General Sir 
Neville Lyttleton. The Commission’s remit was to enquire: 
Into the origin, inception, and conduct of operations of war in Mesopotamia, 
including the supply of drafts, reinforcements, ammunition, and equipment of 
the troops and fleet, the provision for the sick and wounded, and the 
responsibility of those departments of Government whose duty it has been to 
minister to the wants of the forces employed in that theatre of war.435  
By the time the Commission’s report was published, many of the criticisms made by 
the commissioners might well have been seen as irrelevant: Herbert Asquith had been 
succeeded by David Lloyd George; Lord Hardinge had been replaced as Viceroy of India 
by Lord Chelmsford, and had himself chaired the Commission into the Easter Rising, 
which published its findings in June 1916. Sir Beauchamp Duff had been replaced by Sir 
Charles Carmichael Monro, 1st Baronet of Bearcrofts, as Commander in Chief of the 
Indian army. And, as Frederick Moberly noted in the official history of the campaign, ‘it 
was known that most of the shortcomings complained of were in the course of being 
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remedied’.436  Most importantly, by the time the Commission’s report was published, 
not only had General Nixon been replaced as commander of forces in Mesopotamia, 
first by Sir Percy Lake and later by Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude,  but Maude’s 
forces had succeeded in capturing Baghdad in March 1917. Moberly has criticised the 
Commission for its failure to apply rules of evidence and to interview witnesses in 
Mesopotamia or India. He argued that: 
The Commission did not always appreciate the true significance of what it 
learnt […]. [Generally] speaking, the members of the Commission were lacking 
in the technical and up-to-date knowledge of military operations and military 
war organisation required in an enquiry of this nature. It is undoubtedly true 
that, in a military sense, its report was incomplete and in a few cases 
inaccurate.437   
Nevertheless, such was the continued interest in the events surrounding the 
authorisation of Townshend’s attempt to take Baghdad in November 1915, that the 
British papers published the findings of the Mesopotamia Commission and 
Commander Wedgwood’s dissenting opinion in great detail, and devoted several pages 
to its analysis in the weeks after the report’s publication in the summer of 1917.  
  The Mesopotamia Commission accepted the Vincent-Bingley 
Commission’s findings that Surgeon General Hathaway had been remiss in his 
oversight of medical services in Mesopotamia, and included a copy of the 
Commissioners’ findings in their own report. The majority report of the Commission 
found that blame for the premature advance to Baghdad lay predominantly with 
General Nixon, on whose advice and reassurance the British government had 
authorised the advance to Baghdad. They described Nixon’s command of forces in 
Mesopotamia as a ‘landmark’, and argued that he had driven the campaign forward 
without regard for the limitations imposed by the geography of Mesopotamia or the 
numbers under his command. 438 The Commissioners found that Nixon had not 
communicated well with his subordinates, and that an unhealthy culture of 
‘secretiveness’ had impaired his ability to command.439 They concluded: 
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He underrated the difficulty of transporting reinforcements, as they arrived, 
from the port of embarkation to the scene of action, and he seriously under-
estimated the number of his opponents and miscalculated the dates at which 
they would arrive. Sufficient allowance was not made either in London or in 
Simla for the probability of such miscalculations. […] Though grave blame must 
be attached to Sir John Nixon for his excessive optimism, those who shared in 
that optimism cannot be wholly free from criticism.440  
 
Those who had ‘shared in that optimism’ included the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge,  
Austen Chamberlain, Sir Edmund Barrow (secretary of the India Office), and the war 
cabinet, because they too had recommended the authorisation of the advance to 
Baghdad. As a result of the Commission’s findings and in response to continued 
criticisms of the early conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia, Hardinge offered his 
resignation from the role of permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office three 
times; it was refused by Arthur Balfour on each occasion. Chamberlain did, however, 
resign his post as Secretary of State for India in July 1917 in response to the 
Commissioners’ criticisms of his role in the authorisation of the advance to Baghdad. 
  The Commissioners were particularly critical of the way the campaign 
had been run. They concluded that the split between ultimate control of the 
expeditionary force in London and day-to-day running in India had been unworkable. 
They criticised the ‘strong economy campaign’, which they concluded had 
characterised the Indian army in the years that preceded the campaign in 
Mesopotamia, and had left it incapable of facing a foreign power.441 The 
Commissioners particularly criticised the failure of those in charge of the campaign in 
Mesopotamia to appreciate the need for river transportation. Mesopotamia’s rivers 
were too shallow, for long periods of the year, to be navigated by any of the Royal 
Navy’s crafts, but special vehicles were not ordered until far too late. This hindered the 
care and evacuation of the wounded after the battle of Ctesiphon, and prevented 
quick transportation of reinforcements to the Tigris relief force in 1916. They criticised 
Lord Kitchener’s reforms of the Indian army, which combined the posts of military 
member of the Viceroy’s council with the role of Commander in Chief. The 
Commissioners found that this placed too much pressure on Duff, who had been too 
swamped with bureaucratic duties to visit the battlefield himself.  
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  Analysis of the report of the Mesopotamia Commission has 
predominantly focused on the apportionment of blame for the premature advance on 
Baghdad, the inadequacy of medical provision and the problematic split of the running 
of the campaign between the Government of India and the India Office in London. 
These aspects of the Commissioners’ report have been treated in depth in many of the 
histories of the campaign, notably Paul Davis’s Ends and Means: The Mesopotamia 
Campaign and Commission. This chapter will deal specifically with one aspect of the 
campaign, found throughout the evidence heard by the Commission but conspicuously 
absent in the findings of the Commissioners as they were published in 1917: the 
emphasis on prestige, which had been at the heart of calls for a commission of inquiry. 
  Although the Commissioners were concerned throughout their 
investigations to find out what role ‘prestige’ had played in the authorisation of the 
advance to Baghdad, they made little comment upon this in their final report. They 
noted only that: 
The loss of prestige associated with these military failures was less than might 
have been anticipated, owing to the deep impression made, throughout and 
beyond the localities where the combat occurred, by the splendid fighting 
power of the British and Indian forces engaged. 442 
 
  However, the archives of the Mesopotamia Commission reveal an 
emphasis on the preservation of British ‘prestige in the East’ that was not reflected in 
the Commissioners’ findings. The men who gave evidence to the Commission indicated 
that the desire to protect British prestige by ensuring military success in Mesopotamia 
was at the heart of the rationale for the campaign itself, and, in particular of the 
authorisation of the advance towards Baghdad. This has, to some extent, been 
acknowledged by histories of the Mesopotamian campaign. Briton Cooper Busch 
argues that prestige was one of the motivations for sending a force to the Gulf in 
November 1915, and identifies the ‘issue of “face”, coupled with the possible benefits 
of a small, victorious campaign in Mesopotamia […] [as] the main cause for the 
campaign in the first instance – and for much of subsequent policy both civil and 
military’.443  Nevertheless, as David French has argued in ‘The Dardanelles, Mecca and 
Kut: Prestige as a factor in British Military Strategy, 1914-1916’, the importance of 
                                                     
442
 Mesopotamia Commission Report, p. 111. 
443
 Busch, pp. 8-9. 
148 
 
prestige as a factor in determining British policy in the Middle East between 1914 and 
1916 has been underestimated. 444  
 
 
British Prestige in the East 
 
  Sir Edmund Barrow, Military Secretary of the India Office, told the 
Commissioners that ‘from the very beginning of these operations, from the very 
inception *…+ the operations in Mesopotamia were desirable to protect India’.445  The 
protection of British prestige was perceived, by those in charge of directing the 
campaign in Mesopotamia, as key to the protection of both Britain’s existing empire 
and its future relations with the Arabs.  Although it is clear that the men who used the 
term prestige understood its connotations, the term requires some definition for the 
modern reader. The Oxford English Dictionary defines prestige in two ways. It states 
that it means both ‘a conjuring trick; a deception, an imposture’ and, more commonly: 
Impressive or overawing influence, glamour. Subsequently: influence or 
reputation derived from achievements, associations, or character, or (esp.) 
from past success; a person's standing in the estimation of others. 
The concept of prestige in this period encapsulated both of these ideas. It was a 
‘conjuring trick’ that enabled thousands of British people to rule over millions of native 
peoples with the illusion of massive, ever-present military power, but it was also 
power derived from a reputation based on past British success and continued control 
over vast swathes of the world.  
  David French argues that ‘prestige was both the cement which 
supported the foundations of [British] rule [in India] and the ideology which they used 
to explain their superiority over the millions of people they ruled’.446 This definition of 
prestige conceives of the concept as a belief in the inherent superiority of the British 
race, which served as a justification for empire. However, French argues that prestige 
was also a myth for the colonised peoples: an alternative to military power that helped 
to keep the empire safe. For French, prestige was a superiority that was projected in 
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order to keep colonial subjects convinced that British rule could not be undermined. 
He argued that this was achieved through a self-imposed segregation of the British 
communities in the colonies, which precluded ‘intimate relations’ of any kind between 
the races in order that ‘the mask of British moral superiority could never be allowed to 
slip.’447  
  Though Edward Said does not discuss the concept of prestige directly, 
he describes how British administrators in the colonies were made to retire at the age 
of 55, so that: 
No Oriental was ever allowed to see a Westerner as he aged and degenerated, 
just as no Westerner needed ever to see himself, mirrored in the eyes of the 
subject race, as anything but a vigorous, rational, ever-alert young Raj.448  
What Said describes here is both aspects of the concept of prestige as it functioned in 
Britain’s colonies. It was necessary to remove representatives of the ruling race before 
they became old and frail, in order that orientals would only ever see them in their 
prime. But it was also important to maintain the belief in this superiority for the 
colonisers themselves: ‘no Westerner needed ever to see himself, mirrored in the eyes 
of the subject race, as anything but a vigorous, rational, ever-alert young Raj’.   
   Ann Laura Stoler has similarly argued that sexual relations between 
colonisers and colonised peoples were strictly delineated because they threatened the 
prestige of the ruling peoples. She writes that métissage was forbidden because it was 
‘conceived as a dangerous source of subversion’ and ‘was seen as a threat to white 
prestige, an embodiment of European degeneration and moral decay’.449 Stoler’s use 
of the word prestige conceives of it as the projection of a moral and racial superiority, 
which was threatened by métissage because the offspring of colonisers and colonised 
were perceived to degenerate the superior race.  
  In his article ‘The Imperial Idea: Ideas of Honor in British India’, Steven 
Patterson uses the word prestige synonymously with the word honour, to describe the 
ideology that informed British rule in India.450 Like Stoler, he links prestige with ideas 
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of sexual segregation, arguing that because there was ‘no solid division between public 
and private spheres in the Raj […], women were charged with upholding the dignity 
and prestige of imperial rule’.451 Patterson also argues that ‘the Raj ostensibly came to 
depend on the prestige of the ruling race, much like the ability of the ICS [Indian Civil 
Service] officer to walk through his district alone, unarmed, and without fear’.452  
Prestige, in this context, was the acknowledgement by colonised peoples of an implicit 
superiority, which served to guarantee the safety of British representatives of the 
empire abroad.  Although Patterson does not define the term prestige, his use of the 
word synonymously with ‘honour’ comes closest to the OED’s definition of it as a 
person’s, or in this instance a country’s, standing in the estimation of others.  
  However, as this use of the term suggests, prestige was more complex 
than this definition implies in the imperial context. The term prestige was also invested 
with a belief in a racial hierarchy, with white, British men at the top. It is this use of the 
word prestige as an important part of imperial Britain’s ruling apparatus that comes 
closest to the ways in which the term was understood in Britain in the early twentieth 
century.   
   In a debate in the House of Commons on the British government’s 
response to the assassination of the Egyptian prime minister, Boutros Pasha, in June 
1910, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Rugby, Mr John Baird (later Viscount 
Stonehaven), declared that Britain’s position in Egypt, and indeed the Empire, 
depended on the preservation of Britain’s prestige. Baird told the House that ‘in these 
*Oriental+ countries we live on prestige’.453 Baird was objecting strenuously to rumours 
that ‘natives no longer need dismount when they meet a British officer in the 
Soudan’.454 He stressed that although it might seem like an insignificant matter to 
people who had little ‘experience of the Oriental’, it was essential to establishing the 
appropriate level of respect between British officers and the people they ruled.455 The 
word prestige, for Baird, was synonymous with respect or deference, which he 
believed necessary to ensure that ‘Orientals’ followed British ‘teaching’, and which 
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ensured the safety and success of those charged with Britain’s civilizing mission in 
Egypt and the Sudan. ‘You cannot have the Soudan controlled in a civilised way by a 
small body of British officers’ Baird asserted, ‘without respect for British authority 
being maintained’.456 That authority was, for him, maintained by acts that 
demonstrated not only the respect he believed should be accorded to a British officer 
by those inferior to him, but also served to reinforce the social and racial hierarchies 
that ensured the continued peaceful maintenance of the Empire.  
  Sir Henry Craik, Scottish Unionist Member of Parliament for Glasgow 
and Aberdeen Universities, joined Baird in lamenting the loss of prestige inherent in 
not requiring ‘Orientals’ to show deference to British officers by dismounting. Craik 
told the House that ‘no one who has lived in the Soudan will for a moment deny that 
that is a necessity for preserving our prestige’.457 Inherent in Craik’s statement was the 
suggestion that those who argued that such practices were old fashioned and 
unnecessary had not spent time in the colonies, and so could not really understand 
‘the Oriental’. He went on to explain that prestige was the only way that young British 
administrators were able to maintain control over large groups of native peoples: 
Are you lightly going to cast away any usage which increases the prestige, the 
dignity, and the safety of these officials? We cannot suppose that they are 
affected in the same way as we are affected. To us such a ceremony as 
returning a salute means absolutely nothing. We treat it as a trifle. But do not 
think that it is a trifle to the Oriental mind. Abandon it, and the Oriental thinks 
that you are afraid of him, and that you wish him to show no respect. There is a 
very small boundary in Oriental minds between lack of respect and the 
advancement of dangerous resistance to your power.458 
 
Craik’s argument was that those who criticised such practices simply did not 
understand the East. As a result, they could not appreciate the impact of such a loss of 
prestige on ‘Oriental minds’. Craik’s comments made explicit the implicit link between 
prestige and the idea of the Oriental mind, reminding his audience that they did not 
think in the same way as ‘the Orientals’. ‘The Oriental’, he argued, would draw grave 
conclusions if such practices, which increased British prestige by reminding them of 
the hierarchy of the races, were abandoned. Henry Craik’s point was simple: any loss 
of British prestige – even one that might seem small to those living in the comfort and 
                                                     
456
 ‘CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 2) BILL’.  
457
 ‘CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 2) BILL’. 
458
 ‘CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 2) BILL’. 
152 
 
‘civilization’ of Britain, would have a direct impact on Britain’s hold on its colonies, and 
on the safety of British administrators in those colonies. 
  One of the features of Orientalism, as Said elaborated it, is a 
homogenisation of peoples considered Oriental. Said cites the example of the former 
Proconsul of Egypt, Lord Cromer who, Said maintains, believed that his experience in 
India and Egypt made him an authority on all Orientals.  Said argues that Cromer was 
able to believe this because he understood the peoples he called Orientals to share 
fundamental characteristics. He concludes that for Cromer, ‘although circumstances 
might differ slightly here and there, [ruling the Oriental] was almost everywhere nearly 
the same. This was, of course because Orientals were almost everywhere the same’.459  
Another crucial aspect of Orientalism, for Said, is that such homogenisation was based 
on a belief in the West’s knowledge of the Orient: the Orientalist believed that he 
knew the Orient better than the Orientals themselves, from his own experiences but 
also with reference to specialists such as Ernest Renan:460 
In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in 
some of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a 
family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be 
effective. These ideas explained the behaviour of Orientals; they supplied 
Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they 
allowed Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon 
possessing regular characteristics.461 
 It was exactly this kind of belief in a ‘family of ideas’ that ‘explained the behaviour of 
Orientals’, supplying them with a ‘mentality’, that allowed Craik and his colleagues to 
pronounce with such confidence the outcome of any threat to British prestige.  
  The debate, the second reading in the House of Commons of the 
Consolidated Fund (No.2) Bill, on 13 June 1910, in which these men deliberated upon 
the importance of British prestige in ruling Egypt, is the same one that Said cites in 
making his well-known argument that Arthur Balfour’s position of authority on 
Oriental matters was derived from his confidence in his knowledge of ‘the Orient’. As 
Craik’s comments indicate, the concept of ‘the Oriental mind’ was central to the way in 
which prestige was understood to function.   
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  Craik spoke authoritatively about the impact any damage to British 
prestige would have upon the Oriental mind. British politicians, administrators and 
military commanders could only strive to preserve British prestige if they felt that they 
understood the Oriental mind.  Only with this understanding could they predict what 
would adversely affect an Oriental’s perception of Britain. In the rationale that 
informed the decisions of the India Office there was a grouping of Arab and Indian 
opinion that suggests that the populations of these regions were treated as a 
homogenous group. One of the reasons for the continued escalation of operations in 
Mesopotamia was the belief that any cessation in activity would be perceived as 
weakness by both Arabs and Indians. Barrow wrote to Lord Crewe, then Secretary of 
State for India, that ‘it is advisable to decide what should be the next step, as a policy 
of passive inactivity is to be deprecated if we are to continue to impress the Arab and 
Indian world with our ability to defeat all designs against us’.462  
  The belief that British officials understood the Orient better than the 
Orientals themselves was central to the debate on the importance of British prestige.  
Said describes the way in which Orientalism defined an Oriental ‘mentality’, but he 
does not discuss the concept of the ‘Oriental mind’, or that of prestige specifically. Yet 
both of these ideas were crucial to the parliamentary debate that he analyses in 
Orientalism. Mr Edward Wood, MP for Ripon and later Viscount Halifax, argued 
passionately about the meaning of the word prestige: 
That is not my meaning when I use the word "prestige". My meaning is that the 
subordinate race should by all means be fairly treated, and that there: [sic] 
should be no sense of injustice. But given that condition, surely you are in a 
position to insist that the black races must and can only be treated as 
subordinate to the race charged with the government of their country for the 
time being. The time may come, and I hope it will come, when those races with 
whose government we are now charged may be in a position to assume the 
control of their own fortunes, and may be able to work out their own destiny. 
When that time is reached, I am sure that all parties in this country will be 
prepared to assist them when they make the attempt. To encourage them to 
make that attempt, however, when they are in the condition of political 
children is not only to court disaster to those engaged in the government of the 
country, but it is to court disaster in one of the most valued possessions of this 
country, and bring into most serious jeopardy the white, races wherever they 
are in contact with the black races.463 (sic.) 
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Wood’s understanding of the term prestige was very much grounded in his belief in 
the civilising mission. Like Cromer, who argued in ‘The Government of Subject Races’ 
that the people ruled by Britain were ‘in statu pupillari’,464 Wood believed that ‘the 
subordinate race*s+’ were ‘in a condition of political children’. In common with Craik 
and Baird, Wood feared that any action that threatened Britain’s prestige would ‘bring 
into most serious jeopardy the white races wherever they are in contact with the black 
races’.  Said’s analysis of this debate in the House of Commons elucidates one side of 
an argument about how to govern Britain’s empire. Certainly ‘knowing the Oriental’ 
was central to all the arguments that followed, and underpinned the concepts of 
‘prestige’ and of the ‘Oriental mind’. Although neither of these concepts could function 
without a firm belief that occidental statesmen understood the orient, the importance 
of ‘prestige’ to the debate on the best way to rule Egypt reveals an awareness of the 
vulnerability and precariousness of Britain’s position in the east: an awareness that the 
confident statements of men like Cromer and Balfour did not reveal, and that the 
pressures of the First World War, less than a decade later, would bring into starker 
relief.  
  The importance of the concept of the Oriental mind to the running of 
the Mesopotamian campaign was most clearly expressed by Sir Arthur Hirtzel, political 
secretary of the India Office. In his evidence to the Mesopotamia Commission, Hirtzel 
stressed that in terms of Anglo-Arabian relations, it was the ‘side shows’, the 
campaigns in the Middle East, that were most important. He argued that: 
 
People have talked about this as a subsidiary theatre of operations. In a sense it 
is, but when Turkey entered the war the war changed its nature for us 
altogether. We [were] then fighting an Oriental Power and a Moslem Power, 
and it has always seemed to me and to others essential that we should defeat 
Turkey, not a collapse of Turkey because Germany is beaten, but that we 
should beat Turkey in the field.465  
Hirtzel’s confidence in what was needed to ensure continued good relations with the 
Arabs during, and after, the war was based on his belief that he understood the 
Oriental mind, and could, therefore, accurately predict the impact of different 
scenarios upon the future behaviour of Arabs. Hirtzel’s emphasis upon the need to 
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defeat the Ottomans in their own territory was predicated on the belief, expressed in 
the Political Department’s Memorandum to the Interdepartmental Committee, that 
‘Orientals are impressed by tangible success, which can be measured in square miles 
and demonstrated on the map.’466    
  The perception that the ‘Orientals’ could understand power only if it 
was demonstrated overtly and locally meant that British military victories in the 
Middle East were seen as extremely effective in winning Arab support. Conversely, 
inactivity, or actual defeats, in the east were perceived to be all the more damaging 
because they would have a greater impact upon ‘the Oriental mind’. Nixon wrote to 
Chamberlain urging the hasty authorisation of the advance to Baghdad on this basis. 
He stressed that even a withdrawal from Townshend’s position at Azizyah back to Kut 
would be construed as defeat, and complained that: 
 
The enemy and the whole tribes will place their own construction on such a 
move, and advance on Kut-el-Amara as he did on Amara in July last […]. Then a 
powerful section of the tribes who had already submitted to us rejoined the 
Turks, and has been a continual source of trouble until British prestige was re-
established at the Victory of Kut-el-Amara. The Arab tribes now regard us as 
irresistible, and have been coming in from all directions to make submission; 
but if we withdraw they will probably behave as before.467 
     
Nixon asserted that the victories achieved by Townshend’s troops had restored British 
prestige, and that this had made British forces seem ‘irresistible’ to the Arab tribes, 
who were ‘coming in from all directions to make submission’. Nixon, like Arthur Hirtzel, 
believed that British ‘prestige’ had been re-established through military victories, and 
that only through continued military success could he guarantee the continued 
‘submission’ of the ‘tribes’. 
   David French argues that the idea of prestige was also manifested in 
ostentatious architecture; pomp and circumstance gave the impression of affluence 
and grandeur and, therefore, of power.468 These can be seen as akin to the ‘theatrical’ 
or ‘ritual’ displays of power, which Bernard Cohn maintains were used by European 
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powers to assert their power over their subjects, both at home and abroad, from the 
eighteenth century onwards.469 Such displays were used to awe colonised peoples, and 
were substitutes for military displays of power. Arthur Hirtzel expressed exactly this 
idea when he told the commissioners that Britain had only two choices in how to rule 
and maintain its empire: ‘prestige and large military forces’.470 In 1915, Captain Harold 
Dickson of the 29th Lancers was invalided to India. He continued to follow the progress 
of his men, and to write home to his mother of his recovery and life in India. He wrote 
to her on 11 June 1915: 
As regards myself, I am quite strong and well again & even took part in a dance 
we had here in the club last week. You may be surprised to hear of such 
gaieties out here in the midst of almost universal sorrow & at such serious 
times. You must remember that it is partly a duty on our part which the 
government encourages out here. You see the natives of India are a most 
panicky crowd, & those who are not panicky are awaiting in hopes of a British 
defeat –1 they belong to the seditious ones. Both classes take their cue from us 
English. The former class would get terribly despondent & the latter distinctly 
troublesome were we to go about with long faces & grow pessimistic at affairs 
in general.  
Obviously our duty out here in each & every circumstance is to ‘keep smiling’ & 
remain ‘merry and bright’. As a result it is wonderful how cheerful & optimistic 
we all are out here. There is just one thing we all want to see & that is universal 
service at home.471  
Dickson was clearly uncomfortable with the relative luxury that he and his colleagues 
were enjoying in India. He strove to justify what might have sounded like an 
offensively ostentatious lifestyle at a time when his own friends and colleagues were 
dying in the service of their country, or suffering unbearable wartime conditions. He 
explained to his mother that such luxuries were necessary to ensure the continued 
stability of Britain’s Indian empire. In other words, he and his colleagues felt it their 
duty to keep up appearances, even at their darkest times, because not to do so might 
reveal the human face of the imperialists and the weakness of the imperial power. In 
French’s words, what Dickson was trying to explain to his mother was that ‘ballrooms 
were cheaper than battleships or battalions’.472    
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  The panic about Indian security, evident in the statements of many of 
those who testified to the Mesopotamia Commission, led the Commissioners to ask 
Arthur Hirtzel whether ‘prestige’ was an ‘Indian disease’.473 This zeal to protect British 
prestige stemmed, in large part, from the fact that those in charge of protecting 
Britain’s Indian Empire felt that illusion of prestige was all that remained; they no 
longer had the overwhelming military force with which they could protect India, only 
the reputation for it. Hardinge and Duff stressed over and over again that India no 
longer had the troops to defend the Raj in the event of an uprising. Prestige was 
literally all they had left.  
  Prestige was seen primarily as a way to protect Britain’s Indian empire 
from both ‘German intrigues’ and ‘Mohammedan’ uprisings. It was widely accepted 
that India could only be kept safe if British prestige was maintained in the Eastern 
theatres of war. India itself was seen as a hotbed of militant Islamic activity waiting to 
ignite. French argues that after the Indian Rebellion of 1857, ‘the British saw Islam as 
perhaps the single most potential source of danger to their rule’.474 It was widely 
believed that if British prestige was allowed to decline in the Middle East, it would 
impact directly upon the safety of India. British officials in London and India conducted 
the Mesopotamian campaign on the basis that the neutrality of Persia could only be 
maintained if Britain continued to wield influence in the Middle East, and that such 
influence was itself underpinned by British prestige. If this was allowed to decline, 
Persia would ally itself with the enemy, Afghanistan would follow suit, the Afghan Amir 
would lose his tentative grasp on power and the Muslim tribes would flood over the 
unprotected Indian North-West Frontier.  
  Austen Chamberlain wrote in his statement to the Commission that the 
authorisation of the advance to Baghdad came as a relief to him because: 
I was anxious as to the effect of the German-Turkish intrigues and emissaries in 
Persia and of the unsettled condition of that country upon Afghanistan and the 
Indian frontier. It must be borne in mind that the situation in Persia was 
intimately bound up with the situation in Mesopotamia and that the situation 
in Persia itself was a menace to the security of the Indian frontier.475 
Alternatively, and perhaps all the more worryingly for British officials in India, the 
declaration of Jehad from Afghanistan would incite Indian Muslims themselves against 
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British rule, and Muslims in the Indian army would mutiny. French writes: ‘a Moslem 
uprising would be doubly dangerous because the British relied heavily on the Moslem 
community to provide recruits for the Indian army’.476  
  It is clear that British officials were uneasy about Britain’s ability to 
continue to rule India in this period.  In his statement to the Mesopotamia 
Commission, Lord Hardinge stressed India’s military vulnerability. He stated that the 
period during which Indian troops were engaged in operations in Mesopotamia had 
been one of the most turbulent in India itself. India’s North West frontier had been 
under heavy attack: 
Although during the previous three years there had been no operations of any 
importance on the North-West frontier, there were between the 29th 
November, 1914, and the 5th September, 1915 no less than seven serious 
attacks made on the North West frontier. […] In fact it may be said that, during 
the most critical period of the war, India successfully carried out the greatest 
military operations on the frontier since the frontier campaign of 1897.477  
Hardinge also argued that India was internally unstable and rife with conspiracies.  In 
his view, insurgents threatened to overpower a country that had been ‘bled absolutely 
white’ of troops in the first few weeks of the war.478  For Hardinge, as the advance to 
Baghdad was being contemplated, the situation in India was critical. He explained 
further in his statement to the Commission that: 
It is unnecessary to say much of the conspiracies at Delhi, Lahore, and 
elsewhere, which were stifled during the war, but the unrest in the Punjab in 
the early spring of 1915 […] necessitating the arrest of no less than 3,500 
agitators, required the utmost watchfulness and preparation on the part of the 
military authorities, and the German conspiracy, planned to break out last 
Christmas Day […] required careful watching and co-ordination of the military 
and naval forces to render it abortive.479  
Hardinge’s feelings were echoed by Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander in Chief of the 
Indian army. In his evidence to the Commission, Duff was asked if ‘the operations in 
Mesopotamia at all affected the dangers of an attack from the north-west frontier’, to 
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which he replied: ‘very much’.480 He went on to state that the danger of invasion 
through the North West frontier was: 
A distinct and very considerable danger from which we were only relieved by 
the success of the Ameer in holding his country much against the will of the 
country. There is no question that the Afghan population were all out to fight 
on the side of the Turks and the Ameer himself was the only power that 
prevented that from happening.481 
  In his testimony, Duff alluded to the fact that this insecurity was linked 
to a greater concern about British rule in India. He agreed that the Indian Government 
was ‘an alien Government’, sustained by divisions between the different races of 
India.482 He stated that the British ‘hold the country on sufferance. If the different 
races could combine that would be the end of English rule’.483 The real worry, as far as 
Duff was concerned, was the threat posed by India’s ‘Mohammedan’ population, as 
this exchange during his testimony illustrates: 
Q. The difficulty since there has been a Mohammedan revival is that if you 
were defeated you might have very serious internal disturbances from the 
Mohammedan population of India?  
A. Yes, that is a population of over 60,000,000.  
Q. Is not that danger ever present in the minds of all Indian administrators, 
both military and civil?  
A. Always.484  
Preventing invasion through India’s North West frontier was, for Duff, the ‘first 
responsibility’ of the Government of India throughout the Mesopotamian campaign.485 
This, Duff maintained, was to be achieved, to a large degree, by preserving British 
prestige in the East.486  Any defeats in Mesopotamia were perceived to impact directly 
upon the Muslim population in India itself.  
  The Government of India’s fears about India’s internal stability were 
greatly increased because of their worries about the loyalty of the Muslim soldiers in 
the Indian army. Having sent their best troops to fight on the Western Front, the 
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Government of India found that it had to defend India against a Muslim uprising and 
fight a war in Muslim territory, against Muslim troops, with men they simply did not 
trust to be loyal. In his evidence, Duff told the Commissioners that in the event of a 
serious defeat on India’s North West frontier, he ‘should be sorry’ to have to rely on 
the troops at his disposal to remain loyal to the British.487 He stated that ‘a serious 
defeat would create a great difficulty throughout India.’488  Indian Army officials 
perceived themselves to be doubly disadvantaged: they could not reinforce IEF D with 
Muslim troops, and they felt that all available Hindu soldiers were needed to defend 
India. However, they could not afford to allow Indian Expeditionary Force D to be 
defeated in Mesopotamia, as they believed that such a loss of prestige would itself 
have threatened India’s security.  
  In a telegram to Lord Crewe, then Secretary of State for India, Hardinge 
reminded him of the complexities of sending troops to Mesopotamia: 
Mussulman troops are in the main averse from fighting Turks and cannot be 
sent freely to Barrett [then Commander in Chief of forces in Mesopotamia] 
while we cannot be sure what their attitude would be if called on to fight 
Mussulmans on the Frontier when a jehad was being preached. It is therefore 
difficult [to send] Hindus of any class. It seems to us that those who are 
directing the strategy of the Empire should give the situation in Mesopotamia 
their most careful consideration. A defeat there would be disastrous to our 
position in Asia and withdrawal from that country, which might be the only 
alternative would be little better.489 
Whilst the defence of India was by far the most important thing to be achieved by the 
preservation of British prestige in the East, the Political Department of the India Office 
also worried that any defeats suffered by Indian Expeditionary Force D would impact 
directly upon the relations that Britain could hope to forge with Arabs during, and 
after, the war.  
  During the war, Arab support for Ottoman forces, or a call for jehad 
against Allied forces from Mecca, was seen as potentially disastrous for Britain. It was 
believed that in this eventuality, Muslims in the British Empire would rebel at a time 
when Britain could ill-afford to protect it by force, and Muslim troops would mutiny. In 
a minute titled The Role of India in a Turkish War, Sir Edmund Barrow argued that: 
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All the omens point to war with Turkey, within a few weeks or even days. Such 
a contingency need not alarm us unless the Turks succeed in drawing the Arabs 
to their side. In that case they will probably proclaim a Jehad and endeavour to 
raise Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes against us, which might be a serious 
danger to India and would most certainly add enormously to our difficulties and 
responsibilities. This shows how important it is to us to avert a Turko-Arab 
coalition.490  
Barrow made it clear that although troops could be landed in the Persian Gulf, 
‘ostensibly to protect the oil installation’, their real task would be ‘to notify the Turks 
that we meant business and to the Arabs that we were ready to support them’.491 For 
Barrow, such a demonstration of Britain’s military prowess would ensure the support 
of the Arabs. He concluded: ‘with the Arabs on our side Jehad is impossible and the 
Indian Frontier is safe from attack’.492 In his statement to the Mesopotamia 
Commission, Lord Crewe wrote that: 
It was clear that our failure to assist the Potentates I have mentioned [Shaikhs 
of Bahrain, Kuwait and Mohammerah] and the other lesser Chiefs in that area 
might ignite a fire which would spread over the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, 
which might, perhaps, involve Mecca itself, and by setting Islam against us as a 
whole would in turn blaze into Persia and Afghanistan, with the final probability 
of exciting a Mohammedan rising in India.493 
Hirtzel also made the link between prestige, Britain’s relations with the Arabs, and 
India clear in his statement to the Mesopotamia Commission. He explained that had 
Indian Expeditionary Force D not been dispatched to the Persian Gulf,  
 
Not only would British prestige have suffered irretrievably, while the Gulf itself 
would have been a serious embarrassment to the Government of India, but the 
declaration of Jehad would hardly have failed – as in the event it did fail – to 
bring all Islam into the field from Egypt to the North-Western frontier of 
India.494  
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  Prestige was seen as an important tool to be used by British officials in 
their dealings with the Arabs. Britain had informal relations with many shaikhs in the 
region, ‘the object of which [was] to make recourse to force unnecessary’.495 Any 
defeats in the Middle East were visible to, and believed to be influential upon, those 
whom the India Office wanted most to manipulate with prestige: the shaikhs, the 
Persians and the Sharif of Mecca, whose support for the Allies the British were trying 
to secure in this period. Hirtzel was unequivocal that British prestige in the East was 
central to Britain’s dealings with Arab leaders. He asserted that, as the advance to 
Baghdad was being contemplated, British prestige stood lower than it had done for 
fifty years, and reminded the Commission that ‘our whole position was based on 
nothing more tangible than prestige’.496   
  From the first landing of troops in the Middle East, therefore, the 
Political Department of the India Office was keen that the commander in charge, then 
Field Marshall Sir Arthur Arnold Barrett, should be reminded of the ‘necessity of 
conciliating Arabs in every possible way. Basra if possible, should be treated as a 
friendly and not an enemy town, and every effort made to restore confidence’.497 
Before forces had even been dispatched to the Gulf, Lord Crewe, then Secretary of 
State for India, and Lord Hardinge made it clear that their primary concern was for the 
protection of British prestige in the eyes of the Arab world. Crewe wrote in a letter to 
Hardinge at the beginning of October 1914 that ‘of the various objects to be attained 
by sending a force up the Gulf [he has] always regarded the moral effect on the Arab 
Chiefs as the primary, and the protection of the oil stores as the secondary’.498   
Hardinge stated that his main concern was that if the oil installation at Abadan was left 
unguarded, it would lead to a loss prestige; he wrote to Crewe: ‘we have to remember 
loss of prestige with the Arabs, whom we wish to encourage, if it is destroyed’.499  
  As British and Indian forces worked their way north in Mesopotamia, 
the justification for each successive escalation in operations was that to remain 
inactive would be perceived as weakness by the Arabs. Hardinge commented that the 
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destruction of the oil pipeline at Abadan ‘materially […] would do us no harm, but if we 
took no action our prestige in the Gulf would vanish’.500 Edmund Barrow’s report to 
the Commission stated that as the advance to Baghdad was being contemplated, ‘the 
question of how the turn of events on the Tigris would affect the Arab mind was also 
one which caused serious anxiety’.501 It was important, therefore, to protect British 
prestige in the East to secure the support of the Arabs for the Allies during the war. In 
a telegram that Duff would later tell the Commissioners altered the Government of 
India’s entire attitude towards the advance to Baghdad,502  Austen Chamberlain made 
clear the importance of securing the support of the Arabs during the war: 
At present moment it seems that German attempt to break through to 
Constantinople will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are 
most uncertain. Persia seems drifting into war on German side whilst Arabs are 
wavering, and unless we can offer them great inducement will probably join 
Turks. We are therefore in great need of striking success in the East both to 
check Persian movement and to win Arabs.  
  It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving 
assurances to Arab leaders that we favour creation of Arab state independent 
of Turks, and that we shall be prepared to consider future disposition of 
Baghdad in connection therewith.503 
 
Britain’s shaken prestige was perceived by the men in charge of the campaign to have 
a direct consequence upon the allegiance of the Arabs. For British officials in charge of 
the campaign in Mesopotamia, prestige was the most important tool for negotiating 
the continued neutrality or, better still, the overt support of Arab leaders for the Allies. 
In an effort to secure this support, a disastrous advance on Baghdad was ordered by 




  Prestige was understood as an appearance of superiority that was 
ultimately based on military power; it allayed the need for a large military presence, 
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but it did so based on a reputation of British strength, prosperity and the intimation 
that this show of power and control was underpinned by Britain’s overwhelming 
military force. It could not function, therefore, if the military power that produced the 
awe and respect evoked by prestige was proved ineffectual. It was for this reason that 
the men who ran the Mesopotamian campaign believed so firmly that it was crucial 
that British and Dominion forces were not defeated in eastern theatres of war. The 
Gallipoli campaign, therefore, had an enormous impact upon those who conducted 
Britain’s affairs in the east. It seems clear that, although it was not the main 
consideration in the decision to order the advance, the prospect of the failure of 
British forces at Gallipoli was an important factor in the authorisation of Townshend’s 
attempt to take Baghdad. It is undoubtedly true that such a victory would also have 
been a welcome relief from the bloody stagnation on the Western Front, but it was 
Gallipoli that most concerned the men debating the authorisation of Townshend’s 
advance in 1915.  
  Amid vehement criticism from the press and in parliament that ‘political 
considerations’ had been allowed to override sound military judgement, almost all the 
witnesses who gave evidence to the Mesopotamia Commission asserted that in no way 
was the advance to Baghdad designed to offset losses at Gallipoli. However, this was 
simply not the case. Chamberlain told the Commissioners that where the 
Mesopotamia campaign was concerned, the political and the military were inherently 
conflated: 
This is one of the military problems where you cannot dissociate military and 
political questions. When I speak of political, I mean the state of Persia, and 
when I speak of the state of Persia, I mean the whole question of the defence 
of the North-West frontier, and the dangers which existed there.504 
As Chamberlain’s statement suggests, political considerations were important to the 
Mesopotamian campaign, but not simply, as the press alleged, because politicians 
were worried about their own careers. Whilst the influence of domestic politics cannot 
be ruled out, the evidence that came before the Commission suggests that for those in 
charge of the campaign in Mesopotamia, the failure of the operations in the 
Dardanelles was important because of its political impact on British prestige in the 
East, rather than because of the impact of the defeats on domestic politics.  
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  Lord Crewe agreed with the Commissioners that ‘political 
considerations seem to have crept in. Persia was in a disturbed state, Gallipoli had 
been a failure, and it was present […] in the minds of the political officers that, if 
possible, we ought to attempt some coup’.505 For him, the advance to Baghdad was 
ordered because of ‘the advantage in Persia, the advantage in Arabia, and the general 
gain of prestige which would be set off against the disaster in the Dardanelles’. He 
concluded that after the failure at Gallipoli, ‘there was a feeling […] that it was 
necessary to assert ourselves, somewhere’. 506 In his oral testimony, Sir Edmund 
Barrow argued that it was not to make up for failure at Gallipoli that the advance was 
ordered, rather it resulted from a fear that if British and Indian forces were contained 
at Kut, Turkish forces would be free to go into Persia, influence Afghanistan and 
threaten India.507 However, in his statement Barrow explained that:  
At the time [the advance to Baghdad was being contemplated] it must be 
remembered that neither in Persia nor in the Caucasus had the Russian 
advance commenced, nor had we any reason to suppose that it would be so 
successful as it has been. These reasons alone, quite apart from the 
Dardanelles, seemed at the time to justify a counterstroke which the General 
on the spot assured us was feasible.508  
Asked the same question, Sir Arthur Hirztel told the Commission ‘that the evacuation 
of Gallipoli would naturally have a very bad effect and it became the more necessary if 
possible to do something to counteract it’.509 Sir Beauchamp Duff stated that he 
believed that ‘in view of what was happening in the Dardanelles they were very 
anxious for a striking success in the East’.510 Hardinge told the Commissioners in his 
evidence that ‘political considerations were entirely in the East, not in the Dardanelles 
at all’.511 However, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, he argued: 
 In view of the German activities in Persia, increasing pressure on Afghanistan, 
and the aspect in the Balkans and Dardanelles, we hold that the capture of 
Baghdad would have such an effect in the Near East, and offers such important 
political and strategical advantages as to justify movement.512  
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Moreover, in his written statement to the Commission he stated:  
The value of such a success as the capture of Baghdad would have been 
inestimable, not only as a set-off against failure in the Dardanelles, but as an 
asset in maintaining a position of equilibrium in Persia, Afghanistan and 
India.513  
 
He went on to tell the commissioners that ‘having private information that the Gallipoli 
expedition was not going well’, and bearing in mind the views of the cabinet upon the 
‘great political and military advantages of the occupation of Baghdad,’ he felt 
compelled to support the advance to Baghdad. 514  
  In his oral testimony before the Commission, Chamberlain read from a 
letter he wrote to Hardinge, as the Baghdad advance was being contemplated by the 
cabinet: 
There is, it would seem, an opportunity within our grasp for a great success 
such as we have not yet achieved in any quarter, and it is difficult to overrate 
the political (and military) advantages which would follow from it throughout 
the Far East *…+. This consideration is rendered even more important by the 
imminent intervention of Bulgaria in the war, by the renewed attack on Serbia 
by Austro-German forces, and by the peril in which these developments place 
our forces in Gallipoli. It is clear that for the time being we can make no 
advance there. Our troops have I fear suffered much in moral, and there is 
great sickness among them. Altogether the prospects of that expedition are far 
from hopeful, and, if the Austro-German attack opens the way for the free 
passage of supplies to the Turks, their position might become untenable.  
 All this strengthens the case for taking full advantage of Nixon’s victorious 
 campaign by capturing and holding Baghdad.515 [sic] 
In a campaign where British prestige was perceived to be so important, a military 
failure of British and Dominion forces in the east had a huge impact on those in charge 
of forces in Mesopotamia. A military failure on the scale of Gallipoli threatened the 
inherent superiority of British over oriental peoples, which underpinned the concept of 
prestige and, therefore, the very rationale of British imperialism in the east.  
  It is clear that prestige was a concept understood as a tool through 
which the ‘Oriental mind’ could be moulded to suit the wishes of British politicians and 
military commanders. However, a working knowledge of prestige and its potential 
impact on Britain’s international relations was not limited to the world of politics. 
Press coverage of the campaign suggests that prestige was widely understood by the 
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British public as the lynchpin that held Britain’s empire together. For the newspapers 
also, the Mesopotamian campaign revolved around the issue of prestige. 
   The Nation’s report, for example, echoed the views of the witnesses 
who came before the Commission. ‘The Story of the Baghdad Campaign’, published 
after Townshend’s force was besieged at Kut, began by stating that the Mesopotamian 
campaign: 
So far, has been more successful than any purely British campaign in the war. It 
has taken risks, but none that were critical without the best reason; and its 
success has done much to re-establish our shaken prestige in the East.516 
 
Unlike later press criticism of the Asquith government, the Nation’s report told its 
readers that the 6th Division’s attempt on Baghdad had taken no risks ‘without the best 
reason’. Linking the advance to Baghdad directly to the withdrawal at Gallipoli, it went 
on to remind them of Townshend’s achievements, most important of which had been 
the fact that the successes of his force had ‘done much to re-establish our shaken 
prestige in the East’. The Nation’s report placed the Mesopotamian campaign in 
exactly the same way as the India Office; the campaign’s significance was not in the 
wider world – it would never help Britain to win the war – but it could serve a very 
important function in the east.  
  Many other publications reiterated this point. The Spectator reported 
that even if Townshend’s force was able to take Baghdad, ‘we must not exaggerate the 
importance of the event. It will help our prestige in the East and depress the Turks, but 
it will not, of course, do very much to end the war’.517 Once again, the achievements of 
British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia were seen to impact primarily on Britain’s 
prestige in the east, but not on the greater war. The tone of the Spectator’s comments 
was assured; it was not telling its readers anything that they did not already know. The 
report suggested that it was obvious that the push for Baghdad would ‘help our 
prestige in the East and depress the Turks, but it will not, of course, do very much to 
end the war’. In the weeks leading up to Townshend’s surrender, the press told the 
British public over and over again how unimportant the outcome of the siege was for 
Britain’s war effort. The Times reported that ‘GENERAL TOWNSHEND has now been 
besieged for 68 days. The siege of Kut is relatively of little importance when compared 
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with the big European campaigns. It has some relation to our prestige in the East, but it 
can scarcely affect the broad course of the war’.518   From the beginning of the siege of 
Kut, the achievements of IEF D were assessed in the British media by their potential 
impact upon Britain’s shaken prestige in the East.   
  Newspapers also made the link between the achievements of 
Townshend’s troops and the security of India. The Nation’s report concluded: 
If we have any regard for our prestige in the East, if we value our Indian Empire 
and the means to rule it humanely, we cannot allow another Eastern campaign 
to demonstrate to the world merely that we know how to die or risk death.519  
 
Such press coverage suggests a popular understanding of prestige that mirrored the 
words of John Craik and Henry Baird almost a decade earlier. It also echoed the 
concerns of the politicians of the time perfectly. The Nation’s report linked the 
Mesopotamian campaign’s achievements directly to the protection of India: ‘if we 
value our Indian Empire and the means to rule it humanely’; just as Baird had 
reminded his colleagues that prestige was the only way to rule the Sudan ‘in a civilised 
way’. Ruling India ‘humanely’, or ruling the Sudan ‘in a civilised way’ were nuanced 
ways of saying without force.  The Times commented that Townshend’s defeat would 
not have as disastrous an impact upon India as some might have feared:   
It is hardly necessary to say that the capitulation of the garrison of Kut has very 
limited military importance. The numbers involved are relatively small, and Kut 
itself is merely a squalid little Arab town […]. The enemy will doubtless exploit 
the episode to the utmost, but their efforts are already heavily discounted. In 
India, for example, the probable fate of Kut has for weeks been understood just 
as well as in this country. A triumphal march of Turkish forces to the sea might 
have a disturbing effect upon India, but it is clear that the Turkish army in 
Mesopotamia is pinned to its present position, and cannot move down the 
river.520 
 
Like the Nation, The Times was reassuring its readers that the surrender of the garrison 
at Kut would not have a destabilising effect on Britain’s Indian Empire. It reminded its 
readers that the public in India were as well prepared for Townshend’s surrender as 
they themselves were, and assured them that the defeat was not serious enough to 
cause any real damage. 
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   However, writing in John Bull, Hales bemoaned the fate of India after 
the failures at Gallipoli and Kut. His unreserved criticism of the running of the 
Mesopotamian campaign, ironically, also echoed the rationale of those who authorised 
the advance to Baghdad. He too believed that the impact of loss of prestige in ‘the 
East’ would be felt in India:  
Many of the Indian soldiers taken at Kut had fought at Gallipoli – they had seen 
our defeat there. They will write home to India. Turkey will see that letters 
reach their destination, and they will tell all India of Gallipoli and Kut. Even now 
the bazaars will be ringing with it – and God alone knows how far reaching the 
consequences may be.521  
Hales’s reference to the impact of Gallipoli on British prestige and Indian security 
mirrored the concerns of those who authorised the advance to Baghdad. Gallipoli had 
a significant influence on the way the Mesopotamian campaign was conducted. As 
Hales’s comment suggests, the failure at Gallipoli was seen as a significant blow to 
British prestige in the east. Hales’s blunt statements voiced the anxieties implicit in 
both the news coverage of the siege of Kut, and of the politicians who were in charge 
of it: at the centre of both was a fear that such a loss of prestige would result in 
rebellion in India. The fact that prestige was understood in exactly the same terms by 
the popular media as it was by British statesmen suggests that far from being a tool of 
statecraft, understood and utilised only by a few men in positions of power, prestige 
was a concept that was widely understood by the British public and formed an 





  Despite the fact that the campaign in the Dardanelles had failed in its 
objectives, that Townshend and his men had surrendered to Ottoman forces and been 
taken into captivity – further damaging British prestige, rather than restoring it – none 
of the scenarios of revolt across the empire that had dogged every phase of the 
Mesopotamian campaign materialised. Yet the belief of British officials in the 
importance of ‘British prestige in the East’ remained entirely unshaken.  
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  Lord Hardinge told the Commissioners that the loss of prestige had not 
led to rebellion in India ‘because [...] people were more or less prepared, and were 
able to take measures against it. It had been drawn out for so long’.522 He went on to 
agree with the Commissioners that ‘the fighting powers shown by our troops created a 
very favourable impression’.523 As a result, his evidence suggested, Britain did not lose 
as much prestige as British officials had feared. Sir Beauchamp Duff, too, told the 
Commissioners: 
I thought that the fall of Kut would have had a much greater political effect in 
Afghanistan and amongst the tribes than actually turned out to be the case, 
and I think that that was due to the fact that our fighting quality was shown to 
be so high.524  
Arthur Hirtzel stressed that disaster in India had only been avoided by the success of 
the Russian campaign in Persia. He stated: 
I saw a note the other day by an officer on the General Staff, which contained 
this remark: “That for the last year India has been defended by Russia” – and 
roughly that is true. I took the question more as referring to India than to the 
borderland of Afghanistan there our prestige has gone down considerably, I 
think. *…+ Prestige in itself is valueless, of course. It is the results which follow 
from prestige which are valuable, and those results are not unfavourable to us, 
or are not more unfavourable than they are in Persia at the present moment, 
because the Russians have made good our defects, and through Persia the 
influence spreads to Afghanistan and the [Indian] border.525 
 
Chamberlain agreed with the Commissioners’ suggestion that the loss of prestige in 
the eastern theatres did not have the impact he, the cabinet, and the Government of 
India believed it would have. He too saw the ‘Russian advance’ as having made good 
British failures in ‘the East’. However, he felt that ‘there has been to some extent a 
mischievous effect upon our prestige as a result of the unsuccessful campaign’, and 
told the Commissioners: ‘I should be very sorry if I thought that the campaign would 
close exactly where we stand now – I mean the Eastern campaign’.526 Chamberlain’s 
comments to the Commission reiterated the fear that existed among those charged 
with governing India and running the campaign in Mesopotamia. The concept of British 
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prestige reveals how precariously British officials felt their grip on the empire to be 
during this period.  
  Prestige permeated the workings of the Mesopotamia Commission to 
such an extent that its relative absence in the Commission’s findings is conspicuous. 
David French suggests that the reason the reports of the Mesopotamia and 
Dardanelles Commissions paid such scant regard to prestige was that the concept was 
far too important to be dissected publicly. French argues that the commissioners did 
not explain the role of prestige in British colonial policy because ‘if, as the rulers of the 
empire believed, their rule was based on a political conjuring trick, it was hardly 
sensible to explain to their audience how it worked’.527 This is certainly true. The 
Commission’s investigations revealed that the emphasis placed on prestige by the 
British and Indian establishments had been entirely misplaced. The loss of prestige in 
the east had little or no impact at all; as the commissioners pointed out to witness 
after witness, India was still safe, and the Arabs still allied themselves with Britain 
shortly after the surrender of the garrison at Kut.  
  However, British prestige was much more than just a rationale for 
managing British colonial relations in the east. To admit that the prestige was flawed 
was to question the inherent superiority of British over eastern peoples, which was 
central to the concept. More disconcerting, perhaps, was the fact that to question the 
power of prestige on the peoples of ‘the East’ was to undermine Britain’s 
understanding of the ‘Oriental mind’. If orientals remained unshaken by the loss of 
British prestige, then perhaps they could understand more nuanced arguments than 
simple ‘tangible success, which can be measured in square miles and demonstrated on 
the map’.528  
 
 
A Note on Baghdad 
 
  As discussed in Chapter One, Lord Cromer was seen by his 
contemporaries as one of the foremost experts on the ‘Oriental mind’. Edward Said 
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cites him as one of the archetypal orientalists: a man who defined the oriental from a 
position of superiority and with a firm belief that he understood the orient better than 
the orientals themselves could. In his descriptions of the oriental mind, Cromer 
defined it in opposition to that of the occidental; Said has described the process of 
creating the orient as one that would necessitate such opposition. In ‘The Government 
of Subject Races’, Cromer reflected that ‘the gulf which separates any one member of 
the European family from another’ was ‘infinitely less wide than that which divides all 
Westerns from all Orientals’.529  
  Yet the city of Baghdad was seen as a suitably high profile target for 
Indian Expeditionary Force D because of its significance for both the Oriental and 
Occidental imaginations. Baghdad’s significance for the British in this period was 
demonstrated by its prominence in the press coverage of the Mesopotamian 
campaign. The Times reported on 30 September, 1915 that: 
Sir John Nixon has the gratification of announcing another brilliant victory by 
the gallant force which he commands *…+. [We] are now within some ninety 
miles of Baghdad itself, the famous capital of the Abassid Caliphs, which even in 
its decay is a city of no mean importance.530  
 
This article is reminiscent of the comments of travellers to Mesopotamia before the 
First World War: it described Baghdad with reference to its perceived heyday under 
the Abbasid caliphate, and remarked that ‘even in its decay’ it remained a high-profile 
target for British and Indian troops.  The Illustrated London News described Baghdad as 
‘the city of the Arabian Nights’531 and as ‘ground famous both in history and 
romance’.532 The Spectator reminded its readers that the loss of such a great city 
‘would be a very serious embarrassment to the Turks, and would greatly increase our 
prestige in the East’.533  
  Baghdad was seen as a victory that had the potential to make right the 
impact of the failure at Gallipoli on British prestige because of its dual significance for 
the Western and Eastern imaginations. Lord Crewe told the Commissioners that 
‘nobody will dispute the reality of those political advantages, or the glamour attaching 
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to the capture of the most famous city, even in the European mind, and still more in 
the Eastern’.534  Given that a belief in the importance of British prestige was predicated 
upon the acceptance of the existence of an Oriental mind whose reactions could be 
anticipated by British officials, the belief that Baghdad was a city of significance ‘even 
in the European, and still more in the Eastern’ mind was revealing. Lord Crewe was not 
suggesting a parity between the two minds: Baghdad held significance ‘even in the 
European’ mind, but far more in the Eastern. Nevertheless, the dual significance of the 
city illuminates a meeting-ground between Orient and Occident, one that the concept 
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The Mesopotamian Campaign 1916-1918 
 
Even in the land that pre-war travellers had perceived as ossified and that servicemen 
and women continued to identify most strongly with its past, the period after the 
surrender of the garrison at Kut brought with it the trappings of modernity. In February 
1916, day-to-day running of the campaign was transferred to London, and after July 
1916, the War Office assumed complete control of the campaign. The handover 
brought with it financial investment in the hitherto neglected theatre. Technology and 
resources that would have been unimaginable in November 1914, when soldiers had 
been expected to fight with guns marked ‘for practice only’, were finally made 
available to those serving in Mesopotamia.535  With greater financial investment at his 
disposal, the General Officer Commanding, Sir Percy Lake, began by reorganising the 
administration of the campaign. The majority of change in Mesopotamia was, 
however, effected during General Sir Stanley Maude’s command of forces in 
Mesopotamia between August 1916 and November 1917. The modernisation of 
Mesopotamia continued under the command of Lieutenant-General William R. 
Marshall, who took over as Commander in Chief in Mesopotamia after Maude’s 
premature death and presided over the remainder of the campaign.  
  Under Maude’s leadership, British and Dominion forces began the 
building of railway lines to connect key Mesopotamian towns and cities; such 
infrastructure, which made the transportation of goods and servicemen much faster 
and more efficient, had been rejected as too expensive in the early stages of the 
campaign. During this period, steps were taken that would transform Basra’s seaport, 
Ashar Creek, into a dock for larger ships. This enabled the more effective receipt of 
supplies and troops.  Telegraph lines were extended, concrete roads built to facilitate 
faster troop movement, and better, more appropriate river transportation was made 
available to British and Dominion forces in the last two years of the campaign. It was 
only in 1916 that nurses arrived to care for the many sick and wounded in 
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Mesopotamia. In stark contrast to the neglect of wounded servicemen that had led to 
criticism of the management of the campaign, nurses were now able to care for 
servicemen and women in modern hospitals. As part of the rapid increase in troop 
numbers in Mesopotamia came a greater number of RFC planes, and with them 
increased air reconnaissance and the beginning of the aerial mapping of Mesopotamia. 
In addition, the latter half of the campaign saw the arrival of motorised vehicles such 
as Ford Lorries and Rolls Royce armoured cars, which began to take the place of 
cavalry in the campaign.536   
  The changes that took place in Mesopotamia in the last two years of the 
war made significant differences to the ability of military leaders to move troops and, 
therefore, to run a more efficient and successful campaign. Under the command of Sir 
Stanley Maude, troops slowly worked their way northwards, retaking the area around 
Kut al-Amara in the early months of 1917. On 11 March 1917, Maude’s troops entered 
Baghdad. The British press feted the newly-promoted General; The Times proudly 
reflected on ‘Sir STANLEY MAUDE’S triumph at Baghdad’ for weeks after British forces 
entered the city.537 Having consolidated the British hold on the city, Maude’s forces 
pushed north, capturing the town of Ramadi in September that year. Under the 
command of Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall, British and Indian troops 
continued to extend the area under British control, reaching the northern city of Kirkuk 
in May 1917, and occupying the key city of Mosul in northern Mesopotamia in the days 
after the armistice with Turkey on 31 October 1918. My primary interest is not, 
however, in the impact of the modernisation of Mesopotamia on the military 
campaign, but in the way British servicemen and women experienced, and therefore 
perceived and represented, Mesopotamia and its peoples once these modern 
conveniences were in place. This chapter will trace the impact of the rapid 
modernisation of Mesopotamia upon British perceptions of the region and its peoples. 
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  The surrender at Kut had been a humiliating defeat that was perceived 
as a severe blow to British prestige in the East. In its wake, the War Committee was 
compelled to alter its policy in regards to the Mesopotamian campaign. British policy in 
Mesopotamia in the second half of the campaign returned to the cautious approach 
that had characterised the first months of the war. British and Indian forces were 
instructed to maintain British influence in the Basra vilayet, to protect the oil wells in 
Persia, and to co-operate with the anticipated Russian advance in Persia. The Chief of 
the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall Sir William Robertson, wrote in April 1915 to 
make it clear to Sir Beauchamp-Duff that ‘our policy in Mesopotamia is defensive and 
we do not attach any importance to the possession of Kut or to the occupation of 
Baghdad’.538 Robertson conceded, however, that in order ‘to counteract the effect of 
the fall of Kut’, it was important to ‘maintain as forward a position as can be made 
secure’.539 Having been severely censured by members of both Houses of Parliament 
and by the popular press, those in charge of the campaign in Mesopotamia were 
reluctant to take any further risks in what remained a secondary or subsidiary theatre 
of the war.  
  It was with slow, deliberate steps that Maude’s troops re-took the town 
of Kut al-Amara in February 1917.  At each stage of what was to become the capture of 
Baghdad, Maude had to argue the case for pushing north with a reluctant War Office 
in London. The recapture of the town of Kut was a cause of pride for those serving in 
Mesopotamia. General, then Lieutenant, Ainsworth told his interviewer that it had 
been ‘a great joy to all of us later when ultimately we got the Turks cleared out of Kut. 
It took us the better part of 12 months’.540  On passing the town in 1917, Captain Allan 
Byrom, a Glaswegian medical student before the war who was initially posted to 
Mesopotamia from March 1917 as a captain in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 
noted that ‘it was very inspiring to see the Union Jack flying above General Head 
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Quarters. As it flaunted in the early morning breeze it seemed to give out a note of 
defiance to all those who would attempt to haul it down.’541  
  Despite their dismissal of Kut al-Amara as an insignificant loss after 
Townshend’s surrender, the British papers celebrated the cautious and well-planned 
way in which General Maude’s forces re-took the town in 1917. The Times proclaimed 
that Maude’s ‘long series of judicious and methodical operations’ had ‘avenged 
General Townshend’.542 The re-capture of Kut earned Maude a promotion, and made 
him a hero in Britain. An editorial in The Times announced that Maude had turned the 
‘tide of misfortune’ and ‘avenged’ those who had surrendered at Kut.543 In a leader 
marking the recapture of the town, the paper made it clear that the consequences of 
the siege of Kut would continue to define the Mesopotamian campaign: 
We have long ceased to regard the operations in Mesopotamia with 
enthusiasm, because we hold that the earlier phases were misguided, and also 
because the demand they made upon our shipping and other resources is 
probably disproportionate to their value. There never was a time when it was 
more important for the Allies to concentrate their energies upon the main 
fighting fronts. But we recognized and appreciate the reasons which have 
doubtless led the Government to persist in their resolute determination to turn 
the Turks out of Kut. British prestige was involved, and it was probably 
imperative not to leave the enemy in undisturbed possession of a strategic 
position which our own forces had held so long and so valiantly. In the face of 
many difficulties, SIR STANLEY MAUDE and his indomitable troops have steadily 
and methodically fought their way along the right bank of the Tigris.544   
Though many changes were being made in Mesopotamia itself, The Times’ coverage of 
the campaign remained constant. Mesopotamia was still regarded as a secondary 
theatre of war, and maintaining British prestige remained the primary motivation for 
keeping troops there at all. Finally, Townshend’s attempt on Baghdad, which had 
defined the campaign in Britain hitherto, was to remain at the heart of press coverage. 
At each stage, the achievements of British commanders in Mesopotamia were 
contextualised with reference to Townshend’s surrender at Kut. In this way, the story 
of Townshend and Kut remained at the heart of representations of Mesopotamia in 
the British press. 
                                                     
541
 Private Papers of J. A. Byrom, IWM Docs. London. Catalogue number: 8503 99/84/1. (Hereafter 
Byrom) 
542
 ‘The Victory of Kut – A Well-Planned Scheme’, The Times, 27 February 1917, p. 5. 
543
 ‘Kut and Ancre’, The Times, 27 February 1917, p. 7. 
544
 ‘Kut and Ancre’, The Times. 
178 
 
  In addition to defining the campaign in Britain, Townshend’s attempt on 
Baghdad in November 1915 redefined those parts of Mesopotamia associated with the 
story into landmarks, or memorials, to the role he and his men had played in the 
campaign and the hardships they had suffered. The town of Kut al-Amara became 
synonymous with the suffering of Townshend’s troops. Gordon Bennett volunteered to 
work as a chaplain with the YMCA in Mesopotamia at the end of 1916. His diary, which 
he sent in instalments to his wife in India, contains a song composed by, and popular 
with, the troops: ‘Messy-pot-amia – Delirium in Many Verses’. The song went through 
each letter of the alphabet from ‘A is the apple that some people say/ Used to exist 
down Kurnah way’ to Z.  For those serving in Mesopotamia K was simply: 
For Kut where Townshend’s brave band, 
For many long months made their glorious stand, 
It had to give in, though relief was at hand,  
But he’s honoured in Mesopotamia.545  
            The myth surrounding Townshend at Kut was added to the many other 
mythologies with which Mesopotamia was identified by British troops. As British 
servicemen and women made their way north, they commented on specific landmarks 
in predictable ways. Basra was invariably described as a disappointing ‘“Venice of the 
East” on account of the number of creeks which lead from the Shat ‘l Arab to the 
native town some two miles away’.546 Qurna was almost always described as the 
‘traditional site of the Garden of Eden’.547 In letters home to his mother and sister, 
Captain Baxter noted that so often did servicemen remark on the Garden of Eden or 
the blue dome of Ezra’s tomb that to do so was a cliché. (He, nevertheless, described it 
in this way in separate letters to his mother and sister, and sent home a drawing of the 
tomb!).548 Captain Baxter served with the 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment 
(38th Brigade, 13th Division) from April 1916 until the end of the war. After the siege 
of Kut, Kut al-Amara and other parts of Mesopotamia associated with Townshend’s 
advance or with attempts to relieve the garrison were added to the list of comment-
worthy attractions. Bennett wrote of his visit to ‘the famous Diyailah Mound and 
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Redoubt’ that it had ‘been the scene of the most dramatic attempt – and failure – to 
relieve Kut, in March last year, where so many of the Manchesters and others, were 
laid low.’549 In his diary for April 1917, Brigadier E. M. Ransford noted the sights as he 
and his colleagues travelled north: 
At intervals the horizon was relieved by mounds, occasional villages and objects 
of archaeological interest – Ezra’s Tomb on the bank of the Tigris – Ctesiphon 
with its great arch – Kut-el-Amara where Townshend and his troops were 
besieged in a loop of the river.550  
 
Kut had gone from a little-known town along the Tigris, noted only for the fact that it 
had a liquorice factory, to a well-known landmark along the route to Baghdad. Here, 
Ransford listed Kut among the sights of interest that broke up what he and many of his 
colleagues regarded as an otherwise monotonous Mesopotamian landscape.   
  When he visited Kut al-Amara in November 1917, Captain Byrom was 
excited at the prospect of staying in the house where General Townshend had stayed 
during the siege of Kut. It served, by that time, as the lodgings of the political officer, 
and Byrom ‘looked forward to staying for a day or perhaps two in a house which was 
closely connected with the famous siege’.551 Reflecting on her time in Mesopotamia, 
Eleanor Shortt told her interviewer that it had been ‘exciting going to Kut, after all the 
siege and everything’.552  As Reginald Campbell Thompson, still serving in the Political 
Service in Mesopotamia, was to note in his memoirs, the siege of Kut had made the 
town of Kut al-Amara famous.553 The buildings of the town, which had been dismissed 
by servicemen and the British press as a ‘squalid Arab town’, had now become sights in 
their own right.554  
  Before Townshend’s attempt on Baghdad, the Arch of Ctesiphon had 
most commonly been associated with the emperor Julian the Apostate. Having 
defeated Persian forces in 363 C.E. but unable to lay siege to Ctesiphon, Julian turned 
his forces towards the Jebel Hamrin region of Mesopotamia, where his men were 
                                                     
549
 Bennett, p. 77. 
550
 Private Papers of E. M. Ransford , IWM Documents Archive, London. Catalogue Number: 4801 
80/29/1, p. 13. (Hereafter: Ransford). 
551
 Byrom, p. 60. 
552
 Eleanor Morrison Shortt, IWM Sound Archives, London.  Accession Number: 8296. (Hereafter: 
Shortt). 
553
R. Campbell Thompson, With the Intelligence to Baghdad By R. Campbell Thompson Sometime 
Captain, SSO GHQ Intelligence IEFD, ‘The First World War Memoir of Captain R.C. Thompson’. I.W.M. 
Docs., London. Catalogue number: PP/MCR/424, Microfilm. (Hereafter Thompson), p. 61. 
554
 ‘The Fall of Kut’, The Times, 1 May 1916, p. 9. 
180 
 
defeated and he died from a spear wound.555 After the battle of Ctesiphon and 
subsequent siege at Kut, the arch took on a new significance for those who served in 
Mesopotamia.  As this extract from Richard Pope-Hennessy’s diary illustrates, the arch 
of Ctesiphon became a memorial to those who had given their lives in the battles 
leading up to the siege of Kut: 
At four o’ clock this afternoon away on the distant horizon there loomed up out 
of the dust the arch of Ctesiphon; it stands well up above the dreary desolate 
plain of Mesopotamia, sole remaining fragment of a great edifice raised to his 
own glory by one of Alexander’s generals, and for many years to come a 
memorial to the dead of the 43rd.  Indeed most of our officers, and God knows 
how many of our men are buried within a stone’s throw of the arch. The 
Seleucidae have passed away – they have no further use for pillars; as that is 
so, perhaps the stout Macedonian who had the pillars built will not grudge the 
time-worn remnant as a memorial to soldiers as stout as any his master led; 
something to tell the men of another age *...+. Here *…+ fought and died and 
conquered against great odds a regiment as brave and as well disciplined as any 
Macedonian phalanx. I believe the arches have echoed to the tread of the 
legions; Persian, Parthian, and Arab armies have in their turn passed it 
spreading desolation and here the Turk learnt that a superiority of three to one 
is not enough when fighting us. It is one of the blood-stained monuments of 
the world. Even in the far distance, shrouded in a grey veil of dust, I could not 
look at it unmoved.556  
Pope-Hennessy’s description of Ctesiphon is far more detailed than that given by most 
servicemen. It is not, however, historically accurate. His allusion to Alexander’s general 
refers presumably to the building of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris, a large Seleucid city 
founded by Antiochus I in 274 BC. Antiochus was the son and heir of Seleucus I, one of 
the Generals who divided Alexander’s empire after his death.557 Seleucia stood 
opposite Parthian Ctesiphon, which was founded between 160 and 140 BC by 
Mithridates I.558 It was the Sassanian King Sapor, or Shapur, (AD 241-271) who first 
built a palace at Ctesiphon.559 Ctesiphon was, however, sacked by several Roman or 
Byzantine armies, and it was another Persian King, Chosroes, or Khosrow, I (AD 531-
579) who in the sixth century AD made peace with the Romans, and made Ctesiphon 
his winter capital. He rebuilt Shapur’s palace, and added the arch, the remains of 
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which Pope-Hennessy could see in 1917.560 The Arabs conquered Ctesiphon in 637 AD, 
and the city was soon superseded by Abbasid Baghdad.   
  The inaccuracies of Pope-Hennessy’s description are significant not 
because they are historically inaccurate, but because of what they reveal about his 
perceptions of Mesopotamia’s history and culture. Pope-Hennessy attributed the 
grandeur he saw before him to a Western or Hellenistic figure – one of Alexander the 
Great’s generals. The civilizations that really did leave the palace at Ctesiphon as their 
legacy are a mere footnote in Pope-Hennessy’s description. They are listed quickly, 
almost as an afterthought. Pope-Hennessy noted that the Sassanians had ‘passed *the 
Arch of Ctesiphon+ spreading desolation’. But it had been the Roman armies who 
sacked Shapur’s Ctesiphon, ‘spreading desolation’, and another Persian leader, not a 
‘stout Macedonian’, who had rebuilt it.  
  Pope-Hennessy’s description focused on two western armies. He was 
clearly very proud of the actions of the British men who had fought at Ctesiphon, 
subscribing to the theory that Townshend’s men had beaten the Turkish force despite 
a huge disparity in numbers, but that Townshend had, nevertheless, had to retreat 
because of a shortage of water and the high numbers of wounded men. According to 
some accounts, Julian defeated Persian forces at Ctesiphon, but turned away from the 
city, to the bewilderment of his officers.561 The two stories were merged, and the Arch 
seemed, therefore, all the more appropriate as a monument to Townshend’s men. 
Pope-Hennessy’s emphasis on Alexander’s armies can be read as a reflection of his 
desire to honour the British men who had given their lives around the site of the Arch 
by comparing them to some of the famous – and successful – armies of antiquity. 
Nevertheless, it is the armies of a western or Hellenistic figure that define the Arch in 
his description, eclipsing the more significant role that was played by other civilizations 
in Mesopotamia’s history.  
  Pope-Hennessy’s description of Ctesiphon illustrates the way it was 
transformed into a monument to the British troops who had given their lives there, 
under General Townshend’s command.562 He seamlessly merged what he believed to 
be the ancient history of the Arch of Ctesiphon with this modern significance. In a 
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precursor of the memorialisation that would characterise the post-war era, he could 
see the Arch only as a monument to the men who had died there and, consequently, 
‘could not look at it unmoved’. The battlefields of Europe were soon to become tourist 
attractions. In these descriptions, we can see the transition of parts of Mesopotamia 
from unmapped wildernesses to battlefields, and finally, as Pope-Hennessy’s 






  As discussed, many of those who were sent to Mesopotamia had 
reservations about the value of the campaign. Their doubts quickly turned to animosity 
as they confronted Mesopotamia’s harsh climate, unfavourable geography, and the 
hardships inflicted upon them by the mismanagement and lack of funding that plagued 
the early stages of the campaign. In contrast, those who served in these latter stages 
of the Mesopotamian campaign were met by a buzzing hub of efficiently planned 
activity and much greater care for their personal needs and entertainment. Those who 
had not served in Mesopotamia during the early phases of the campaign could not 
perceive this as a great improvement, but they could see the Mesopotamian skyline 
changing before their eyes, and noted such changes with great pride. Allan Byrom 
reflected upon the changes made in Basra with imperial pride. ‘From a sleepy seaport 
town ruled by Turkish misgovernment, oppression and stick-in the-mud principles’, he 
boasted, ‘Basra had been turned into a hive of industry under the guiding hand of the 
proud people who rule beneath the Union Jack’.563  Byrom concluded that ‘it is only on 
seeing things like this that one can appreciate to the full extent what a wonderful little 
nation we really are’.564  
  British servicemen often remarked on the stark differences between the 
simple (often mud) buildings of Mesopotamia and those introduced by British and 
Indian forces. Because the latter were often larger than the buildings around them, the 
changes made by British and Indian forces quickly came to dominate the skyline in the 
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towns where they were introduced. Thus, Captain McKeag, who arrived in 
Mesopotamia in March 1917 with the 1st/6th Ghurkhas (Abbottabad Brigade), noted 
that in Ashar Creek, ‘the principal building is the telegraph office, which is of only one 
storey, but as [it] is built of brick it looks quite distinguished amongst the surrounding 
mud houses’.565 Second Lieutenant Harold Hussey arrived in Mesopotamia in 
December 1916. He served first with 3rd Battalion Devonshire Regiment, and in 
February 1917 was attached to the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment (Jullundur 
Brigade, 3rd Lahore Division). He was killed in an advance with the Manchesters, in 
March 1917. In letters home, Hussey described the Mesopotamian landscape. ‘On the 
left bank’, he told his family, ‘there is literally nothing. i.e. there is no camp, trees, 
civilized habitation (there are probably a few Arab villages dotted about) – only just 
open desert, stretching away in the distance as far as the mountains’.566 Disregarding 
Arab villages as a form of ‘civilized habitation’, Hussey went on to describe the only 
feature of the Mesopotamian landscape to strike him as significant: ‘beyond, the 
desert as on the other bank, [...] a line of telegraph wires stretching accross [sic] 
apparently to infinity’.567 Hussey’s description of Mesopotamia’s landscape paints a 
picture of an empty land, marked only by the presence of endless telegraph wires 
stretching as far as the eye could see. The wires that defined the Mesopotamian 
landscape in Hussey’s description had literally marked those areas under British 
control with a visible sign of continued British power. But, in their prevalence in these 
servicemen’s letters and memoirs, these newly constructed landmarks are also a 
reflection of shifting British perceptions of Mesopotamia. Its landscape was no longer 
dominated by landmarks that reflected Mesopotamia’s mythological or historical 
significance; instead, modern practicalities and wartime events were beginning to 
dominate descriptions of Mesopotamia in this period.  
  Captain McKeag visited the city of Baghdad twice during his stay, both 
times travelling at least part of the way on the newly-constructed railways. Though he 
was not impressed by the speed with which he reached the city, such convenience 
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would have been unheard of in the early years of the war. During his second trip to 
‘the city of the caliphs’ in April 1917, McKeag reflected:568 
Really we run Baghdad very well, and it must be no light matter.  Both the 
military and civil police are models of smartness, and, I believe, efficiency. The 
latter are imported from Egypt. Sanitation, compared with what it must have 
been, is admirable. Roads are steadily improving, and this is not a country in 
which road material is easily found. There are fixed rates for the hire of bellums 
[boats used by locals] on the river, while steamers run up and down between 
the city and various camps near, at fixed hours. Even the bazaar urchins have 
been numbered and registered as messenger-boys, and are a great 
convenience, since not only are vehicles few, but far the most convenient, 
almost the only way to “do” the bazaar is on foot, and one cannot carry one’s 
purchases  about oneself. [...] Five years of British rule would make Baghdad an 
extremely prosperous city.569   
Like Byrom, McKeag was extremely proud of the change brought about in 
Mesopotamia under British rule. He stressed the enormity of the task of ruling 
Baghdad, reminding his family that the efficiency achieved was ‘no light matter’ and 
underlining the scarcity of resources: both the manpower for the civil police force and 
material for the new roads were imported. What McKeag admired was the 
quantification inherent in the British rule of the city and the resultant de-mystification. 
His description stressed that each formerly unknown variable had become clearly 
numbered, ordered and administered by British powers: ‘even the street urchins have 
been numbered and registered as messenger-boys’. McKeag was not simply rejoicing 
in the efficient running of the city, or in its modernisation, but in the standardisation 
and quantification of its unknowns.  
  By the time Pope-Hennessy arrived in Baghdad in May 1918, he could 
write with delight of the improvements the British had made to the city’s skyline: 
The brown Tigris flows past them in great swirling eddies. The only alteration to 
the landscape is the solitary addition the British have made to the architecture 
of Baghdad. It is not a minaret – though not unlike one at first sight – for it is 
that typically western feature, a chimney- the chimney of the electric 
powerhouse which now lights us and turns invigorating fans in our rooms and 
offices. Blessed be electricity!570  
Pope-Hennessy’s description of the addition of the chimney of an electricity plant is 
indicative of the mixed reactions to the trappings of modern life in a land 
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predominantly understood before the war to have been frozen at an early stage in its 
development. Electricity dramatically improved the quality of life for servicemen and 
women serving in Mesopotamia’s climate by bringing them modern luxuries such as 
electric lighting and fans. In an acknowledgment of a typical description of a city 
identified with the Arabian Nights stories in Britain, Pope-Hennessy likened the 
chimney to a minaret: the paradigmatic emblem of an eastern or oriental city.  But, as 
he stressed, the focus of his description was in fact a western feature. It was to the 
practicality of these changes that Pope-Hennesy’s remarks attended: ‘fans in our 
rooms and offices’. Electricity, one of the quintessential elements of modern life in the 
west, dominated his description of a city that only a few years earlier had been 
associated with fable and antiquity.  
  However, not all British servicemen rejoiced in the ‘blessings’ brought 
about by changes made by British and Indian forces. Like the men and women who 
described Mesopotamia before the war, McKeag saw the real city of Baghdad as a 
disappointment.Yet his nostalgia was not simply for the grandeur of Abbasid Baghdad, 
but for a Baghdad untainted by the modernisation that had been wrought by British 
occupation: 
Baghdad is not by any means the magnificent city that its history, or rather its 
renown, would lead one to expect. There are no very famous palaces and very 
few fine mosques; nor are there any noted ruins, though indeed ruins in the 
East, except probably the work of the ancient Persians at Persepolis and 
Ctesiphon, are not of any great attractiveness. Buildings are for the most part 
graceful rather than grand and lose their beauty when they fall into dis-repair. 
Yet seen from the river in its proper setting of sunlight the City of the Caliphs 
has a great deal of charm and strangeness, especially now, when the trees are 
green, giving a contrast with the toned yellow of old brick. But alas! Even since I 
was here before a tall iron chimney has been introduced to interfere with the 
harmony of the place, and before long there are bound to be many such jarring 
notes.571  
The beginning of Captain McKeag’s account is reminiscent of the descriptions of 
Baghdad given by pre-war travellers to Mesopotamia: he saw it as a disappointment, a 
city fallen from the heights it had reached at earlier points in its history. Like pre-war 
accounts, McKeag’s description of the city also identified Baghdad’s heyday in its 
ancient history, seeing everything since the Caliphate as a downward slide into 
disrepair.  
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  However, McKeag’s description contains a different kind of nostalgia, 
described by Renato Resaldo as ‘a particular kind of nostalgia, often found under 
imperialism, where people mourn the passing of what they themselves have 
transformed’.572 McKeag was disappointed by the fact that ‘a tall iron chimney has 
been introduced’, which, for him, disrupted ‘the harmony of the place’. He was 
saddened by the possibility of further modernisation, regretting the probability that 
‘before long there are bound to be many such jarring notes’, despite the fact that 
these changes were brought about by the actions of his own colleagues, in the service 
of his country. Finally, McKeag found the modernisation of Baghdad ‘jarring’ because 
modern substances, such as iron, seemed to him to have no place in ‘the East’. In 
another diary entry, McKeag noted that Baghdad’s bazaar was once:  
Reputed to be the finest in the East, but the old buildings have completely 
disappeared, and even the modern ones are in bad repair, a good deal of the 
vaulting having been replaced by that most obtrusive evidence of 
Westernization in the East – galvanized iron.573   
For McKeag, galvanized iron was an ugly, physical manifestation of the worst kind of 
western influence on the east. In an echo of the nostalgia expressed by him in regards 
to Baghdad's skyline, the introduction of iron into Baghdad’s architecture was the last 
chapter in a story of decline. His nostalgia for Baghdad’s former grandeur echoed that 
of pre-war travellers, but in his lament of the modernisation of Baghdad as a result of 
British intervention, McKeag was expressing very different sentiments from those 
voiced by pre-war travellers, who had longed for the modernisation of Mesopotamia 
by means of British intervention.  
  Most British servicemen enjoyed the benefits that modernisation 
brought into their lives. Indeed, McKeag himself wrote that he was considering 
Baghdad as a possible place for settlement after the war because of its excellent rail 
links with the rest of Asia and the Middle East.574 It is clear that those who came to 
Mesopotamia after the fall of Kut had a far more pleasant experience. They were, on 
the whole, well fed, well looked after when they became ill or were injured, and 
stationed in barracks that, in comparison to the accommodations in the early stages of 
the campaign, were luxurious. Gordon Bennett’s letters were filled with the 
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entertainment he and his colleagues at the YMCA organised for the troops: nightly 
films screened in their own cinema, and games of football and rugby.575 
  Reginald Campbell Thompson recalled that by the time British forces 
occupied Baghdad, ‘the staff had *...+ plenty of motor cars, and there were even motor-
launches; and we were housed in palaces with gardens, and courtyards, bananas and 
theatrical flowers’.576 He noted that he had been stationed in ‘an enormous room 
panelled with pieces of looking glass, and a magnificent red carpet, a curious rococo 
place’.577 Entertainment was plentiful; Thompson recalled the occasional ‘Concert 
Party [...] and even a pantomime, most ambitiously conceived and executed’ where 
‘the appropriate story Sinbad was performed’.578 Even amidst a quickly changing 
skyline, the Arabian Nights stories continued to seem an apt choice for the city of 
Harun al- Rashid. Reginald Campbell Thomson stressed that such entertainment was a 
welcome relief from the ‘interminable work’, but this comfortable lifestyle was a far 
cry from the early stages of the campaign.579  
  Those who had served in Mesopotamia from the early stages of the 
campaign noted the changes made to Basra and the surrounding areas in particular. 
Thompson wrote that upon his return to southern Mesopotamia in March 1918, 
‘Basrah had become an unknown quantity to *him+’.580 He described how the city ‘now 
spread literally for miles over the country, and included was a broad tarmac road’.581 
Even Thompson had become accustomed to certain modern conveniences; he did not 
find it noteworthy that he was able to quickly source the goods he needed from Basra, 
and to board ‘the train *...+ off to Nasiriyah’.582 Both would have been unimaginable 
luxuries two years earlier.  
  Servicemen wrote particularly highly of the services available in and 
around the town of Amara.  Allan Byrom visited the town in November 1917; he 
recalled that he was ‘able to go out a little and so take still more enjoyment in life 
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generally and in the pleasures of Amara and its surroundings in particular’.583 It was 
practically unheard of for a serviceman to note the ‘pleasures’ of any part of 
Mesopotamia in the early part of the campaign. Byrom’s description of the 
entertainment on offer not only demonstrates the stark difference from the sheer 
misery reported by servicemen early in the war, but the extent to which the town had 
changed:  
These [pleasures] included short trips up river in a motor boat and occasional 
visits to the cinema, without which no town, either East or West, is complete. 
The motor trips were most enjoyable and gave me an opportunity of viewing 
more closely some of the scenery I admired so much when coming down 
stream on the river boat, while the pictures brought me once again into touch 
with the Western World. The films were quite up to date and vastly superior to 
the last I had seen in Baghdad. The famous Charlie Chaplin was to the fore, and 
although he may seem funny to those at home, he is ten times funnier when 
seen on the screen in a place like Amara. The Arabs were greatly excited and 
showed their delight in no unmistakeable manner.584   
Byrom was clearly happy in Mesopotamia. The climate, the people, the flies and the 
diseases that afflicted him were entirely unaltered, but he was clearly enjoying himself. 
Byrom stressed the modernity of his experiences in Mesopotamia: he explored the 
landscape in a ‘motorboat’, not a ‘native’ craft, and not only did he go to the cinema, 
but he stressed that the films themselves were ‘quite up to date’.  His insistence that 
the films available were the latest releases highlights the high standard of living 
enjoyed by those serving in Mesopotamia in this period.  Byrom may have found 
Chaplin’s films all the more entertaining in Mesopotamia because they were a 
welcome relief from the hardships of war, though one would not have guessed it from 
the remainder of his description. What struck him was the incongruity between 
Chaplin’s groundbreaking films and their existence in a place traditionally located in 
historical and mythological discourses in the British imagination. The linguistic barrier 
between Byrom and the ‘Arabs’ rendered them silent in his description, like the films 
he described. Byrom stressed that the Arabs ‘were greatly excited and showed their 
delight in no unmistakeable manner’. No doubt, the arrival of the cinema – a modern 
luxury by any standards in 1917 – in Mesopotamia was a cause of excitement among 
the local population as well as the troops. Their physical, rather than linguistic, 
expression of delight evokes an image of the peoples of Mesopotamia as ‘primitive’, 
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living in a pre-linguistic stage of their evolution. This comment, therefore, draws the 
reader’s attention once more to the novelty, and peculiarity, of a cinema in 
Mesopotamia, and sets its modernity – stressed in Byrom’s description – in opposition 
to the ‘primitivism’ of the peoples, in Byrom’s account. 
   By the time Byrom visited Ashar Creek in southern Mesopotamia in 
October 1918, he could dine at ‘the club’, choose between two cinema theatres and 
even take in a game of golf:  
The Strand Cinema is an open-air show, but at the Splendid Palace one could 
witness a really good performance, including the very latest Charlie Chaplin 
film, from a plush-covered box seat, while appropriate music was dispensed by 
a string orchestra, which unfortunately, like the person’s egg, was only good in 
parts. In the Club practically the only permanent members were the British civil 
residents in Basra, but officers could by paying Rs. 6/8 obtain a ‘chit’  book of 
Rs. 5 value. Fairly good meals and drinks could be had at fabulous prices.585  
So settled does the British community in Ashar Creek sound, that Byrom might have 
been describing a peace-time British colony anywhere in the world. Once more, Byrom 
stressed that he could watch ‘the very latest Charlie Chaplin film’. His detailed account 
paints a picture of southern Mesopotamia on the eve of the Turkish surrender as a 
transformed place. He recalled well-established British firms such as ‘Gray Mackenzie 
& Co., Strick, Scott & Co., Andrew Weir & Son, and Hills Bros’, which had situated their 
headquarters in the ‘European quarter’ of Ashar.586 Byrom described the 
transformation of Ashar with great pride, noting that: 
Going across Ashar Creek from the Strand via Whitley Bridge, one comes 
straight into Bridge Street, which owing to the innovation of British ideas and 
handiwork became quite a respectable thoroughfare, with British, Indian and 
Native shops, at which one could buy useful things without being altogether 
robbed. There were also several small restaurants run by Locals for the use of 
the troops.587  
Here, despite the ongoing war, a community of British people had access to all the 
conveniences they could want; businesses flourished, and place names were anglicised 
or entirely replaced with English names. British firms were trading successfully, and 
shops and restaurants run by the native population had begun to cater for the British 
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Adventures in the East 
 
  In his article ‘War, Memory, and the Modern: Pilgrimage and Tourism to 
the Western Front’, Modris Eksteins argues that the lure of seeing the world was a 
motivating factor for many men who volunteered to fight in the early months of the 
First World War.589 Eksteins claims that the attraction of travel was used to recruit 
men from around the empire. He cites recruiting posters which ‘offered “a free world 
tour to Great Britain and Europe: the chance of a lifetime”’, in order to entice young 
Australians to join the armed forces.590 Although very few British servicemen 
expressed a desire to serve in Mesopotamia for these reasons, some British 
servicewomen did see nursing in Mesopotamia as their chance for an interlude of 
liberty, fun and travel before settling down to the responsibilities of married life.  
  Eunice Winifred Lemere-Goff served in ‘Mesopot’, as she called it, as a 
nurse with Queen Alexandra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service. In an interview 
conducted many years after the war for the Imperial War Museum, she described how 
she and her sister had volunteered for service in Mesopotamia because ‘we wanted 
more experience, we wanted to see another country, we wanted [...] to meet other 
people, to see the Arabs *…+ that was the idea: of seeing another country’.591 Lemere-
Goff had only good things to say about Mesopotamia; her recollections were of a land 
that was ‘very primitive, but *…+ very enjoyable’.592 She remembered travelling to 
Mesopotamia on ‘a lovely big ship’, and of serving in Basra in ‘very big hospitals, it 
wasn’t one hospital there were about half a dozen hospitals’.593 Her impressions of the 
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Arabs of Mesopotamia were equally favourable. She described leisurely expeditions 
into nearby towns: 
When you had your time off, to cross over into the town you had to go in what 
you called a bellum *…+, but Arabs used to paddle you along, Arabs, young 
Arabs. And they were charming people. Some could talk your language, some 
couldn’t. Then I started learning a bit of their language *…+ so that I could 
discuss things with them, you know. *…+ We’d go shopping and have donkey 
picnics, met some lovely young officers out there.594 
Crucially, women like Lemere-Goff had volunteered; they had chosen to contribute to 
the war effort, and where they wished to serve. This element of choice may well have 
contributed to the overwhelmingly positive memories expressed here, which stand in 
stark contrast to the majority of reactions to Mesopotamia expressed by her male 
colleagues, even in these latter stages of the campaign. The description above would 
be difficult to identify as a wartime scene; it reads like the travels of a young woman to 
a foreign country at any time. Like any sensitive traveller, Lemere-Goff attempted to 
grasp the basics of the local language, and seemed to have enjoyed the outings she 
described and her interactions with the local population. Asked directly what her 
experiences of Mesopotamia’s peoples had been like, she recalled that the Arabs 
‘were very friendly; very, very nice’.595 She recalled that she and her sister had 
travelled unescorted on a train to Baghdad with only one ‘young white man – that was 
all – the rest were all Arabs *…+ right out in the desert. But we were safe as houses, we 
didn’t mind’.596  
  Eleanor Shortt was also a nurse with Queen Alexandra’s Imperial 
Nursing Service. She served in Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and later in Persia. Reflecting on 
her time in Mesopotamia in an interview conducted nearly seventy years on, she told 
her interviewer that she ‘volunteered for “Mespot”*…+; some people were coming 
back with horrible tales, I said “well never mind, I’ll try it.” *Laughs+.’597  Her 
recollections of Mesopotamia were much like those of Eunice Lemere-Goff. She 
volunteered for service in Mesopotamia because she ‘thought it sounded exciting and 
rather interesting’.598 Asked specifically why she had wanted to go to ‘Mespot’, Shortt 
reasserted the fact that she had simply been curious: ‘Just to see what it’s like. 













Thought the desert would be rather good’.599 Her reasons for wanting to serve in 
Mesopotamia were remarkably similar to those given by pre-war travellers to 
Mesopotamia, who had also been fascinated with the prospect of an unmapped land, 
with vast deserts. Like Lemere-Goff, Shortt stressed that she had ‘had a marvellous 
time *…+, thrilled to bits to be seeing something new’.600 Asked what her reaction had 
been to the announcement that the war was over, she told her interviewer that 
though she had been ‘glad the war was over’, she had also regretted the end of an 
exciting episode of her life. Her reaction to the announcement of the armistice was 
‘“Oh dear, it’s a little bit dull”’.601 She saw her time in Mesopotamia as an adventure, 
made firm friends with whom she kept in touch after the war, and was sad to see an 
exciting period of her life come to an end. 
  Although women like Gertrude Bell and Louisa Jebb did travel to 
Mesopotamia in the early twentieth century, such travel was not yet widely available – 
indeed, this was part of the attraction of Mesopotamia. Moreover, few would have 
had the means to finance such trips at this time. For women like Eunice Lemere-Goff or 
Eleanor Shortt, the war was an opportunity for travel and adventure in places they 
might never otherwise have been able to see. Although as nurses they were reminded 
daily of the human cost of the war (Lemere-Goff worked predominantly in surgical 
theatres), it is clear from their enthusiastic and happy recollections of their time in 
Mesopotamia that, for them, it was also an adventure, and the opportunity of a 
lifetime. Despite the fact that she had had to be carried into Basra on a stretcher 
suffering from heat exhaustion, Shortt had no hesitation in affirming that she had 
‘enjoyed every minute of it’ – a response one would be hard-pressed to find from 
many men who served in Mesopotamia, even in the latter half of the campaign.602  
  It must also be acknowledged that the retrospective nature of these 
sources may have coloured the women’s recollections. Mary Ann Brown’s diary, by 
contrast, gives a much less favourable impression of her time in Mesopotamia. Brown 
also served as a nurse in Mesopotamia; she arrived in December 1916, and her diary 
stopped when she became ill in January 1918. In many ways, Brown’s diary indicates 
that she shared the attitudes of her male colleagues in Mesopotamia. In particular, 











unlike Lemere-Goff, she was extremely fearful, and had an intense dislike of the 
‘natives’ or ‘Arabs’ of Mesopotamia. In a continuation of earlier attitudes towards 
Mesopotamia’s peoples, Brown’s diary is littered with references to the 
dangerousness, treachery and thieving of Arabs. Upon her arrival she noted: 
The Persians and Arabs on the opposite side [of the river] are not too friendly: 
the English sentries get shot occasionally. *…+ 
 Our huts are guarded by an armed sentry all night; it makes one feel 
safe when you go to bed knowing there is a man with a fixed bayonet outside 
your door.603   
As is suggested by her conflation of ‘Persians and Arabs’, like many of her male 
colleagues serving in Mesopotamia, Brown knew very little about Mesopotamia or its 
peoples. Like servicemen in the early part of the campaign, Brown noted the Arab 
sniping at British and Indian forces. The fact that a sentry was posted outside her 
lodgings suggests that she and her colleagues were fearful for their safety. Brown was 
grateful for the protection afforded by the sentry, and often noted her fears for her 
personal safety in her diary. In an entry dated 20 January 1917, she recorded a break-
in at the canteen: ‘some Arabs thieving again’.604 This undermined her feeling of 
security inside the camp; ‘strange the sentrys *sic+ didn’t see them,’ She reflected: ‘two 
Indian guards walk about all night and one stands at *the+ officers entrance.’605 Finally, 
Brown concluded:  
I will need to carry around the carving knife with me, I certainly wouldn’t like to 
disturb them at their thieving, it’s a wonder I didn’t, because I passed by the 
canteen four times last night; they must have shaded their light well, if I see 
any suspicious creatures about I will first call the guard and clear out, in case a 
stray shot comes my way.606  
 
She became convinced that the country was populated by dangerous, unscrupulous 
people. No longer sure of the security of the military camp, Brown reflected in her 
diary her uncertainty about how she could ensure her own safety. Arming herself with 
a knife might make her feel safer, but she did not like the idea of using one. In the end, 
she resolved to ‘call the guard and clear out’.  Perhaps because of these early 
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impressions of Mesopotamia, Brown did not note any positive interaction with 
Mesopotamia’s peoples. She cited several examples of what she described as ‘Arab 
treachery’,607 and believed that they were ‘treacherous bruits a brut thug don’t know 
any better’*sic.+.608   
  On a trip to Baghdad in November 1917, Brown described ‘the country 
getting more and more wild’, and remarked that ‘the natives run along the banks in 
their birthday suits, they are quite savage and would murder you for the clothes you 
wear’.609 These sentiments were typical of attitudes towards Mesopotamia’s peoples 
throughout the campaign. Brown’s comments were a mixture of fear that she would 
be harmed and a reflection of her acceptance of the racial stereotypes of this period. 
As a result, she did not see the people running along the river bank without clothes as 
poor, but as ‘quite savage’. It was not only Mesopotamia’s landscape that she was 
describing as ‘more and more wild’, but implicitly, its peoples too.   
  Nevertheless, Mary Ann Brown shared some of the views expressed by 
Shortt and Lemere-Goff. She too found Mesopotamia exciting. Despite complaints 
about the people, flies and weather, she noted that ‘it is all very interesting here, 
always something going on’.610 Later, as some of the men she treated were sent to 
India or back home, she noted: ‘they are so glad to get away from this country and 
cannot understand when I say I don’t want to go back yet’.611 Women volunteered for 
service in Mesopotamia despite its reputation as dangerous and difficult, because it 
afforded them opportunities for travel and experiences, which they might not 
otherwise have had. It is possible that the passage of time helped to fade the 
discomforts, unmentioned in Shortt and Lemere-Goff’s accounts but so prominent in 
Brown’s. That she too should have enjoyed her time in Mesopotamia enough to want 
to stay when others looked forward to their return to Britain suggests that young 
women perceived their time in Mesopotamia very differently from their male 
colleagues. For young women from backgrounds not as privileged, or as encouraging of 
independent travel, as those of Gertrude Bell or Louisa Jebb, the First World War 
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offered not just an opportunity to serve one’s country, but also an unparalleled 
opportunity for independence and travel.   
  Although such sentiments were rarely expressed by men serving in 
Mesopotamia at any stage of the campaign, the ways in which servicemen related 
their experiences of Mesopotamia were reminiscent of pre-war travelogues. The 
slower pace of the campaign during the last two years of the war gave servicemen far 
more free time, and the availability of conveniences made their lives easier and more 
comfortable. This gave their accounts of service in Mesopotamia the characteristics of 
travel narratives. In his letters home, Richard Pope-Hennessy regularly described 
outings that could, were it not for the wartime settings, be mistaken for travellers’ 
tales. He described one reconnaissance mission in May 1917, during which he 
‘explored the wonderful old castle of el Ajik, a Mesopotamian edition of a robber 
baron’s castle on the Rhine; an impressive wreck of great age’.612   
  It was not simply the sightseeing that rendered Pope-Hennessy’s 
descriptions reminiscent of travel narratives, but the way he regularly took 
photographs and collected aide-memoires and souvenirs. On this occasion, he wrote 
to his wife that he had ‘picked up some fragments of pottery for *her+ and took some 
photographs’.613 On several occasions, Pope-Hennessy wrote home that he had ‘picked 
up a few pieces of pottery to remind [him] of one of the most tragic places in this most 
tragic land’,614 or that he had ‘posted *their son+ John a fur cap with a red top such as is 
worn by a Turkish lieutenant-colonel’.615 These comments suggest a touristic 
experience of Mesopotamia, in which one collected souvenirs, took photographs and 
sent home gifts – exactly as one might do on holiday.  
  Other servicemen’s diaries also give the impression that while 
Mesopotamia continued to be a war-zone, those who served there during this period 
related their experiences in such a way as to suggest that they were travellers, not 
servicemen. Upon arrival in Baghdad, Captain Byrom expressed his delight at having 
reached ‘Baghdad, the city of Arabian Nights, and the principal town of Turkey in Asia’, 
and remarked that the following day he ‘sallied forth to see the sights!’.616 In his diary 
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entry for the 12 March 1917, Rev. Bennett wrote home with pride that he could ‘only 
say Baghdad is in our hands’.617 He went on to reflect: ‘whatever there may be in the 
nature of souvenirs [...] I imagine the troops will not be allowed in the city at all until 
everything has been policed and reorganized after the looting by the Turks, Arabs and 
Kurds’.618 In a letter home, Captain Baxter wrote that he hoped that ‘people at home 
are keeping all my letters. They will, I hope form for my souvenirs of the great war 
*sic+’. He went on to add that, unlike other servicemen, he had ‘never troubled to 
collect shrapnel and shell cases etc. they are far too common and photographs are so 
much trouble, besides being strictly forbidden on active service’.619  Baxter’s 
comments indicate that British servicemen and women were marking not only their 
time in Mesopotamia specifically, but their service in ‘the great war’ more generally.  
  Susan Stewart has argued that travel writing, and especially the 
collection of souvenirs, can be seen as inherently nostalgic modes of marking 
experiences. She notes in particular that:  
The exotic souvenir is a sign of survival – not of its own survival, but the survival 
of the possessor outside his or her own context of familiarity. Its otherness 
speaks to the possessor’s capacity for otherness: it is the possessor, not the 
souvenir, which is ultimately the curiosity.620   
Stewart’s analysis of the function of the souvenir seems an apt way to view the 
collection of souvenirs by servicemen and women in Mesopotamia. In a wartime 
setting, her observation that the souvenir marks the collector’s ‘survival’ outside his or 
her normal experience is doubly significant: the souvenirs described above literally 
mark the survival of these men, as well as their ability to survive outside their ‘own 
context of familiarity’ in the sense Stewart describes. Stewart’s acknowledgement of 
the transformative impact of ‘exotic’ or ‘other’ experiences also seems a fitting way to 
view the collection of souvenirs in this context. As discussed, the alterity of 
servicemen’s experiences was a marked reaction to their service in Mesopotamia; 
particularly in the early phases of the war, they felt their experiences to be 
incomprehensible to those outside Mesopotamia.  
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De-mystifying the land of the Arabian Nights 
 
  Even in these later stages, servicemen frequently remarked on their 
alienation from Mesopotamia; they could neither understand nor describe the land 
and its peoples to their loved ones back in Britain. Second Lieutenant Harold Hussey 
remarked on several occasions that Mesopotamia and its peoples were so unfamiliar 
that he lacked the vocabulary to describe them to his family. He wrote home in 
January 1917 that though he knew that his family would have liked to ‘hear something 
of *his+ first impressions,’ they were ‘not easy to convey’.621 He later expounded on the 
difficulty he had in describing, or relating to, Mesopotamia and its peoples: 
This is a very strange country, and difficult to describe, as I have never seen 
anything approaching it before. It seems unreal somehow: as if I shall soon 
wake up and find myself in my ample bed at Sheldon.622  
Comments such as these suggest that Hussey found it difficult to relate to 
Mesopotamia in any way. He described it as a dream-like state, in which he could not 
quite believe his eyes, expecting at any minute to awake and find himself in the 
familiar surroundings of his home in England. Captain Baxter also felt that there was 
something indescribable about the Mesopotamian landscape and climate. He wrote 
home that he found it:  
Absolutely impossible when describing anything, to give you the idea of 
sunshine. [...] When you look at a photograph of anything happening out here, 
you never imagine enough sunshine to go with it. So I want you always to 
imagine a cloudless sky, a windless day and over everything bright glaring 
sunshine and no dull colours.623  
  Like the pre-war travellers, servicemen and women continued to 
associate Mesopotamia with biblical stories and the Arabian Nights; these rendered 
the land, which many perceived as alien or indescribable, familiar. ‘It seems funny at 
first to hear people talking familiarly about these old familiar places’, Captain Baxter 
wrote home to his family.624 ‘Someone giving direction as to the way: “You keep to the 
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left of Gomorrah and go straight on till you come to Lot’s mound.”’625  Although there 
was a dispute amongst those serving in Mesopotamia as to whether Sodom and 
Gomorrah were, in fact, located in Mesopotamia, the re-naming of places in 
Mesopotamia after familiar biblical sites helped British servicemen and women to feel 
more at home there. Like pre-war travellers, those who served in Mesopotamia in the 
latter half of the campaign likened the country and its peoples to pictures from the 
Bible, or figures and scenes from the Arabian Nights stories.   
  Like many of his colleagues who pronounced themselves unable to 
describe or relate to] the country they were serving in, Hussey resorted to these 
familiar stereotypes from his childhood to understand and describe Mesopotamia: 
The houses are all extremely like biblical pictures – as are the Arabs. They are 
dressed awfully like the illustrations in, for instance, the illustrated New 
Testament in my room. I must here state that it is absolutely impossible to 
describe one tenth of the daily scenes here: everything is so unlike anything I 
have ever seen. For instance, apart from the Army and YMCA, I have only seen 
one European, and I am writing about two days after we landed.626  
Although Hussey still found Mesopotamia strange, only ‘one tenth of the daily scenes’ 
remained impossible to convey. Moreover, he had identified what exactly it was that 
he found so alienating about the country: there were very few Europeans. Despite the 
fact that he pronounced Mesopotamia indescribable, he had many familiar cultural 
references to draw upon. For Harold Hussey, and for many others, the alien peoples of 
Mesopotamia were most easily understood if likened to familiar figures from the Bible.  
  Rev. Gordon Bennett also wrote home to his wife in India that the Arabs 
he encountered were ‘dressed like the old pictures of Abraham’ and ‘look all the worst 
you hear of them’.627 Later he noted that ‘the Arabs here or in Basra verify the 
accuracy of the best Bible picture’.628 Here, Bennett was confirming both pre-war 
stereotypes of Arabs as figures from the Old Testament, and wartime stereotypes of 
Arabs as cut-throats and thieves. McKeag’s response to the peoples of Mesopotamia 
also drew on familiar images. He wrote home that the people of Basra were ‘simply an 
un-idealised version of the Arabs of pictures’.629 His description of the Arabs of Basra 
was not dissimilar to that given by Harold Hussey; McKeag too was drawing on familiar 
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imagery to describe an unfamiliar scene. Like pre-war travellers, McKeag saw the 
actual Mesopotamians as a disappointment, because they did not live up to the 
expectations engendered by his preconceptions.   
  This period of the Mesopotamian campaign was one of transition in 
which the old, familiar imagery of oriental or biblical stories sat uncomfortably with 
the changes being wrought by modern warfare. Upon his arrival in Baghdad, Rev. 
Bennett reflected on this uncomfortable mingling of the eastern and the western, or 
modern. He described the house in which he and his colleagues were lodging in the 
following terms: 
Through to its courtyard stand four vast chatties (big enough for concealing 
four at least of Ali Baba’s forty thieves) through which the chlorinated waters of 
the Tigris drip, innocuous, if not entirely crystal clear, into the vessels below. 
This back courtyard opens out upon a wondrous grove where one can wander 
about half a mile amongst rose blossoms and rhododendrons, orange and 
pomegranate, vine and fig trees, with date palms rising gracefully above them 
everywhere. It is a perfect oriental fairyland, but alas there are no fruits to be 
plucked from off them now (perhaps this is the reason why the Arab 
husbandmen have so little objection to our strolling therein) and the nearest 
suggestion to a Ginn arising in trailing wreaths of smoke, is in sober truth the 
work of the useful if hardly ornamental incinerator we have had to install in 
one corner. By the time the second crop of fruit is ripening, I imagine the 
owners will of course receive fair market value. Meanwhile, the latter are 
happy to accept packets of the ubiquitous Woodbine as our offering in return 
for bunches of beautiful roses, and to attend with their delighted children 
(though, being Moslems, of course, not their wives as well) at our evening 
cinema and other entertainments.630  
In this description, the already old-fashioned references to the Arabian Nights sit 
alongside the modern conveniences of the British army. Urns that could have held Ali 
Baba’s thieves now hold the ‘chlorinated waters of the Tigris’, made safe for 
servicemen to drink. Bennett’s ‘perfect Oriental fairyland’ is filled with the plants of 
the East, but not with its spirits. The smoke in the corner, Bennett regretfully informed 
his wife, is not ‘a Ginn arising in trailing wreaths of smoke’, but ‘the useful if hardly 
ornamental incinerator we have had to install in one corner’. Finally, his interaction 
with the Arabs could not be further from a scene from the Arabian Nights. No longer 
characters from biblical stories, these men are compensated for their flowers with 
Woodbines and entertained by the modern cinema.  
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  Photography played an important role in the de-mystification of 
Mesopotamia in the last two years of the war. Though Baxter wrote that the taking of 
photographs on active duty was forbidden, servicemen were otherwise encouraged to 
take photographs of their time in Mesopotamia. These photographs can also be read 
as souvenirs, in Susan Stewart’s terms. Photography supplies were easily obtainable, 
and photographs could either be developed by servicemen and women themselves, 
with the prints shown to the censor for approval, or simply given to the official 
photographer, who would print and censor the photographs. Aerial photography 
transformed the way British commanders conducted the campaign in Mesopotamia. 
Moberly writes that as early as late 1916: 
The British air force was very active *…+ reconnaissance, photography and co-
operation with our artillery were all developed to a high degree of efficiency. 
Reconnaissance and photographic work were specially important, as accurate 
survey maps of the country bordering the Tigris beyond our front did not exist; 
and, to remedy this, large areas were photographed mile by mile and, from 
these photographs, maps were compiled.631   
RFC planes were able to produce accurate images of the Mesopotamian landscape and 
of Ottoman troop movements. These transformed attitudes of commanders towards 
the land: no longer plagued by mirage or the inability to predict Mesopotamia’s 
landscape, they were able to accurately gauge what they were to come up against. In 
much the same way as McKeag was able to rejoice in the quantification of each 
disparate element of Baghdadi life, so the aerial photography of Mesopotamia enabled 
British commanders in the field to eliminate the unknown elements that had drawn 
pre-war travellers such as Gertrude Bell. The desert was no longer an uncharted 
wilderness; Mesopotamia’s ‘Oriental backwardness’ was being modernised and 





  In the second half of the campaign, the simplified, stereotypical 
understanding of race that had characterised British descriptions of Mesopotamians 
and Indians in the first two years of the war was complicated by a number of factors. 
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As troop numbers in Mesopotamia were increased, men from Britain who had never 
served in the Indian Army or lived in India were sent to serve in Mesopotamia. Men 
like Harold Hussey interacted with people from other cultures for the first time during 
their service in Mesopotamia .  Hussey was shocked to find that he was surrounded by 
faces that were not white. He wrote home that there were ‘a lot of Indian troops on 
board, who wear miscellaneous strange and scanty costumes’. His early impressions 
were favourable; he noted that ‘some of the native officers are very fine looking me, 
with profuse rich beards’.632 His naive comments reflect the extent of his ignorance 
regarding the country in which he was being sent to serve. He wrote home with 
surprise that there were Indian troops ‘everywhere’:633 
There are far more Indians than British in this part of the world. Although some 
of them are excellent fighters they are treated very much like children. You 
constantly see a full grown m[a]n – most men wear beards – sobbing like a 
child. And they understand corporal punishment far better than anything else, I 
believe.634  
Hussey saw the Indians under his command as infantile. Although he acknowledged 
that some were effective combatants, even ‘excellent fighters’ were treated ‘like 
children’. His belief that Indian troops responded better to corporal punishment 
reflected his understanding of them as simple and child-like people who, therefore, 
could not be reasoned with.  The vision he presented of the lives of these men is very 
affecting. One wonders what treatment or circumstances had moved so many Indian 
servicemen to tears, such that this was Hussey’s predominant impression of Indian 
troops.  
  Richard Pope-Hennessy’s views on race were an especially complex 
mixture. He espoused particularly strong views on his Indian troops. He believed that 
the Indian soldiers under his command were inferior to his white troops, writing on 
one occasion that ‘the Indian regiments did not do badly that day, far from it, but they 
simply could not have done the anything without the British regiments’.635 He objected 
to press coverage in Britain, which emphasised the important role being played by 
Indian soldiers in Mesopotamia, noting that it was ‘rather sickening to see 
uninstructed opinion in England given to understand that the job was done by 
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natives’.636 However, even before he had arrived in Mesopotamia, Pope-Hennessy 
took time to outline his views on India and all its inhabitants: 
I loathe the Indian as much as the Anglo Indian. I love the African native as 
much as I loathe the native of India; he is at the same time more of a man and 
more of a child – these people are too much slave and too much devil, full of 
old, age-old devilry.637  
In these reflections, his complex and contradictory view of the races he had 
encountered is made clear. He despised India’s inhabitants, often complaining about 
Indian inefficiency and the luxury in which he found wartime British communities in 
India. His comments indicate that he saw African ‘natives’ as simpler: ‘more of child’.  
He respected the fact that these peoples did not try to imitate the ways of white men; 
this is what made them ‘more of a man’, in his eyes – despite his understanding of 
them as primitive.  On the other hand, though they might have been considered more 
‘advanced’, Pope-Hennessy believed the people of India to be duplicitous; they 
behaved like ‘slave*s+’, but were always scheming: full of ‘age-old- devilry’.  Though he 
subverted some of the conclusions drawn from discourses of race in this period, they 
formed the basis of his analysis of, and interaction with, people of other cultures.  
  Captain Baxter expressed similarly multifarious sentiments about the 
Arabs (Mesopotamian and Egyptian) he encountered in Mesopotamia. He wrote home 
that: 
The Arabs here are a vastly superior type to the Egyptian Arabs. I don’t think I 
have even seen such a degraded type of humanity as the lowest classes of the 
Egyptians. They are little better than beasts, if at all. I suppose they have been 
spoilt by civilisation. Anyway the ones here, who have kept their independence, 
are superior in every respect.638  
These comments draw heavily on contemporary theories of race; Baxter saw the 
Egyptians as being in a primitive stage of their evolution – ‘little better than beasts’. 
Baxter disliked the servility of the Egyptians, and although he did not much like the 
Arabs of Mesopotamia, he respected the fact that they had ‘kept their independence’. 
His observation that the Egyptians had been ‘spoilt by civilisation’ is ambiguous. It can 
be read as a comment upon British rule in Egypt, but also as a reference to the ancient 
civilizations of Egypt. The Egyptians he encountered had either been spoilt by having 
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had to accommodate British power, or by their distance from the achievements of 
their forefathers. In either case, the distance between these Egyptians and civilization 
is highlighted in Baxter’s account. 
   It is clear that, like Pope-Hennessy, Baxter did not particularly like his 
Indian colleagues. He described Muslim soldiers at prayer one evening: 
It is rather nice now sitting out. The sun has gone down and it is getting rather 
dark. In the west a long row of camels in single file, are crossing the remains of 
the sunset, looking quite black against the glow. I love the way they sway their 
necks protestingly with every one of their slow unwilling steps. Here and there 
an Indian crouches on the ground and bumps his forehead on the ground, 
facing Mecca in the South West. Or else he stands and chants the monstrous 
verses of the Koran. He keeps it up for about half an hour.639  
The beginning of his description is of an idyllic, and stereotypical, scene from ‘the East’. 
While the image of camels moving across the desert at sunset was described in careful 
detail and filled with affection, his description of the Indian soldiers at prayer is 
comparatively aloof. The camels seem to glide across the image he created, but the 
Indian soldiers ‘bump’ their heads jarringly on the ground and chant ‘the monstrous 
verses of the Koran’.  He showed a relatively detailed understanding of the Muslim 
religion, citing the direction of prayer and the holy book, but the experience was an 
alienating one for him. Though the Muslim prayer was just as much a quintessential 
part of life in Mesopotamia as the camels, the prayer interrupted Baxter’s serenity and 
comfort.  
  As Mary Ann Brown’s diary indicated, many of the stereotypes of Arabs 
as treacherous, dishonourable, lazy people continued to be prevalent during this 
period. The ‘Arabs’ were still seen as a plague upon British and Indian troops, and their 
image as merciless bands preying upon the vulnerable was only enhanced by stories of 
Arab maltreatment of British soldiers after the surrender of the garrison at Kut al-
Amara. Margery Thomas joined the army in 1916 and served as a nurse in 
Mesopotamia. Thomas began her memoir of the time she spent in Mesopotamia by 
reflecting on the suffering of Townshend’s men. She recalled that  ‘although at the end 
of 1917 we did not yet know the story of the march, the 5 ½ month siege of Kut –“the 
most heroic muddle in our history” – was still being talked about’.640 Thomas herself 
nursed some men ‘who had been through that hell’ and were so frail afterwards that 
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they were swapped for Turkish prisoners of war and treated in British hospitals.641  She 
nevertheless reflected that they had been ‘the lucky ones’: 642 
Of the 13,000-odd made to walk into captivity, some 70 per cent had died or 
were to do so. With hardly any food and water and no medical attention, they 
had to struggle through burning hot deserts, terrible much when it rained, 
sand, flies, mosquitoes, and were afflicted by dysentery, malaria and 
heatstroke. But what they feared most was the hatred of the marauding Arabs 
who saw it as their Muslim duty to kill ‘infidels’. So any poor, sick soldier who 
fell away from the main body of captives would be tortured, killed and 
sometime mutilated. The Arabs even crept into the camps and stole the boots 
off the exhausted men, and any other kit they could find. 643 
Thomas’s discussion of the siege is a testimony to the siege’s importance to her 
encounter with Mesopotamia in 1917, and to its lasting importance to her 
understanding of the campaign. Looking back in a post-war memoir, she felt that the 
siege of Kut held far more significance than she had credited with at the time. The 
Arabs in Thomas’s account are brutal vultures who preyed on the weak –  the standard 
story of the suffering of British prisoners after the war. As discussed in Chapter Two, it 
was this image of Mesopotamia’s inhabitants that came to dominate British 
perceptions of Mesopotamia’s Arabs. Though Thomas noted ‘the apathy and 
indifference of the Turks’, which she believed had allowed the Arabs to abuse the 
British prisoners in their care, she did not blame the Turks themselves for any 
maltreatment of British troops.  
  The Turks retained their reputation for honourable and gentlemanly 
behaviour, which had characterized descriptions of Ottoman troops in the first two 
years of the war despite reports of the maltreatment of British and Indian prisoners of 
war.  An article in The Times titled ‘The Clean Fighting Turk’ called for an end to English 
sympathies with  the Turks, calling attention to their treatment of the British soldiers 
who had surrendered at Kut, their massacre of the Armenians, and maltreatment of 
peoples under their control throughout the Middle East: 
He [the Turk] has massacred, pillaged, outraged; for two years and a half he has 
broken every convention, maltreated our prisoners, killed our wounded, held 
our women hostages, but he remains the ‘clean fighting Turk’.644 
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But the article was met with hostility. In a response, an anonymous letter to The Times 
reminded the author of the article of how honourable an enemy the Turks had been: 
When it comes to a question of honest fighting there are not, I think, low 
opinions about the Turk. The men in the first landing on the Peninsula, north or 
south, the soldiers of Sulva, the heroic forces that attempted to relieve Kut as 
well as those men who held it, the men who fought against overwhelming odds 
at Katia, whose experience entitles them to speak, do not share your 
correspondent’s opinion. They know that, on the whole, the Turk has fought 
like a white man. He has never used poisoned gas or liquid fire, and he has 
invariably respected the white flag. He has not fired upon hospitals, and he has 
generally done the best that he could for our prisoners and wounded, 
sometimes at great personal risk.645  
 
In another reminder of how the Mesopotamian campaign remained a step behind the 
modern warfare of the Western Front, the author of the letter praised the fact that the 
Turks ‘had never used poisoned gas or liquid fire’.  The letter continued a long tradition 
of defending ‘the Turk’ in Britain, which persisted throughout the early stages of the 
campaign and, as the letter illustrates, was difficult to undermine even after reports 
began emerging of Turkish maltreatment of British prisoners of war. The British affinity 
and respect for the Turk is here particularly highlighted in the compliment that the 
Turks had fought like white men, here synonymous with civilization and honour.  
  Stories of Arab thieving and treachery, however, continued to be 
prevalent for the remainder of the Mesopotamian campaign. Rev. Bennett wondered if 
he was safe being transported by boat alone with an Arab, and recounted a story he 
had heard of ‘Arabs stealing a tent, with poles and ropes complete from over the 
sleeping forms of its occupants and the first thing the latter knew of it was when they 
woke up a little extra cold in the morning!’646 According to another story, they ‘actually 
announced their intention of stealing the Colonel’s and the Adjunct’s horses from a 
certain camp – and did so too!’647  Regardless of the veracity of tales such as these, it is 
clear that the Arabs continued to be perceived as brazen thieves.  
  Captain Baxter wrote home to reassure his family that ‘the Arabs here 
are not openly hostile, as you might expect’.648 His comments reflect the extent to 
which the image of Arabs as brutal men who preyed on British troops had reached 
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Britain. The image of the Arabs as a small but constant threat to British personnel was, 
by this time, firmly entrenched. Baxter was not telling his family anything that was not 
common knowledge. ‘Of Course’, he wrote, the Arabs ‘are never averse to getting 
money, and are quite unscrupulous how they do it’.649 But Baxter’s descriptions of 
Arab behaviour lack the bitter hatred of the Arabs that had characterised the accounts 
of those who served in the first two years of the campaign.  Baxter conceded that the 
Arabs were unscrupulous, and that they attacked weak or vulnerable targets under 
cover of darkness: 
All Arabs are the same. So one is never quite free from pin-prick attacks. Small 
parties after dark are none too safe. Sentries have to keep their eyes and ears 
open. And in the darkness just before moonrise there is quite a possibility of a 
sudden raid, a little quick loot and murder, and a quick escape by the light of 
the newly risen moon.650 
 
‘But’, he concluded, ‘after all, that is what we are here for, and if we can’t hold our 
own in that sort of a scrap, we might as well go home and guard railway bridges!’651 
Arab raids were a nuisance, but such ‘scraps’ with insignificant enemies were mere 
‘pin-pricks’ – more annoying than dangerous. They did not frighten Baxter in the way 
they had frightened his colleagues in the early phases of the campaign.  
  Richard Pope-Hennessy wrote regularly of the trouble caused by the 
Arabs around the camp. His reaction upon seeing ‘some Arabs in the distance’ was to 
telephone for ‘to Terry at Dujailah to fire a few rounds of shrapnel at them while Tim  
turned on his machine guns at a range of 1700 yards and scared them’.652 The Arabs 
were regarded as a threat wherever they were seen, and were treated as any other 
enemy would have been. Captain Harold Dickson, by this time serving as a political 
officer in the Arab town of Suk al-Sheyukk, continued to complain about the behaviour 
of the Arabs in his district. In September 1916, Dickson noted: the Arabs ‘had been 
firing on our patrols. We killed about 100 for certain and wounded a great many 
more’.653 He concluded that ‘*it+ will do a lot of good, as the Arab understands nothing 
as much a hammering’.654 Dickson’s conclusion that the Arabs could only understand 
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force seems to have been reached by many of those serving in Mesopotamia at this 
time. His belief that he could make sweeping statements about what ‘the Arab’ could, 
or could not, understand reflects his continued belief that he understood ‘the Arab 
mind’. Like Harold Hussey’s belief that corporal punishment was the best method of 
communication, such statements as Dickson’s suggest that Arabs were perceived only 
to respond to force. This echoed the assumptions made about the Arab or Oriental 
mind in the months before 6th Division’s advance in 1915.  
  Alongside her description of what she saw as Arab treachery, Brown left 
a record of the heavy-handed response of British and Indian forces to these attacks. In 
one instance, ‘over twenty’ people believed to have been spies were ‘caught and shot 
the other day’.655 More shockingly, in February 1917 she noted ‘1200 of the Somersets 
have gone across to shoot the Arabs and burn the villages. I passed some of the 
villages on Saturday, they are shut in by very high mud walls very well protected’.656 
The only references to Mesopotamia’s peoples in Mary Ann Brown’s diary were of 
alleged violent crimes committed or of negative summations of Arab character.  
Moreover, she saw Mesopotamia’s inhabitants as primitive and simple. It is perhaps 
unsurprising, therefore, that she should accept such collective punishment as a 
reasonable response to the violence she associated with the local population.  
  Negative stereotypes of Indian troops as lazy or unwilling to fight in 
Mesopotamia continued to circulate during this period. Rev. Bennett recalled a story 
told to him by a Medical Officer: 
An Indian military hero, with a wound, probably self-inflicted, in his trigger 
finger, who began by making him, so far all unsuspecting, a present of a ring 
looted from a dead German, and a few days later, when most cast down at the 
information that the finger would not need to be amputated immediately 
whipped out of his pocket a beautiful gold watch and chain and implored the 
doctor to accepts it, if only that trigger finger could be irrecoverably cut away. 
The result was that he was kicked back to the front on the spot (‘Pity I didn’t 
get hold of the watch and chain first’ added the MO) but we’ll hope such cases 
are the very rare exception.657  
Bennett’s ironic reference to the Indian soldier as an ‘Indian military hero’ is suggestive 
of his general attitude towards Indian soldiers. Both he and the Medical Officer 
assumed that the original wound was self-inflicted and that the soldier had looted the 
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dead bodies of German soldiers. Though the medical officer accused the man of trying 
to bribe him to remove his trigger finger, the man was not court-martialled. Instead, 
the officer simply sent him back to work.  Bennett hoped, rather than believed, this to 
be ‘a rare exception’.  
  Even in stories where he praised the fighting of Indian troops, Bennett’s 
prejudices rendered his descriptions problematic. He wrote at length of ‘One story of 
bloody war heard almost first hand *...+ too good not to be recorded’. In early March 
1917, as British troops fought a series of difficult offensives culminating in the capture 
of Baghdad on 11 March, Bennett was told the following story: 
During the hard fighting in which the Devons drove the Turks out of three lines 
of trenches last Saturday morning one of our men fell, rather than jumped, 
down into the trench and next moment was rolling on the ground together 
with a Turk. Wrenching his arm and rifle free he was just managing to bayonet 
him, when one of the 1/8th Ghurkas together with whom the Devons had 
‘hopped the twig’ rushing up, clean severed the Turk’s head from his body with 
one blow of the famous kukri. A second Turk attacking them at the same 
moment, with the return swing loses his also.  Upon which, what does Johnnie 
Gurka do, in a moment’s respite, but pick up first one fallen head for inspection 
and then the other, saying, as one who invites well-earned  approbation “Teek, 
Sahib? Teek?”’658  
The editor of Bennett’s diaries and letters informs the reader that ‘Teek?’ meant ‘All 
correct?’; seeking praise for his actions, the Indian soldier was asking if he had done 
the correct thing in killing the two Turkish soldiers. While the British and Turkish 
soldiers were both depicted as equals on the battlefield, the Ghurkha is a caricature of 
an Indian soldier. He decapitated the Turkish soldier with a uniquely Indian weapon, 
his ‘famous kukri’. Having beheaded two men, he turned to the British soldier, and in 
his own language, not in English, enquired as to whether he had done the right thing. 
This renders the Indian soldier child-like in his simplicity. His bravery is depicted as 
simple learned behaviour. The manner in which he killed the two men, beheading 
rather than stabbing them, and using a ‘native’ weapon rather than an ordinary 
bayonet or a gun, is evocative of ‘primitive’ or ‘tribal’ warfare. The white soldier, who 
unlike the Ghurkha had fallen, rather than jumped, into the trench, is depicted as 
implicitly superior to the Indian soldier. Though it is unclear whether he actually 
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outranked him, the British soldier’s superiority was implied by the fact that the 
Ghurkha required his confirmation and in the Indian soldier’s use of the word ‘Sahib’.  
  Bennett ended his anecdote by remarking that it was no ‘wonder we 
hear that Tommy and Johnnie are the best of friends, evidencing the same by losing 
‘chips’ to each other at cards, and learning (save the mark) each other’s language’.659 
These comments are borne out in other stories of Indian bravery in the field of battle, 
but not in the tale he himself recorded. Captain Allan Byrom recalled one Ghurkha 
under his command in Northern Mesopotamia who had risked his life to replenish 
water supplies. Byrom remembered that the ‘little Ghurka’ *sic+ had ‘volunteered to be 
water drawer and carrier and begged me to let him go’: 
Reluctantly I consented to do so, at the same time informing him that he took 
his life in his own hands *…+. Several times, to the amazement and wonderment 
of all, he repeated his trips successfully and did not stop until all requirements 
were supplied. [...] I shall never quite understand how he escaped, unless it was 
owing to his dusky skin and undoubted skill in scout craft. [...] At the first 
opportunity I commended him for distinction.660  
Byrom’s tale of Indian bravery is very different from the one recounted by Reverend 
Bennett to his wife. Byrom stressed the bravery of the soldier under his command, 
reminding the reader that he had volunteered despite Byrom’s warning about the 
danger in which he would be placing himself. Moreover, Byrom stressed his own 
amazement that the soldier had been successful in his task, and emphasised the 
soldier’s skill as well as his skin colour. The anonymous soldier is defined by his race, 
his skin colour and his skill, suggesting a relationship between these attributes in 
Byrom’s memory of the man. Given this, Byrom’s suggestion that the Ghurkha’s ‘dusky 
skin’ contributed to his survival can be read as an acknowledgement of the skill he 
associated with Ghurkha troops, rather than as a suggestion that his darker 
complexion made him less conspicuous to enemy fire.   
  The local population continued to be seen as simple or backward; their 
primitivism seemed to stand in stark relief to the modernity that resulted from 
continued British control in Mesopotamia. Reginald Campbell Thompson, then serving 
as a political officer at their newly installed headquarters in Baghdad, recalled the 
reaction of local Arabs to the Turkish and British planes overhead. He noted that ‘the 
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Arabs paid no attention to these wonders, for Scheherazade’s stories are full of flying 
carpets, so why regard them as marvels?’661  His statement reflected the continuing 
association between the Arabian Nights stories and how British servicemen perceived 
Mesopotamia. Thompson’s comment suggested that, having no real understanding of 
the modern technology that would enable an aircraft to exist, the Arabs could only 
understand them as fantastical creations, like the flying carpets of the Arabian Nights 
stories.  
  Thompson also suggested that Indians serving under British command 
had little understanding of modern technology. He recounted one story of ‘the Indian 
bearer of my friend Blakes’ who ‘surpassed all efforts’ by sleeping on three unexploded 
bombs ‘until told what they were’.662 Once again, the modern warfare of the First 
World War is contrasted in Thompson’s account with the ‘simplicity’ of the Indian 
bearer, who despite living in a battlefield did not recognise the trappings of modern 
warfare as dangerous.  
  As British control became more widespread and took on a more 
permanent nature, Anglo-Mesopotamian relations became more regular and more 
complex. Greater opportunities for interaction between individuals allowed British 
servicemen and women to gain a greater understanding of the different races living in 
Mesopotamia, and a conception of Mesopotamians as individuals rather than 
members of a race whose characteristics they believe they understood and disliked. 
Reference has already been made to shops and restaurants that began to spring up to 
cater for British servicemen and women during this period of the war. In addition, men 
like Byrom took on jobs that forced them into far closer contact with individual Arabs.  
  In the last two years of the war, Allan Byrom became a political officer, 
and later took on a job in the department of local resources in Basra. In these roles, he 
came into close contact with both communities of Mesopotamian peoples and 
individuals – usually men. Although his descriptions of Mesopotamians continued to 
include broad generalisations and tales of Arab treachery, even these tales were more 
nuanced. He described an ‘Arab raid’: 
These men had attacked us for two reasons. Firstly because they had been paid 
by the Turks to do so, and secondly they thought that as there was only a small 
force on that side they stood a good chance in a surprise attack, with the 
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prospect of good haul of loot. That is always an attraction the Arab, and he will 
risk a lot to get it *…+. *The+ only result obtained was that our usual routine was 
disturbed, and for several days extra precautions had to be taken to prevent 
any more surprise attacks from mercenary Arab tribes.663  
This description has many of the traits of earlier descriptions of Arab behaviour. Byrom 
referred to ‘the Arab’ and described the behaviour of the attacking party in terms of 
racial characteristics, suggesting that ‘the Arab’ could not help but attack, because that 
was his nature. However, Byrom’s representation of the raid lacked the anger that had 
characterised earlier accounts of Arab behaviour. Moreover, in addition to broad 
generalisations, Byrom drew attention to the influence of Turkish powers, and made 
light of the impact of the raid on British servicemen.  
  Many of Byrom’s other descriptions of Mesopotamian peoples were far 
more detailed than any seen in the early part of the campaign. Like many of his 
colleagues, he noted the large Jewish population of Baghdad, even describing their 
European dress and the languages spoken in the Jewish community.664 He described 
how being the only British officer in charge of a small region of Mesopotamia gave him 
the opportunity to gain ‘an insight of the character, doings, and language of the Arabs 
that I could not otherwise have obtained’.665 He recalled that the ‘natives came to 
[him] for advice and assistance when in difficulty regarding their private affairs. [He] 
also became the local medical practitioner, and occasionally found quite a little queue 
waiting outside *his+ house in the evening’.666  Although he overestimated his grasp on 
the Arabic language – triumphantly mistranslating the common Arabic name Abdullah 
– Byrom’s wish to learn enough of the local language to communicate with people 
suggests a willingness on his part to interact with locals. 667 
   In his later appointment at the department of local resources in Basra, 
Byrom had occasion to describe different roles in Mesopotamian society: ‘A mudir *...+ 
is better class and fairly educated native, who is in Government pay and acts as a sort 
of district supervisor. He is responsible for the collection of all taxes from the natives in 
his area.’668 Byrom was even able to name individuals and to distinguishing between 
the different races of Mesopotamia:  ‘Abdulla beg, the mudir of Hartha, was a well-
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built, extremely pleasant and good-looking Armenian, who before the war could not 
speak a word of English, and now speaks it fluently’.669  Byrom’s description is notable 
because it departed from so many of the characteristics of early-war descriptions of 
Mesopotamia’s peoples. Not only did he describe specific, rather than general aspects 
of Mesopotamian life, but he did so about an individual whom he was able not only to 
name, but to speak of favourably. This would have been unheard of in the early phases 
of the war.  
  The accounts of other officers, such as Captain McKeag, also contained 
a mixture of racial generalisations or stereotypes and more detailed accounts of 
interaction with individuals in Mesopotamia. McKeag wrote, for instance, that:  
Physically the Arabs are splendid. They’re not very big-muscled, but lithe, and 
extraordinarily tough. They can walk all day, even in the hot weather, and live 
on almost nothing, with little or no protection from cold or heat. Also they 
stand sanitary conditions that would kill a white man in a week, for their 
villages are appalling.670  
McKeag generalised about the ‘racial’ capabilities of Arabs and white men without 
hesitation. His comments are noteworthy, however, because they were positive, in 
contrast to pre- and early-war representations of Mesopotamia’s peoples, which were 
predominantly negative. Captain McKeag also had the opportunity to engage with 
individuals in Mesopotamia. He noted one Armenian: ‘Daniel Effendi by name, who 
owns a great deal of land both here and elsewhere and has both the capital and the 
brains to develop it under the wing of Pax Brittanica’.671 Despite generalisations about 
race, McKeag was able to distinguish between individuals of different ethnic origins in 
Mesopotamia, and even to relate the story of how Daniel Effendi met and married his 
wife. 
  One of the consequences of the decision to create an infrastructure that 
would help the British war effort in Mesopotamia was that labour had to be imported 
to build roads and railways. As a result, the number of races serving under British 
command in Mesopotamia multiplied. In addition to coming into contact with 
Mesopotamian peoples of different ethnic origins, British service personnel also came 
into contact with an increasing number of peoples from across the world serving in the 
British labour corps.  
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  As Reverend Bennett travelled north with British troops, he was 
accompanied by ‘a couple of hundred men of a Chinese Labour Corps (probably 
carpenters) and *...+ as many Egyptians’.672 He described the Chinese and Egyptian 
labourers to his wife:  
They are packed in as tight as herrings, but they do not seem to mind, and I 
think they seem to find nearly as much interest in watching us, as we do in 
studying them. There are some interesting characteristic differences, apart 
from the obvious differences of physical features. I have seen chopsticks used 
for the first time [...]. [Each] man has his little china blue basin, for his tea or his 
rice – the Egyptian seems to rely more on his fingers – (for ‘bully and biscuit’ at 
any rate) –  and his metal water bottle.  
Among about half dozen of the Chinese there is a thick bamboo opium pipe, 
with a little sticking up tube in the middle, which looks like a trombone mouth 
piece but is really for the lighted opium. They take solemn sucks at the wide 
end of the bamboo in turns, and hand it on to the next one, dreaming I know 
not what of home and dragons and ancestors. 
The Egyptians on the other hand smoke endless cigarettes; they seem to sing 
more than do the Chinese. All are provided with a kind of uniform and thick 
underclothes, but where the Egyptians have bundles, and heavy ammunition 
boots, the Chinese have strongly corded boxes, and light shoes, of which they 
without exception, tread down the sides at the heel, to use them as ‘slippers’ in 
the proper Oriental way. The Egyptians’ perpetual pastime is searching the 
seams of their undergarments – it is rather, indeed, a primitive instinct than a 
mere pastime; the Chinese I have hardly seen doing that at all, though whether 
because there is less need for it or because they themselves are more 
indifferent to the ‘minor horrors’ I could not say. And my scientific and 
ethnological instincts are not keen enough to prompt me to investigate further. 
I have seen the Chinese playing dominoes, and the Egyptians, I think, playing 
cards, and there seems to be very little sign of quarrelling even where there is 
little else to do. What are we carrying these sons of older civilizations along to, 
either ultimately, or even in this immediate campaign?673  
Though Mesopotamia can be described as a ‘contact zone’ (to use Mary Louise Pratt’s 
term) in the period before the Mesopotamian campaign and at each of its stages, it is 
in this last phase of the campaign that Pratt’s definition of a contact zone seems 
particularly apt.674 What Bennett was describing in this episode, reproduced here at 
length to demonstrate how this interaction with peoples of ‘older civilizations’ had 
engrossed him, is exactly what Pratt describes: men from disparate parts of the world 
brought into contact by factors outside their control. It was exactly the prospect, 
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outlined by Pratt, of ongoing relations being formed that fascinated Bennett – though 
he would not have recognised them as ‘involving conditions of coercion, radical 
inequality, and intractable conflict’.675   
  Bennett celebrated the fact that these men had been brought to work 
under the auspices of the British war effort as proof of ‘our British Empire’s way with 
older civilizations’.676 In fact, he saw the interaction between British and other races as 
reciprocal: ‘they seem to find nearly as much interest in watching us, as we do in 
studying them.’ Nevertheless, Bennett saw himself as assessing, however 
inadequately, the behaviour of the Egyptian and the Chinese men ‘scientifically’ or 
ethnologically. His gaze, as Pratt’s description suggests, is not equal to that of the men 
he described, but superior, located within a European, scientific tradition. He assessed 
the men’s ‘physical features’ and noted their habits and behaviour, as an 
anthropologist might have done. He commented on the different ways in which they 
ate, what drugs appealed to them, even how much they sang and what games they 
played. He was particularly fascinated by the ways in which the men dealt with the 
western clothes and organisational structures in which they now found themselves. He 
was, therefore, intrigued by the way the men altered the clothes they had been given: 
the Chinese men’s ‘light shoes’ transformed into slippers ‘in the proper Oriental way’; 
the Egyptians’ ‘primitive instinct’ to search the seams of his clothing, and the way 
Egyptian soldiers ate familiar ‘bully beef’ in their own, unfamiliar, way.  
  The pressurized nature of wartime conditions and the number of 
different peoples forcibly brought into contact as a result of the decisions of remote 
powers rendered Mesopotamia all the more complex. It can therefore be better 
understood as a series of contact zones interacting simultaneously, each with its own 
power structures and hierarchies. Particularly in the second half of the war, 
Mesopotamia was a contact zone between a dominant white, British or western gaze 
and its others, but also a zone for the formation of hierarchies between other peoples 
brought into contact by the war under British command.   
  Although Bennett remarked that the Chinese and Egyptian labourers 
got on very well, the cohabitation of men of different races and religions caused 
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problems. Margery Thomas recalled that the introduction of black soldiers from the 
Caribbean and Africa had presented difficulties: 
The British tommies did not want to sit with the ‘blacks’ and the ‘blacks’ did not 
want to sit with each other. The ‘blacks’ were not Indians – we never saw them. 
These were negroes. Some, from the West Indies, were cultured, educated 
men, more fastidious than many a British soldier [...] but others, from the Gold 
Coast or Nigeria, were much less sophisticated. They had been brought in to 
work on the Inland Waterways, and had never seen things like cups, saucers 
and cutlery before, and their table manners were non-existent. So the two lots 
of ‘blacks’, who looked exactly alike, had to be found separate tables. 677 
Thomas’s recollections illustrate the different discourses of race at play in 
Mesopotamia during this period. Alongside these more predictable prejudices she 
described ran a series of other racial hierarchies; soldiers from the Caribbean did not 
wish to associate with men from Africa. Thomas herself preferred the West Indian 
men, whom she believed to be more ‘sophisticated’ because they were familiar with 
cutlery and had other traits such as culture, education and cleanliness, which marked 
them out as more ‘civilized’ and therefore more likeable in her account. She found the 
men from the West coast of Africa ‘much less sophisticated’, because they were 
unfamiliar with western basics such as cutlery, cups and saucers. Thomas interpreted 





  For many servicemen, like Byrom and Pope-Hennessy, the modern was 
synonymous with the west. As Mesopotamia’s landscape was transformed by railways, 
telegraph lines and concrete roads, it became more western and therefore, less alien. 
Those aspects of Mesopotamia that could not be made familiar with the addition of 
the trappings of modernity were brought under British control though the use of 
modern technology: most notably through the use of aerial mapping and surveillance.  
British servicemen felt this technology to be so alien to the east that Mesopotamia’s 
peoples had no way of understanding it, let alone of engaging with it independently of  
British or western intervention. The telegraph lines that had struck Harold Hussey as 
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the only noteworthy feature in the Mesopotamian landscape and the planes that 
replaced flying carpets in Thompson’s memories of the city of the Arabian Nights made 
Mesopotamia a less opaque and less disconcerting place for British servicemen and 
women. More comfortable, and with a greater freedom to travel, they looked to 
familiar discourses of travel and modernity to familiarise the alien in Mesopotamia’s 
landscape. Although greater contact with individuals allowed some British men and 
women to see beyond the ‘marauding hordes’ that had dominated representations of 
Mesopotamia’s inhabitants in the early parts of the campaign, violence continued to 























From Armistice to Coronation: 1918-1921 
 
 
The First World War transformed British perceptions of Mesopotamia. By the end of 
the war, Mesopotamia was no longer simply the site of the untimely death of Julian 
the Apostate, but that of General Sir Stanley Maude, ‘hero of Baghdad’.678 It was not 
only remembered as the scene of the ancient battles of Alexander the Great, but as 
the place where Charles Townshend’s brave men had held Kut-al-Amara against all 
odds. The Mesopotamia of 1918 had not ceased, for Britons, to be the land of the 
Arabian Nights, of Abraham, Jonah and Daniel, Sennacherib and Nebuchadnezzar; 
these pre-war perceptions of Mesopotamia were so well entrenched that they became 
a prism through which British travellers, journalists, diplomats, soldiers, sailors, airmen 
and nurses saw and interpreted Mesopotamia throughout the First World War. In the 
post-war period, these earlier perceptions of the region became fused with a new, 
wartime, vision of ‘the land between the rivers’ to create a modern idea of 
Mesopotamia in Britain. The history of the debates between, and decisions made by, 
those in London, Delhi and Baghdad in these years is complex, and has already been 
exhaustively outlined by historians of the Middle East.679 In this concluding chapter, I 
will not attempt to add to this already rich historiography, but will explore how pre-
war and wartime perceptions of Mesopotamia combined in these crucial years. 
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  In the days after the armistice with Turkey on 30 October 1918, British 
troops under the Command of General Sir William Marshall occupied the city of Mosul. 
There had been little movement on the Mesopotamian front since the occupation of 
the northern city of Tikrit, in November 1917. Although troops from the 
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force had been sent into Persia, 1918 had seen only one 
major battle in Mesopotamia before British troops moved to occupy Mosul on 3 
November. The fact that the city was occupied after the Armistice of Mudros meant 
that Mosul was not officially declared part of the soon-to-be-created Kingdom of Iraq 
until 1926. This was one of many uncertainties that plagued those who set about 
creating the new state. As Gertrude Bell lamented during the war, London’s inability, 
or unwillingness, to lay claim to Mesopotamia hindered nascent attempts at forming 
an effective administration.680 This is a point that had been made by others throughout 
the campaign. In response to the criticism of the Mesopotamia Commission, for 
instance, Sir Beauchamp Duff argued that he could not possibly have provided 
adequate equipment for a campaign whose aims and objectives had never been clearly 
defined by the government in London, and were consequently changing on an almost 
weekly basis.681 In a letter dated 15 July 1916 – eight months before Maude’s troops 
had even occupied Baghdad – Bell reflected on the difficulties of establishing an 
administration in a country ‘which is all beginnings’.682  She insisted that the ‘real 
difficulty under which we labour here is that we don't know, and I suppose can't know 
till the end of the war, exactly what we intend to do in this country’.683 However, the 
uncertainty of which Gertrude Bell despaired continued to characterise Mesopotamia 
in the years immediately following the war.  
  As Britain embarked upon the task of creating a state out of three 
provinces with ‘no historical, religious or ethnic homogeneity’, it was daily reminded of 
the difficulties – and cost – of empire-building by circumstances elsewhere in its 
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empire.684 By mid 1918, all 26 southern counties of Ireland were Sinn Fein strongholds, 
practically under martial law.685 The Easter Rising of 1916 had created martyrs and 
mythology for the Republican movement that would act as a catalyst for the creation 
of the Irish Free State in 1921. In India – still the most prized of Britain’s imperial 
possessions and central to British policy in Mesopotamia throughout the war – a 
growingly united and vocal nationalist movement was succeeding in gaining 
concessions towards greater autonomy from Britain. The Lucknow Pact of 1916 united 
the Congress Party and the Muslim League, and frightened Britain into Montagu’s 1917 
declaration and later the introduction of Indian officers into the Indian Army. These 
concessions were followed in 1919 by limited constitutional reforms.686 Britain 
approached the tricky business of ‘nation-building’ in the Mesopotamian vilayets a less 
confident imperial nation than it had been in 1914. As Lord Islington (Liberal), former 
under-secretary of state for India and head of the National Savings Agency, told the 
House of Lords in a debate on Mesopotamia:  
A time has come when we have to make up our minds as a country that we can 
no longer undertake to be either the rulers or the protectors of the whole of 
the world, and if we try [...] ineffectively [to] undertake this protection, to my 
mind it is the most sure means of damaging our prestige in these countries. It 
would be much better for us to have no garrison there at all.687  
 
This speech, which prefigured Bonar Law’s famous declaration only two years later 
that Britain could no longer ‘act as the policeman for the world’, makes explicit what 
was implicit in the debates on prestige during the war: Britain was a less confident 
imperial nation than it had been, and men like Lord Islington wanted Britain’s 
commitments circumscribed to protect what was left of British ‘prestige in these 
countries’. There was, however, no consensus in London or in India as to what should 
be done with Mesopotamia.  
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The Mandate for Mesopotamia 
 
  The award of the Mandate for Mesopotamia to Britain at the San Remo 
conference of April 1920 was met with much criticism in Britain. Many, including 
former prime minister Herbert Asquith, argued that accepting a Mandate for a 
territory that included all three of the former Ottoman provinces was too great a 
burden on the post-war British state. If the benefit of a continued British presence in 
Mesopotamia was to gain access to oil reserves and maintain a route to India, then 
these aims, Asquith and others argued, could be achieved far more easily, and far less 
expensively, by retaining only the former Ottoman vilayets of Basra and/or Baghdad. 
This, they believed, would allow Britain all the benefits of the Mesopotamian mandate 
at a fraction of the cost. The Times ran several long leaders arguing that it would be 
madness to accept responsibility for all three provinces at a time when the British 
taxpayer was being asked to pay more and more.688 Although the paper also 
questioned whether accepting the Mandate was contrary to the terms of the Armistice 
of Mudros, or whether it undermined the rights of Mesopotamia’s peoples to 
autonomous government as envisioned by the League of Nations, the question at the 
heart of its critique of the government’s policy was always: ‘how much will 
Mesopotamia cost the British taxpayer?’689 The paper’s criticism of the government 
was relentless. In addition to its own coverage, The Times published letters arguing 
that the government should not accept the terms of the Mandate as they stood. In one 
such letter, Lord Islington asked whether Britain could ‘afford to continue this lavish 
expenditure, drawn from the British taxpayer’s pocket, on countries like Mesopotamia 
and Palestine’.690 ‘An Observer’ who described him/herself as ‘an imperialist of long 
standing’ worried in a letter to The Times in June 1920 that ‘the cause of Empire may 
be ruined and the back of the nation broken by our undertaking the weight of 
indefinite responsibilities *in Mesopotamia+’.691  
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  On the other side of the debate, less frequently reproduced on The 
Times’ pages, others argued that it was vital to Britain’s interests to keep 
Mesopotamia. Many continued to see the region as an important pathway to India, 
and a necessary factor in the protection of Britain’s Indian Empire. Others argued that 
it would be wrong to give up territory that had been gained by the bloodshed of British 
soldiers. Many more still asserted that Mesopotamia was a region that, with only a 
little investment, would yield great rewards for Britain in terms of oil revenue, but also 
in terms of agricultural production. As one correspondent concluded in a letter to The 
Times, ‘cutting our losses in this case is not good business’.692 In a speech to the House 
of Lords in June 1920, Viscount Goschen, British ambassador to Berlin at the outbreak 
of the First World War, summarised the debate on Mesopotamia accurately and 
succinctly: ‘In this country there have been two schools of thought with regard to 
Mesopotamia — the optimists who thought it was a Garden of Eden where everything 
could be grown, and the pessimists, who regarded it as a bare desert’.693  
  As Goschen’s reference to the ‘Garden of Eden’ suggests, those who 
believed that Mesopotamia could flourish under British tutelage often framed their 
argument not in terms of creating a new prosperous state, but in terms of restoring 
the ‘Garden of Eden’ to its former fertility. In the same debate, for instance, Lord 
Sydenham argued that, contrary to the assertions of those who argued that Britain 
simply could not extend its commitments to an empire in the Middle East, Britons 
remained ‘more fitted than any other people to undertake the work of bringing back 
peace and prosperity to a country which has been ruined by centuries of Turkish 
misrule’.694 Britain’s role in Mesopotamia was, for him, not to create peace and 
prosperity, but to ‘bring *them+ back’.  Sydenham went on to argue that ‘to restore the 
lost riches of Mesopotamia is merely a question of capital and of labour, gradually and 
intelligently brought to bear’.695  
  Arguments such as Sydenham’s drew on visions of the region as the 
Garden of Eden or at its zenith under Abbasid, Assyrian or Babylonian dynasties. 
Where such imagery, familiar from before the war, was employed in these post-war 
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years, it was most often used to argue that this was Britain’s chance to reap the 
rewards of overseeing the ‘restoration of the Garden of Eden’, as Willcocks had termed 
his irrigation project of 1910-11.  
  Whilst pre-war and wartime representations of Mesopotamia were 
central to the rhetoric of those who wished to encourage British involvement in 
Mesopotamia, those who argued that Mesopotamia could not repay British 
investment often framed their arguments around more recent, wartime images of the 
region and its inhabitants. Writing in 1920, Sir George Buchanan, the engineer sent to 
Mesopotamia during the war to design and establish a railway system, argued in The 
Times’ pages that the Arabs of Mesopotamia were simply not ready to ‘be civilized in a 
hurry’.696 Echoing sentiments expressed by Sir Mark Sykes in 1907, Buchanan drew on 
a pre-war image of the Arab as a lazy, ineffectual worker, paralysed by oriental 
fatalism. More powerfully, perhaps, in the same year as Charles Townshend’s memoir 
of the war, My Campaign in Mesopotamia,697 and the second edition of Major Edward 
Sandes’s account of the suffering of those taken prisoner after the surrender of the 
siege of Kut, In Kut and Captivity,698 were being published, Buchanan argued that the 
Mandate was too great a price to pay to civilize ‘the peaceful Arab *whom he had 
seen] behind the battlefront, digging up our graves and throwing our dead about for 
the sake of looting their uniforms and boots’, and concluded that he ‘would rather see 
the British taxpayer’s money spent in this country’.699 It was their reputation for 
behaviour such as this that had caused so much hatred of the Arabs among British 
servicemen and women during the war. The image of unscrupulous Arabs desecrating 
the graves or bodies of loved ones so recently lost would have been a powerful 
disincentive against further British investment – both in lives and money – in 
Mesopotamia. Buchanan’s language gestured towards the savagery attributed to 
Mesopotamia’s Arabs during the war; his sarcastic reference to the ‘peaceful Arab’ 
alluded to the reputation for disloyalty and random violence that Mesopotamians had 
acquired during the war, and subtly reinforced the distance his letter suggested 
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between Arabs and Britons in terms of civilization or progress. Buchanan further 
emphasised the difference he perceived between Britons and Arabs by his repetition 
of the word ‘our’: ‘our graves *...+ our dead’; this repetition, following closely on from 
the emotive image of British dead being looted by Arabs, encouraged an emotional, 
patriotic response from his readership, and reminded them of Buchanan’s core 
argument: that to accept the Mandate proposed at San Remo did not serve ‘our’, 
British, interests, and that those whom it might benefit were neither ready for, nor 





  The revolt of 1920, David Omissi asserts, ‘shook the very foundations of 
British rule in Mesopotamia’.700 In the months after Sir Arnold Wilson was appointed 
acting Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, growing unrest, fed by an attempt by 
nationalists to occupy the city of Mosul in May 1920, festered into a widespread 
rebellion. The revolt had its roots in dissatisfaction with British rule, but soon drew 
supporters from among all those who felt their interests were threatened by the 
prospect of permanent British control in Mesopotamia. Motivated variously by hopes 
of creating a Muslim or Arab state, resistance to the high levels of inflation and 
taxation, and the resentment of ex-Ottoman officials whose jobs were now in British 
hands, the revolt had an enormous impact on the debate on the Mandate in Britain.701  
  A.T. Wilson was widely blamed for losing control of the situation in 
Mesopotamia, but he was restrained at every stage by an indecisive home government 
that neither gave him a policy to follow, nor allowed him to manage the situation as he 
saw fit. With no guidance from London, the acting Civil Commissioner set about finding 
a suitable mode of interim Iraqi government. His idea was to set up a Central 
Legislative Council headed by a High Commissioner. Wilson wrote to London for 
permission to announce this scheme, but was prevented from doing so time and again. 
On 5 May 1920, the government in London issued a statement on the need for an Iraqi 
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civil administration; this aroused nationalist condemnation in Mesopotamia. Arnold 
Wilson once more asked for urgent permission to publish his plans, but was stalled 
once again. By late June 1920 the rising was in progress, and Wilson’s plans had to be 
abandoned.702 
  During the summer of 1920, violent raids spread across Mesopotamia. 
Railway and telegraph lines were vandalised, compromising British communications 
and supply lines. Several British political officers, and some of their wives, were 
kidnapped. Some, including the infamous Colonel Leachman, were killed. The rebels 
commanded large numbers of followers, and were well armed. David Omissi has noted 
that at the height of the rebellion, in August 1920, they ‘fielded about 131 000 men, of 
whom perhaps half were armed with modern rifles’.703 When increasing numbers of 
ground troops failed to suppress the Arab and Kurdish rebels, the Royal Air Force was 
used to bring an end to the rising. As Jafna Cox and others have shown, this set a 
controversial precedent in the methods used to police Mesopotamia. Well into the 
1920s, RAF planes were being used to enforce British taxation policy, often 
indiscriminately killing civilian women and children in their wake.704 Charles Tripp 
estimates that ‘the revolt cost the lives of an estimated 6,000 Iraqis and roughly 500 
British and Indian troops’.705  
  As the summer of 1920 progressed, attention was drawn away from the 
fiscal commitments the British treasury was being asked to make in Mesopotamia to 
the growing violence and the growing list of British casualties. Headlines such as ‘More 
Trouble in Mesopotamia’,706 ‘Mesopotamia Revolt Spreads: 400 British Casualties’,707 
and ‘Anarchy in Mesopotamia: Tribes Hostile and Alert – Extensive Damage to 
Communications’dogged the government.708 With each escalation in violence, the 
garrison in Mesopotamia was enlarged, and the expenditure of the British taxpayer 
increased. By August 1920, The Times declared that Mesopotamia was ‘simmering with 
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insurgence’.709 The newspaper ran a series of editorials criticising the civil 
commissioner, Sir Arnold Wilson, for allowing the situation to become so serious, and 
the government for its spending in Mesopotamia and commitment to accepting the 
Mandate despite the evident resistance from Mesopotamia’s population.  The Times’ 
most vehement criticism was reserved for the decision to allow British women and 
children to move to Mesopotamia before the country was entirely stable. Public 
attention was drawn to the dangers faced by British women and children by the 
capture, in August 1920, of Mrs Buchanan.  
  The paper reported that ‘Mrs Buchanan [...] was captured by the Arabs 
at Shahroban, on the Persian road, when her husband, Mr. E.L. Buchanan, and other 
officers of the Mesopotamian service were killed in action’.710  Mrs Buchanan’s 
husband had served as a Captain in the Royal Flying Corps in France during the war, 
and had been posted to Mesopotamia as Assistant Irrigation Officer. Early reports 
suggested the Buchanans had their son with them and that he too had been taken 
hostage, but he was soon reported to be safe with his grandmother, in London. This 
family’s ordeal focused the public’s attention on the growing violence in Mesopotamia 
– particularly the threat to British women.  In one editorial, The Times compared the 
situation of wives in Mesopotamia to the capture of Lady Florentina Sale following the 
infamous British defeat at Kabul in 1842: 
We may admire the fortitude and devotion of these women, who naturally 
sought to join their husbands, but no words can be too severe in condemnation 
of the folly of sending British wives and children by the hundred to one of the 
most trying climates in the world, and scattering them about a region still 
under military occupation. There has been no precedent for this recklessness 
since the wives of officers were permitted to join their husbands at Kabul 
eighty years ago, and the story of the ultimate sufferings of LADY SALE and her 
companions is well known.711  
 
The story of Lady Sale, to which The Times referred, was also the story of Major-
General William Elphinstone’s infamous defeat in 1842. Having lost Kabul to Afghan 
troops, an ill and elderly Elphinstone was allowed to take the British community and 
camp followers and leave the city. The party of over 16,000 British and Indian men, 
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women and children left Kabul in early January 1842, and in harsh winter conditions 
tried to reach the nearest British-held town of Jellalabad, 90 miles away.712   
  Almost immediately after leaving the city, the party was attacked; only a 
handful of men and women survived. The massacre of so many British troops and 
civilians caused outrage in Britain and India. A small number of officers, including 
Eliphinstone and his deputy, Brigadier John Shelton, Lady Sale and other wives of 
officers, reluctantly surrendered to the Afghan forces, and were held captive in Kabul 
until the autumn of 1842. Lady Sale was rescued by her husband, Sir Robert Sale, and 
her account of her experiences, A Journal of the Disasters in Afghanistan: A Firsthand 
Account by One of the Few Survivors, was published in 1843. The popularity of this 
volume, the infamy of Elphinstone’s surrender and death in captivity, and the scandal 
of the loss of so large a British force ensured that Lady Sale’s story became widely 
known.713  
  The Times’ reference to the trials of Lady Sale would have been deeply 
disturbing to a contemporary audience because of its allusion to the danger to British 
women in Mesopotamia, but also because it suggested that for the second time since 
British forces landed in Mesopotamia they were in danger of a humiliating defeat. In 
his introduction to an edited volume of Lady Sale’s memoir, Patrick Macrory notes that 
the loss of Kabul in 1842 was ‘one of the greatest defeats ever inflicted upon the 
British by an Asian enemy, an ugly massacre and a blow to Britain’s prestige 
unequalled until, one hundred years later almost to the month, Singapore fell to the 
Japanese’.714 The siege of Kut has been described in almost exactly the same terms by 
modern historians; Priya Satia writes of IEF D’s surrender that ‘no other British army 
had surrendered with its colors since the battle of Yorktown in 1781, and none would 
again until Singapore fell in 1942’.715 For The Times’ contemporary audience, the 
parallels between Kut and the loss of Kabul would have been all the more resonant. 
The fears surrounding Mesopotamia in 1920 were, therefore, manifold.  
                                                     
712
 Mowbray Morris, The First Afghan War (London: Sampson Low, 1878), p.87. Morris estimates that 
the party was made up of 4,500 fighting men, only 700 of whom were Europeans, and 12,000 camp 
followers. 
713
 Patrick Macrory writes that the memoir was ‘reprinted four times, a total printing of 7,500 copies’. 
Patrick Macrory, Military Memoirs, Lady Sale: The First Afghan War (London: Longman’s, 1969), pp. xviii- 
xix. 
714
 Macrory, p. ix. 
715
 Priya Satia, ‘Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and Technology in the First 
World War’, Past and Present, 197 (2007), 211-255 (pp.211-212)   
227 
 
  Primarily, many in British political and public life worried about the cost 
of a long-term British commitment to Mesopotamia. Hidden within these concerns, as 
the comments of men such as Lord Islington suggest, was the underlying anxiety for 
British prestige or standing on the world stage. What would happen to Britain’s 
international reputation if commitments in the Middle East revealed the cracks in 
Britain’s control of its empire? Worries about British prestige were heightened by the 
volatile situation in Mesopotamia during the summer of 1920, as scenes of seemingly 
unrestrained violence threatened to undermine Britain’s control, and therefore its 
prestige, in the east. If the ability to guarantee the safety of the most vulnerable in the 
British community was seen as a measure of Britain’s control in that region, it is 
unsurprising that the focus of public apprehension, as described in the contemporary 





  Many of the anxieties of this period were captured in fictional 
representations of the years between the Armistice and the coronation of Faisal. Maud 
L. Eade’s The Tawny Desert (1929)716 and F.S. Brereton’s Scouts of the Baghdad Patrols 
(1921) are both set during the years between Armistice and coronation.717 Although 
very different in genre, style and readership, both novels reflect the uncertainty that 
characterised British attitudes towards Mesopotamia in this period and capture the 
altered nature of post-war British perceptions of Mesopotamia. It is through these two 
texts that I would like to trace the changes in British perceptions of Mesopotamia in 
this period more closely. Both novels depict Mesopotamia at its most unstable. During 
the war, Britons described Mesopotamia as a place characterised by its shifting 
allegiances, shifting landscapes, and uncontrollable or unbearable weather conditions. 
In the post-war years, Mesopotamia was in a state of flux, rendering a region already 
characterised by instability in the British imagination all the more so.  
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  Frederick S. Brereton’s Scouts of the Baghdad Patrols is a boys’ 
adventure story set predominantly in post-war Baghdad. Mick Dent, an upstanding 
young British man, has been orphaned during the war. He travels out to Mesopotamia 
to join his uncle’s thriving business. Upon his arrival, he establishes the first Scout 
troop in the city. Mick’s Scouts accept boys of many different ethnic backgrounds: 
Swedes, Spaniards, Irishmen and Welshmen, ‘Armenian boys of decidedly Jewish 
appearance, three Arabs, the son of the Turkish official before-mentioned, and a host 
of other youngsters *…+’.718 Mick sets about training his recruits, ‘boys, dressed 
practically like soldiers’, to act as a self-appointed police force in Baghdad. During the 
course of the novel, the boys encounter a gang of evil Arab criminals; among other 
lawless activities, the gang is bent on appropriating the business run by Mick’s uncle, 
Samuel Dent, by unscrupulous means.  When the boys humiliate the criminals, the 
Arab gang is ordered to kill all the boys in the Baghdad patrols. Risking life and limb, 
the boys help Baghdad’s ineffectual (native) police force to find the gang and arrest 
them, saving Samuel Dent’s business and several lives along the way. 
  Brereton’s narrative is imbued with the anticipation of the coming 
violence of the rebellion. Baghdad’s population is depicted as gratuitously violent. As 
one of the boys, Jack, explains:  
In England, I understand, a murderer is looked upon with horror; in my country, 
Spain, [...] a murderer is hunted down promptly; but in Mesopotamia a knife 
thrust is common, these natives are intensely cruel in many cases, and while 
decent people wouldn’t think of cutting the throat of a harmless Scout, a native 
here would rejoice in the act, if he thought he had reason for it; for instance, if 
he wanted to revenge himself. 719   
The people of Baghdad, therefore, are neither ‘decent’ nor, Jack suggests, would they 
hesitate at cutting the throat of ‘harmless Scout’.  Jack’s speech paints Baghdad’s 
population as sadistic: ‘rejoicing’ in inflicting pain on a group of children doing no harm 
at all.  
  The violence described here and throughout the novel is central to 
Brereton’s plot. Scouts of the Baghdad Patrols turns upon a group of grown Arab men 
hunting down and trying to murder a group of young, unarmed boys. Only once is the 
threat of the revolt made explicit; Brereton’s narrator notes that ‘almost every day 
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brought its tale of Arab uprisings, of the cutting off of some convoy or isolated station, 
of an attack upon the railway running up from Basra, and of other acts of violence’.720 
However, in the midst of almost unceasing description of Arab violence and duplicity, 
this mention of the revolt is hardly noteworthy. This unrelentingly violent image of 
Mesopotamia’s inhabitants has its roots in wartime accounts of Mesopotamia’s 
inhabitants, as Brereton’s narrator explains:  
Mesopotamia was still a country filled with dangers to the British [...]. 
Malcontents, who had troubled the Turks by acting as marauders, and who 
now that the British had come were thorns in the flesh, [...] were forever 
carrying out some unlawful expedition.721  
 
Here the link to the war is made explicit with references to the behaviour of the Arabs 
during the campaign. In a continuation of wartime descriptions, the Arabs in this 
account continue to be characterised by fickle or non-existent loyalties, and are 
harassing British forces, where once they hounded the Turks. Wartime accounts 
frequently described gangs of Arabs as ‘marauding’; using such vocabulary in the novel 
reiterates the link with these perceptions of Mesopotamia’s inhabitants. The fact that 
violence continues in Mesopotamia despite the fact that the country is nominally at 
peace suggests that such behaviour is an inherent part of Mesopotamian society, 
rather than a reaction to the war.  
  The duplicity of Arabs is embodied in this novel by the character of 
Selim. One of Samuel Dent’s trusted employees, Selim works with the evil Mahmud to 
kidnap Dent and force him to sign his business over to Selim. Luckily, Sam Dent is 
rescued by his nephew and his friend Sandy – cunningly disguised as Arabs. The 
duplicity of the Arab is uncomplicated: he simply is not the loyal employee he pretends 
to be. By contrast, the boys’ ability to disguise themselves and to shift seamlessly 
between races and even genders is a more empowering shape-shifting.  As with the 
wartime stories in which a British soldier ‘became’ an Arab, these transformations 
mirror the doubled nature of the Arab as defined during the war, but they also 
transform what is essentially a destabilizing and unsettling characteristic of 
Mesopotamia’s people into a skill that enables British protagonists to take control of 
an unstable situation and make it safe once more.  
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  In Scouts of the Baghdad Patrols, it is at the Arch of Ctesiphon that the 
boys first encounter a group of Arab thieves reminiscent of Ali Baba’s motley crew. The 
thieves trap the children in a small cave, and their leader orders his men to kill them 
all: ‘“See” he yelled. “They do not fire, these infants. They are afraid to handle rifles. 
Then they are unarmed! Slaughter every one of them.”’722 The children’s youth and 
innocence is highlighted in their description as ‘infants’ – even younger and more 
helpless children than they really are. The innate violence of the Arab, on the other 
hand, is here reflected in the villain’s expectation that young children be able to handle 
firearms, and in his ordering the children’s murder even though he believes them to be 
entirely unarmed.  
  Brereton’s novel traces several of the changing conceptions of 
Mesopotamia itself and of its inhabitants. One of the most notable changes brought to 
the fore in Scouts of the Baghdad Patrols is the impact the war has had upon sites in 
Mesopotamia. Like the servicemen and women discussed in Chapter Four, Brereton’s 
characters and narrator have changed their descriptions of Mesopotamian landmarks. 
Some, such as the Arch of Ctesiphon, have come to signify an entirely new set of 
cultural references, rooted in the war.  
  The Arch is described several times in Brereton’s novel, and serves as a 
key site of action for his protagonists. The descriptions of the Arch highlight the extent 
to which it has become defined in Britain by the story of Townshend’s advance to 
Baghdad. The boys hint that the Arch may have had some significance before it 
became associated with Townshend; they describe it on two occasions as ‘the old, 
broken-down tomb of some almost forgotten Caliph who ruled in these parts’723 and 
as ‘the ancient tomb of the long-extinct Caliph’,724 but both these references to a past 
beyond Townshend’s involvement are vague and barely accurate. The Arch was not a 
‘tomb’, unless we think of it in the terms described by Pope-Hennessy as the burial 
place of Townshend’s men and the men who followed in their steps in the advance 
towards Baghdad on 1917; the ‘Caliph’ to whom the boys misleadingly attribute the 
Arch is ‘long-extinct’ or ‘almost-forgotten’. These descriptions accurately reflect the 
shift in British perceptions of this historical site. The Arch’s history – the kings, soldiers 
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and Caliphs who had made it interesting for earlier travellers – have become 
irrelevant, and the Arch of Ctesiphon has assumed a new significance: one almost 
entirely concerned with Charles Townshend and the 6th Division’s contribution to 
Britain’s war effort.   
  The boys even go on a trip to the Arch to trace Townshend’s advance – 
a tourist-trail parody of the advance of the soldiers two years before: 
That’s Kut-el Amara up there, where Townshend and his gallant division held 
out for so many starving months, and beyond we shall be able to trace his line 
of advance right up to Ctesiphon, where he fought, and, incidentally, where the 
reinforced British army, which later invaded the country, broke up the Turkish 
line at Kut, and later captured Baghdad. You will find that city an interesting 
place Tom – far better, far cleaner and sweeter now that it is British.725  
 
Mick’s description could be that of a teacher on a trip with a group of school children, 
or even that of a tourist guide. The significance of both Kut al-Amara and the Arch have 
here become suffused with the story of Townshend and his men. As ever, Brereton 
does not miss a chance to praise the influence of British rule, emphasising the 
improvements to Kut to his young readership. Just as newspaper accounts of 
Townshend and his men in the wake of the surrender of Kut had done, Brereton’s 
characters erase any negative associations: only the positive aspects of Townshend’s 
advance are reproduced. 
  Race or ethnic identity plays an important role in the novel, with each of 
the main characters representing his ‘people’. Whilst a predictable hierarchy of races 
operates within the novel, the inclusion of boys from so many different ethnic 
backgrounds serves to highlight the complex approaches to difference – whether 
European or otherwise – within the novel. Evan, for example, is Welsh. He is good-
humouredly called ‘Effan’ by the boys, because that is how he pronounces his own 
name. This draws attention to Evan’s ethnicity throughout the novel. Juan Alvarez’s 
name is deemed unpronounceable and immediately changed to John, and then to the 
more familiar Jack. Juan’s name is anglicised to the point of unrecognisability.  The 
‘Dutch boy Scout’s’ name, meanwhile, gets no mention at all: he is called ‘Jim, simply 
because his own particular name was unpronounceable. It was Jim, the Dutch Boy 
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Scout, Van something or other in his native country, but christened Jim for the sake of 
convenience’.726  
  The boys’ heterogeneous identities are subsumed into a British, martial, 
imperial identity embodied in the Boy Scout movement. This can be read as a 
metaphor for empire: the scouts see themselves as embracing difference and 
spreading values of discipline, hard-work, and logical reasoning. However, this is 
ultimately an all-subsuming, self-serving exercise. There is no real parity between 
Europeans and non-Europeans, or between British boys and other Europeans; rather, 
an immediate hierarchy is installed. The boys elect Mick as their leader, with high 
hopes of finding that: 
[A] noble heart beats under the dusky skins of the brats you see in Baghdad. If 
they could be caught young and trained young, and fine ideas could be pumped 
into their heads at the impressionable age, they might grow up honest, decent, 
gallant citizens, unharmed by other influences which might surround them.727  
In her introduction to Robert Baden-Powell’s Scouting for Boys, Elleke Boehmer argues 
that the Boy Scout movement had its roots in the insecurities engendered in Britain by 
the Boer War. Part of the movement’s appeal, she notes, was its pre-occupation with 
creating good, strong, martial young boys from all classes, who would go on to serve 
the empire. Boehmer explains that: 
Modelled on the hardy colonial frontiersman, the ideal Scout, disciplined and 
self-sacrificing, is also set up as the culmination point of a mythical lineage of 
British national history: he embodies the virtu and honour of the medieval 
knight, the stout-hearted courage of the Elizabethan explorer. [...] Scouting will 
be to imperial Britain the training in discipline and patriotism that latter-day 
imperial Rome so woefully lacked.728  
 
Boehmer’s interest is in locating the driving forces in Edwardian society that made 
Scouting so popular in the early twentieth century. The Scouts of Brereton’s novel 
certainly aspire to the characteristics she identifies, and, as I have argued, their drive 
to be good British imperial agents – representing the very best of their people in the 
east and hoping to convert young Arab boys before they become tainted by the 
eastern habits – is made explicit in the novel. If, as Boehmer asserts, scouting was in 
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part made popular by fears over Britain’s imperial standing at the turn of the century, 
then we can read its centrality to this post-war vision of Mesopotamia – set in the year 
Britain was debating the possibility of taking on the responsibility of the 
Mesopotamian Mandate without ‘losing prestige’, to use Lord Islington’s words – as an 
assertion that, unlike Rome, Britain continued to produce young men of good stock 
who were willing and eager to take on the imperial mantel.  
  Maud L. Eades’s The Tawny Desert: A Romance of the I.W.T. [...] in 
Mesopotamia is, at its heart, a love story. It begins with a young, brave Englishwoman 
in distress: Sheila Hereford is stranded in the desert, surrounded by Arabs. Captain 
Mervyn Manners, a quietly heroic ‘Britisher’ liked and respected by his colleagues at 
the Inland Water Transport section of the Royal Engineers, comes to her rescue. When 
Sheila – still in the nightdress she was wearing when her brother, Major Clifford 
Hereford’s, ship came under attack – and Mervyn (recently shot by Arabs in the 
attempt to rescue Miss Hereford) meet, it is love at first sight.  Unfortunately, Mervyn 
is already engaged to Electra Mordaunt, a nurse and wartime colleague of Sheila’s in 
Bombay. Electra is everything Sheila is not: unfaithful, immoral and duplicitous. While 
Mervyn loyally attempts to repress his true love for Sheila in order to honour his 
engagement to Electra, Electra herself is cavorting with other officers and casting 
aspersions on Sheila’s unblemished reputation. In the course of the novel, Mervyn 
escapes several attempts on his life by an evil Arab, and is saved from an unfair 
convictione of the brutal beating of his Indian cook, Ventakaswamy, (actually beaten 
by the aforementioned Arab) only by Sheila’s intervention. Meanwhile, Sheila is busy 
rebuffing the advances of married colonels and generally spreading morality wherever 
she goes (Colonel Lewcam and Electra Mordaunt are saved by her intervention from 
lives of sin). Predictably, the novel ends with the happy marriage of Sheila Hereford 
and Mervyn Manners. 
                Although the reader’s attention is focused primarily on the love story at 
the centre of the narrative, the setting of the novel is far from insignificant. 
Mesopotamia lends romance and exoticism to the novel. The title situates it in the 
desert, suggesting to a female audience familiar with E. M. Hull’s best-selling novel, 
The Sheik, a vast expanse of uncharted territory, far-removed from the modernity or 
civilization of Europe, and populated by dark, elegant, noble – but wild – shaikhs and 
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their harems.729 The desert represented the epitome of romance and exoticism. The 
threat to British control of Mesopotamia forms an important part of the tension 
created by Eades in this novel. Although the ‘tawny desert’ could refer to any number 
of desert locations, the novel is specifically located in Mesopotamia during the revolt 
of 1920. A preface by Brigadier-General Hughes (Director of the Inland Water 
Transport in Mesopotamia) attested to the novel’s verisimilitude, and reminded 
readers that the events in The Tawny Desert unfold just as ‘one of the most serious 
catastrophes to British arms was only very narrowly averted, the magnitude of which 
was little realised by the general public at the time’.730  
  A sense of unease pervades the narrative of The Tawny Desert from its 
opening sequence: 
Silence! Gripping; absolute. The brooding, speechless silence that precedes the 
dawn. *…+ Suddenly within the womb of that impenetrable darkness there was 
movement, soundless as the stirring of the yet unborn. A minute of time swung 
into the past. Then a shadow, another, even five shadows for a brief moment 
blurred into the surrounding obscurity. Phantoms of the night maybe – flitting 
shades of ill omen.731  
 
The Arabs of Mesopotamia are fantastical, ghoulish figures in this passage: ‘phantoms 
of the night *...+ flitting shades of ill omen’. Stripped of any humanity, these Arabs, like 
those in Brereton’s novel, embody the very worst of the stereotypes that had 
characterised them in wartime accounts of Mesopotamia: a dangerous, unconstrained 
and unpredictable presence, bringing nothing but ‘ill omen’ in their wake. During the 
war, the ‘roaming hordes’ of Arab horsemen were a threat to a predominantly male, 
military population, but in this post-war period they take on a new guise as a danger to 
unarmed, civilian British women. Here Eades uses imagery that is suggestive of new 
beginnings: a dawn about to break, a birth about to take place. However, rather than 
signifying hope, these new beginnings are shrouded in deep apprehension. The silence 
that precedes the dawn is a ‘foreboding’ one, and the pregnant womb described holds 
nothing but darkness and shadowy, supernatural presences. What is being born in The 
Tawny Desert is not a new country, but an insurrection.  
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  Liminality is one of the central themes of The Tawny Desert, and serves 
as a metaphor for Mesopotamia at this time. Mesopotamia is neither British, nor 
controlled by any other authority, be it French, Turkish or Arab. The Mandates 
awarded by the League of Nations in 1920 were not formally approved by the League’s 
council until July 1923.732  It is, in this period, as the characters of the Tawny Desert 
assert throughout, a place nominally at peace, but actually still at war. Finally, it is a 
place in transition, a country not yet born. Its people, the novel suggests, stand at the 
crossroads between ancient and modern, east and west, between Arab nationalism 
and British tutelage.  
  The people of Mesopotamia, generally referred to simply as Arabs, are 
also characterised by a doubling. In British wartime accounts, this doubling was most 
often a mark of Arab duplicity. However, in this post-war vision of Mesopotamia, the 
doubling that characterised Arabs in the wartime British imagination becomes more 
complex, incorporating British representations of ‘the Arab’ well entrenched before 
the war as well as new wartime ideas about Mesopotamia’s peoples. Sheila remarks 
that the Arabs:  
Are too strong, too virile a race to love their conquerors; but they can hide this 
well under a proud and calm exterior. They are potential volcanoes; quiet on 
the surface, in their outward placidity. But the fires are there, within, ready to 
leap forth in a moment.733  
 
Sheila’s description draws on pre-war ideas of the Arabs as a proud, ‘virile’ race of 
warriors. This romantic vision of the Bedouin Arabs, originating in the writing of men 
like Sir Richard Burton, was rarely applied to Mesopotamia’s Arab population during 
the war. It is perhaps the romantic nature of Eades’s narrative that leads her to include 
it here. Sheila’s description also reflects the political situation in Mesopotamia in 1920; 
despite appearances to the contrary, Mesopotamia – here represented by its 
inhabitants – is a volcano about to erupt. References to burning fires within, with an 
innate ability to ‘leap forth in a moment’, evoke images of magical shape-shifting 
creatures from the tales of A Thousand and One Nights but they also  conjure a familiar 
vision of the Arab as over-sexed, and reaffirm the fickle, ever-changing nature of Arab 
loyalties depicted in British accounts during the war. 
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   Shaikh Mesjed el Mansuric embodies the multi-faceted nature of Arabs 
hinted at above. Exiled to Bombay during the war for his anti-British behaviour, he now 
embodies both British tastes and Arab values. Among his own ‘wild’ people, Mansuric 
is an imposing presence,734 his ‘veneer of the West’ replaced by a ‘calm and dignified’ 
countenance and a ‘commanding personality completely dominating that wild and 
fierce-looking horde of ruffians’ who adored him as their ‘prince’.735 The ‘veneer of 
West’, however, seems to run a little deeper than is first suggested. Mansuric is a fan 
of the Nasiriyah races, and: 
Alone with these British people whose friendship he believed in and valued, 
Mansuric was a charming companion. His reserve was let in the other room 
with his aba, and the conversation never flagged. He relished a friendly glass of 
wine when secure from the prying and condemnatory eye of his own people. 
With his guard absent he was free to enjoy himself.736  
 
Mansuric serves several important functions in Eades’s narrative. As Mathew Paris has 
argued in relation to boys’ adventure stories during the war, authors felt it necessary 
to include ‘one noble native who becomes a loyal follower of the Allies’ in order to 
reflect the descriptions of the heroic Arabs who had risen in support of the Allies 
during the war.737 Here, Mansuric falls into Paris’s definition: he is loyal to the British 
and wishes to see them continue to rule in Mesopotamia. Moreover, Mansuric is no 
ordinary Arab; he is a noble shaikh, depicted as aristocratic in his manners and 
behaviour. As Toby Dodge has shown, the British authorities put much faith in men like 
him, believing them to be ‘untainted by modernity’: decent and loyal and the best 
leaders and representatives of their own peoples, they became both the 
representatives of their tribe and the collectors of the British revenue.738 Nevertheless, 
the stark contrast between Mansuric and his people is telling. Mansuric has only been 
converted to these sophisticated tastes by British imprisonment, before which he 
himself was a rogue not dissimilar to the ‘fierce-looking horde of ruffians’ whom he 
ruled.739 In Eades’s novel, the vast majority of Arabs conform to this wartime 
stereotype of the Arab. The continued use of the word ‘horde’ reflects its prevalence in 
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wartime literature and letters. It evokes an image of a primitive, barely control 
violence moving at will through Mesopotamia.  
  In much the same way as a stark distinction is drawn between Mansuric 
and his people, the novel also distinguishes between male and female Arab views on 
Britain and on British involvement in post-war Mesopotamia. The presence of British 
women and their centrality to the plot brings into clearer focus the role of 
Mesopotamian women. Though Mesopotamian women featured in many wartime 
accounts, in Eades’s novel they take on a greater significance. While the men of 
Mesopotamia vacillate in their loyalties and are characterised by fickleness and 
unpredictability, the women, the novel suggests, reveal the true hatred of British rule 
felt by Mesopotamians. It is Sheila Hereford who identifies Mesopotamian women’s 
hatred for Britons. The narrator describes Sheila’s impressions of the people of 
Mesopotamia. While the Arabs (here signifying only Arab men, just as they did in 
Louisa Jebb’s travelogue) ‘fascinated her even while they repelled her’, the Arab 
women frightened Sheila: 740 
But the women, the Arab women in their rich-hued draperies and jangling 
bangles, had affected her to a peculiar degree. She had wondered what lay 
hidden in the depths of their dark, flashing eyes, black as sloes; then, as their 
sinister glances had bored into hers, she had experienced a sudden recoil. It 
was as if a veil had been withdrawn, revealing to the white girl passions crude 
and elemental, savagery cruel and terrible. 741 
 
Sheila’s penetrating gaze ‘unveils’ both the Arab woman and her true feelings towards 
Britain. The imagery used is Manichean: the Arab woman’s exoticism (symbolised by 
her veil and the passions she reveals to Sheila) is dark – her eyes ‘black as sloes’. 
Words such as ‘crude’, ‘elemental’ and ‘savage’ suggest she is racially backward, while 
the attendant ‘cruel and terrible’ passions conveyed in the ‘sinister gaze’ are in stark 
contrast to Sheila Hereford’s whiteness, invoked to suggest innocence but also a 
higher, purer racial identity. The Tawny Desert can be read as a ‘woman’s-eye-view’ of 
the situation in Mesopotamia in the summer of 1920. In the novel, women of both 
races represent the true characteristics of their respective race; they are depicted as 
representatives figures: their virtues and flaws reflecting those of their peoples.  
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  Sheila Hereford is the embodiment of the virtues of British women: she 
is fair (in both senses of the word), brave, loyal, and her Christian morals are 
impeccable.  Indeed, Sheila, opposed from the beginning of the novel to the ‘exotic’ 
and likened in the same description to an ‘English garden’, can be said symbolise 
Britain in the novel.742 When an Arab mistreats his horse at the races, it is Sheila, 
representing a British love of animals, who, regardless of any danger to herself, runs 
onto the track to prevent him from whipping the animal. Sheila does not simply 
represent the virtues every good, moral Englishwoman should have, but particularly 
one who is a representative of her sex and country in a foreign land.  
  At several points during the novel, the reader’s attention is drawn to 
the fact of Sheila’s ‘whiteness’. When Electra suggests to Mervyn that she did not 
associate with Sheila because of her inappropriate relationship with a certain colonel 
while a nurse in Bombay, Mervyn is infuriated by ‘her beastly attack on the flaming 
whiteness of Sheila’.743 This is one of several occasions where Sheila is defined by her 
‘whiteness’, signifying, as it does in this instance, both her race and her sexual and 
moral purity ‘flaming’ bright. In a later passage, Eades situates this specifically within 
the colonial setting. Sheila is mortified when she realises that Mervyn had been led to 
believe that it was she, and not Electra, who had had an affair with Colonel Lewcam in 
Bombay. Heart-broken and dismayed by his low opinion of her, Sheila begins her walk 
home through the streets of Amarah: 
Approaching was a group of Arabs. They were staring with curious eyes at this 
English girl, so terribly white, and as one distraught.  
 Instantly, with that alien gaze upon her, the strange instinct of British 
pride and reserve fell upon her as a mantle. With head held high, straight as a 
sapling, so she went. [...] Her world might crash about her ears, but it behoved 
her present a calm front and smiling face. The Arabs had brought that fact 
home to her. But in her heart was a cold despair like unto death.744  
 
Once again, Eades calls attention to Sheila’s whiteness – here indicating her perturbed 
mental state, but also drawing attention to her racial difference from the Arabs whose 
‘alien gaze’ surrounds her. Sheila’s whiteness draws the attention of the Arab men, but 
it is also her whiteness, in a racial sense, that causes her to recall that she is a 
representative of her country and her race, and that, as such, she could not under any 
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circumstances present anything but an entirely composed and dignified countenance 
before the ‘alien gaze’. 
  The liminality or hybridity that runs right through The Tawny Desert is 
also to be found in the type of society being formed in Mesopotamia’s newly 
established British communities. The community starting to take root in 
Mesopotamia’s towns is reminiscent of the British communities in India under the Raj. 
The characters use Indian shorthand phrases: guests are invited to take ‘tiffin’ 
(lunch),745 and servants are asked to serve ‘chota hazri’ (breakfast or morning tea).746 
The very presence of Indian troops and servants, and the linguistic shorthand that they 
enable, evokes an atmosphere akin to that of British India.  
  However, Eades is also careful to distinguish this community from those 
of India, and to locate it specifically in Mesopotamia. She refers readers briefly to what 
used to be the defining attributes of the region: the desert, the biblical and iconic Tigris 
and Euphrates, the Garden of Eden, Babylon, the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia 
and Baghdad, and the Arabian Nights stories associated with it. In addition to the 
Indian servants, the recently arrived wives of officers employ Arab servants until the 
political situation makes their employment untenable. Gesturing towards more recent 
symbols of Mesopotamia in the post-war British imagination, Eades also emphasises 
Mesopotamia as the novel’s location through constant references to the war and its 
aftermath: Mervin is attacked not on any bridge, but on the MacMunn Bridge, ‘named 
after General MacMunn’ who served in Mesopotamia during the War and commanded 
the forces in Mesopotamia after the Armistice between May 1919 and January 
1920.747 Through these references, a picture is painted of a new British expatriate 
community: one that has not yet settled in its new home, but whose standards and 
habits were already guided by the conventions of colonial life as defined elsewhere in 
the British Empire.  
  While the nature of British communities themselves reflected the 
uncertainty that characterised Mesopotamia at this time, the instability of the region is 
highlighted by the fact that, as in Brereton’s novel, Mesopotamia was a place where 
conflict continued to escalate despite its nominal peace. Eades’s narrator and 
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protagonists hint regularly that, while Britons in Mesopotamia had rejoiced in the 
cessation of hostilities and felt safe enough to begin to form an expatriate community 
that included their wives and children, all was not as stable as it should have been in 
Mesopotamia in 1920. On the surface, the British community is depicted as extremely 
settled: the reader follows the action at the Nasiriyah races and ‘the club’ at Amarah, 
where a small but flourishing community all know and socialise with one another. Even 
the bazaars seem to have tailored their ways to suit the tastes of English ladies who 
now patronise them. But Eades hints throughout that this seemingly secure 
community is really in serious danger.  
  Just as the twists and turns of Sheila and Mervyn’s romance reach their 
climax, the sense of foreboding in Mesopotamia turns to actual violence, and the 
British community begins to worry. In the domestic setting of the novel, this manifests 
itself in the firing of Arab servants, who are no longer trusted not to turn on their 
mistresses, and in the circumscription of the movements of the women of the 
community. Young Burney tells Sheila that her brother does not want her to go to the 
Bazaar unaccompanied: ‘“He’s not feeling too sure of these Arabs, you know.”’748 The 
British women on whom the novel focuses receive news of the growing violence 
through the papers or, in a censored form, from their husbands or brothers.  
  Despite fears for their safety, British stoicism prevails. Eades describes 
how ‘*while+ the rising did not extend to Amara, the atmosphere was electric, pregnant 
with a seething unrest. For the little handful of Britishers life went on, to outward 
seeming, much as usual’.749 Once again, Eades uses the image of a pregnancy to allude 
to the coming violence. Nevertheless, the ‘British pluck’ the narrator admiringly notes 
in these remarks, demonstrated by Sheila in her encounter with the Arabs earlier in 
the novel and by Mervyn when he is wrongly accused, is the same as that of the scouts 
in Brereton’s novel. Central to both texts is a British resilience and determination to 
overcome the troubles of Empire-making. It is this stoicism that both novels celebrate. 
Even The Times grudgingly ‘admire*d+ the fortitude and devotion of these women’ who 
had travelled across the world to establish families and a British community in what 
the paper described as ‘one of the most trying climates in the world’.750 These texts 
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suggest that while British politicians might have been warning of the dire 
consequences of over-extending Britain’s responsibilities in the Middle East, for some 





  In these novels, the already sinister wartime vision of the Arabs as a 
predatory race that preyed on the defenceless – prisoners in their care, wounded on 
the battlefield, or even the bodies of the dead – takes its most threatening and amoral 
form as British women or children, not British servicemen, become the target of Arab 
violence. Pre-war ideas of Mesopotamia had not disappeared in representations of 
Mesopotamia in the years 1918-1921, but they had certainly receded to the 
background. In these years, as the ‘land between the rivers’ ceased be defined in 
Britain by a name rooted in classical antiquity, Mesopotamia, its people also acquired a 
new identity in British accounts, one with its roots in the most modern of conflicts. 
Although pre-war ideas about Mesopotamia were used to ground the reader, it is the 
war-time vision of Mesopotamia that is predominant: one in which its people are 
violent and untrustworthy, and their allegiance can never be trusted for very long. The 
decisions Britain made about its relationship with Mesopotamia in the years 1918-
1921 would shape the future state of Iraq, but they also irrevocably changed Britain’s 
perceptions of, and relationship with, Mesopotamia itself.  It is beyond the purview of 
this thesis to link these post-war representations of Mesopotamia to emerging British 
policy at this time. It seems relevant, nevertheless, that a British policy of 
indiscriminate communal punishment by air bombardment should emerge in the very 






Figure 7. Richard C. Carline, Siege of Kut-el-Amara Seen From the Air, 1919. British Maurice-Farman 
Aeroplane Approaching, Attacked by Enemy Fokker , (1919), Imperial War Museum. 
The image reproduced above is a painting by Richard Carline. He and his brother, 
Sydney, were sent to Mesopotamia as official war artists during the war. Many of their 
paintings, like this one, represent Mesopotamia from the air – a modern vision of a 
region that was soon to lose its antiquated name. I have argued that the First World 
War transformed British perceptions of Mesopotamia. Carline’s painting brings 
together many of the attributes that had come to define the region by the end of the 
war. Although the painting is of a Mesopotamian town, its subject is actually the 
British war effort: not Kut al-Amara itself, but the siege of Kut. As I have shown, the 
siege of Kut came to define the formerly anonymous Mesopotamian town for Britons: 
it does so here, as it did in so many British accounts of the campaign. The very choice 
of the siege of Kut as the subject for Carline’s painting reaffirms its place as one of the 
defining events of the Mesopotamian campaign in Britain.  
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  Carline offers the viewer an aerial ‘snapshot’ of both the landscape and, 
crucially, an attacking German Fokker. We can also see the wing of the plane in which 
we imagine the artist sketching the scene. The presence of both aeroplanes places the 
viewer in the middle of a battle, reinforcing the wartime setting of Carline’s painting, 
but also the modern nature of the warfare taking place in the skies of a place 
associated in Britain the with the battles of ancient kings. The land that could be 
neither accurately mapped nor effectively navigated by British servicemen is here 
presented in a format reminiscent of the aerial maps that transformed the latter half 
of the Mesopotamian campaign. The modernity of the aerial view is palpable; in a real 
sense as well as a metaphorical one, Mesopotamia’s skies had ceased to be filled with 
flying carpets in the British imagination. The skies of a region that would soon become 
a training ground for the youngest of the British armed forces, the Royal Air Force, are 
here aptly filled with a far more modern flying machine.  
  This thesis charts changing British perceptions of Mesopotamia 
between the years 1907 and 1921. It argues that the First World War can be seen as a 
turning point in the way Mesopotamia was perceived and represented in Britain. I 
argue that in the years preceding the war, Mesopotamia took on new significance in 
Britain as a site of Anglo-German imperial rivalry and as a potential source of oil. The 
travelogues of those British travellers whose accounts I examine suggest that they 
struggled to reconcile their impressions of Mesopotamia as a backward oriental 
despotism with the achievements of its past civilizations. In order to deal with this 
incongruence, they appropriated what they saw as laudable in Mesopotamia’s history 
as the precursor of their own, western civilization, and dismissed contemporary 
Mesopotamian culture as afflicted by the flaws that they believed typified ‘the Orient’.  
              This project suggests that scientific theories of race and civilization 
were central to the ways in which British servicemen understood Mesopotamia’s 
peoples and their Indian colleagues in the first two years of the war. In a region where 
they felt a greater fear of the local population than of their Ottoman adversaries, these 
discourses allowed British men and women working under circumstances of extreme 
pressure, with limited resources, to feel a degree of control.  I argue that fears about 
‘British Prestige in the East’ were an important motivation for the despatch of IEF D. 
These anxieties – made clear in the archives of the Mesopotamia Commission but also 
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in contemporary political debates – brought to the fore apprehensions about Britain’s 
existing empire.   
                In the final two years of the war, a better-funded and expanded force 
was able to occupy northern Mesopotamia. In order to do so, British commanders built 
an infrastructure that transformed the region. In modernising Mesopotamia, this 
project asserts, they fulfilled the wishes of pre-war travellers, and de-mystified an area 
resented by British servicemen and women for its alienating opacity. Finally, the years 
between the Armistice and the coronation of Faisal in August 1921 established a new 
conception of Mesopotamia in Britain. The Arab Rebellion of 1920 confirmed wartime 
British perceptions of Mesopotamia as a place populated by fickle, lawless hordes with 
no loyalty or honour. In short, the First World War removed Mesopotamia from the 
myth, fable and antiquity that had characterized ‘the land between the rivers’ in the 
British imagination, and located it definitively within the realm of early-twentieth-
century politics. 
  The limitations of time and space have left several questions to be taken 
up by future research. More remains to be said about what events in the Middle East 
tell us about Britain’s changing relationship with India in these years. Briton Cooper 
Busch, Toby Dodge, Peter Sluglett and Priya Satia have examined how British India 
influenced the creation of the Iraqi state; but how did the British Raj influence the way 
in which the British community in Mesopotamia/Iraq saw the region and interacted 
with it? How, in other words, did experiences elsewhere in the empire influence the 
way Britons perceived the new colonies of the early-twentieth century, such as Iraq? 
The work of Santanu Das, Dewitt Ellinwood and Satyendra Pradhan, and David Omissi 
has done, and continues to do, much to bring the long-silent voices of Indian 
servicemen into our understanding of the First World War.751 Recently, Michèle 
Barrett’s work on the failings of the Imperial War Graves Commission to live up to its 
commitment to commemorate those who gave their lives in the service of Britain 
without distinction ‘on account of military or civil rank, race or creed’ has begun 
exploring how Imperial troops were perceived and treated by Britain in the aftermath 
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of the war.752 More work remains to be done, however, on the perception of these 
servicemen in Britain during the war. Finally, an analysis of British perceptions of the 
nascent Iraqi state during the years of the British Mandate remains a fruitful avenue 
for future research.  
  In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it seems that we in 
Britain are once again taking an interest not in Iraq, but in Mesopotamia. When 
Mesopotamia became a battlefield of the First World War, it ceased to be an abstract 
concept and became an everyday reality for Britons; it seems that this most recent 
British and American military occupation of Iraq is reviving an interest in an older, 
more distant vision of ‘the land between the rivers’.  In 2003, the British Museum saw 
a rise in the number of visitors to its impressive Mesopotamian collections. In an 
article in The Times in March that year, John Curtis, keeper of the Department of the 
Ancient Near East, told the paper that ‘with Iraq being so much in the news, people are 
wanting to find out something about it.’753 In the world of business, too, it seems that 
it pays to remember Iraq’s ancient history: when in 2005 three British businessmen set 
up a petroleum company to work on the oilfields of Iraq, they called it the 
Mesopotamia Petroleum Company. The British Museum’s recent exhibition, Babylon: 
Myth and Reality, is a testament to the continuing interest of the British public in the 
ancient history of Iraq. Barry Unsworth’s 2009 novel Land of Marvels is set in 
Mesopotamia just before the outbreak of the First World War. In Unsworth’s novel, 
Mesopotamia is defined by its ancient history and its status as a site of Anglo-German 
rivalry in relation to the Baghdad railway and as a site of global rivalry for its valuable 
oil reserves.754  
  The occupation of Iraq in 2003 has revived British interest not just in 
modern-day Iraq, but in the land of the Assyrian, Babylonian, Akkadian and Sumerian 
kingdoms known in Britain for centuries as Mesopotamia.  As Hollywood gears up for a 
new film adaptation of the Arabian Nights stories, perhaps a new generation is 
beginning to think of Baghdad not just in terms of suicide bombs, dictators and 
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sectarian violence, but as the place where once there ruled a caliph called Harun al-
Rashid, who became famous in the west not only as the ruler of one of the most 
powerful and sophisticated civilizations of its day, but also for his adventures in 
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